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## INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

Why Nations Differ in Military Skill (And How That Should Affect U.S. Defense Planning)

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#### **PREFACE**

This research was conducted under the Independent Research Program of the Institute for Defense Analyses.

The authors owe thanks to several people who generously assisted our efforts. Prof. Herbert K. Tilemma of the University of Missouri made available his dataset on foreign military interventions. Prof. Patrick J. McGowan of Arizona State University made available his data on coups. Ms. Mary D. Hinkle, a government specialist on China, made many helpful suggestions in our research on the scholarship on Chinese civil-military relations. Prof. Stephen D. Biddle of the University of North Carolina, adjunct member of the IDA staff, and our co-investigator in much of the work that this paper uses as its point of departure, reviewed our research design and suggested many improvements. Mr. Michael Leonard at IDA reviewed the draft paper and also made suggestions for improvements. Thanks are also due to Ms. Shelly D. Smith and Ms. Burnette A. Aylor of the IDA staff for their assistance in the editing and production of the paper.

The authors alone are responsible for any errors that remain.

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#### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A consistent recent theme sounded by defense policymakers and commentators is the difficulty of planning under conditions of strategic uncertainty. The uncertainty confronting defense planners is said to stem in substantial part from two causes, often thought to interact. The first is the possibility that sustained economic growth in developing countries may permit significant increases in defense spending and human development over the next 15 to 25 years. For example, substantial growth in incomes and literacy occurred in parts of East Asia over the past three decades. This has led many analysts to speculate that similar gains may occur or continue in countries such as China. Such sustained growth invested in military budgets could, the argument goes, result in the emergence of one or more regional powers or even "near-peer" competitors to the United States in the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. How might these new powers arise? Through the proliferation of advanced technology and weapons systems, goes the argument. Thus the second uncertainty, the degree to which such proliferation will occur, is related to and interacts with the first.

Some of the concerns about the spread of advanced technologies center on the acquisition by potential adversaries of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, and/or the use of such weapons or other exotic technologies for terrorist attacks or asymmetric counter-value strategies to deter the United States from acting in regional conflicts. But the primary concern regarding arms transfers centers on their potential for dramatically improving the conventional military capability of potentially aggressive or destabilizing regional actors. The Secretary of Defense has stated that the ability to defend key allies and regions against this threat is and will remain one of the highest American defense imperatives over the next 15 to 25 years. So if it is true that access to better weapons automatically translates into improvements in military capabilities, our security strategy may be at risk over the mid- to long-term future.

Taken together, the two sources of uncertainty seem to pose a double dilemma for defense planners. Economic performance in the developing world (and concomitant improvement in human development) has been highly variable over the past 30 years, but was quite high over that period in a number of countries. In addition, the number of sources of modern weapons and military technology is increasing. The confluence of these trends has led many to conclude that (1) it is impossible to characterize meaningfully the future capabilities of potential adversaries, but (2) the potential for *at least some* of them to make dramatic improvements in conventional military capabilities (because they will be able to afford them) cannot be ruled out, and therefore (3) the U.S should pursue prophylactic policies, especially in the form of robust modernization, aggressive pursuit of advanced technologies, and controls on technology and arms transfers.

The syllogism in the preceding paragraph may, however, rest upon two questionable assumptions. The first is that possession of advanced weapons leads automatically to improved military capability. Ongoing research at the Institute for Defense Analyses suggests a different relationship: that user skill and operational doctrine interact strongly with weapons technology, and that skill levels therefore profoundly affect combat outcomes. If true, then to increase one's capability, it is not enough simply to be able to acquire advanced weapons—militaries must also be able to develop and maintain high skill levels. In addition, the demonstrated robustness of the skill-technology relationship leads us in turn to question the second basic assumption posited above, i.e. that increased capital and human resources equals increased capability. If military skill is indeed largely a matter of resources invested over some time period, then given a decision to do so and sufficient resources, any government can make substantial improvements in its military's skill, especially over the mid to long term. But based on the preliminary research presented here, we believe there may be important systemic impediments in many nations that will retard or frustrate their attempts to translate resources into improved military skill. Moreover, because these impediments are a function of the fundamental nature of systems of governance and cultural norms, they are extremely difficult to change by policy and tend to be stable over even long periods of time. These traits are present in many of our potential adversaries. If our hypothesis is

true, it may be the case that future threat levels can in many cases be meaningfully predicted more accurately and may be less severe than currently believed.

We hypothesize that two factors in particular affect a country's ability to attain and sustain military skill and that these factors operate largely independent of resources and deliberate policy. The factors are civil-military relations and a phenomenon called "cultural lag."

Regarding the first, *poor* civil-military relations limit the types and intensity of military training that the government is willing to permit. To sustain their hold on power, threatened regimes also often feel compelled to intervene detrimentally in military promotions and operational planning. As a result, militaries that are distrusted by their regimes often manifest duplicate chains of command, lack horizontal and inter-service communication, practice little or no joint training, and exhibit hyper-centralized decision-making. Each of these retards realistic training at high tempos, and acts as brakes on operational synchronization.

The second factor, "cultural lag," finds its genesis in the differences in culturally based norms of interpersonal behavior in organizations between the designers of modern advanced weapons systems and their users. Most advanced weapons systems (and here the word "systems" should be emphasized) are designed in "Western" countries. Their designs include the designers' culturally based expectations about the behavioral norms that will predominate in the organizations in which these assets will operate. When these weapon systems are exported to and operated by countries that do not share the same culture-based organizational behavior norms, a mismatch occurs. This mismatch has a tangible and substantial detrimental effect on operators' ability to train and utilize the system (especially on their ability to train intensely or actually employ the system on a sustained basis). This detrimental effect will be increasingly intensified as technology links individual weapons systems together into systems-of-systems, thereby intensifying system interdependence and training and operational complexity.

We tested for this detrimental effect in an examination of 457 military operations that have occurred since 1945. We controlled for disparity in economic resources and human capital between combatants, and found that there were differences in performance

(defined as fatalities suffered per day) between militaries in countries with good vs. bad civil-military relations and with Western vs. non-Western organizational cultures.

Why should poor civil-military relations and cultural lag matter to defense planners? Because both are enduring national attributes that change only slowly and are not susceptible to direction by policy, i.e. a government cannot legislate trust between military and civilian officials. Also, many developing nations (including many of our potential adversaries) have one or the other characteristic, so even if they grow steadily richer and can find willing weapons suppliers, their military capabilities will probably remain low. So if our hypothesis is true, it has several interesting implications for defense planning and policy.

#### PLANNING UNCERTAINTY AND SIZE OF THE THREAT

The conventional wisdom is that the size of tomorrow's defense challenges is extremely uncertain. That may be incorrect. The size of tomorrow's threats may be easier to forecast—and smaller—than generally supposed.

Most of the nations commonly mentioned as potential security concerns for the future have either bad civil-military relations or very non-Western norms of organizational culture or both. If our hypotheses are correct, these characteristics may act as significant brakes on their ability to improve military skills and thus generate combat power. This does not gainsay the possibility that some of these nations may have quite large military establishments. Economic growth may even permit them to have sizable quantities of advanced equipment. And the human raw material available for military service may be better educated. But their ability to integrate those assets into sustained, large-scale military operations may be quite limited. Nations limited in this way will be at a significant military disadvantage vis-a-vis skilled opponents, even skilled opponents equipped with somewhat less modern systems.

#### POLICIES ON ARMS TRANSFER AND CONTROL

If our hypotheses are correct, arms transfers to developing nations are probably much less likely to cause significant shifts in regional conventional arms balances than commonly supposed. (Again, as stated previously, we are not asserting that this is true

about transfers of nuclear, biological, or chemical arms or technologies.) Many recipients will simply lack the ability to fully utilize the modern weapon system capabilities. So to the extent that regional powers make realistic assessments of their neighbors' military capability, arms races will not automatically be kindled by the introduction of even advanced systems into a region. Nor would the transfer of such weapons to a potentially hostile power necessarily increase the risk to our allies in the region or to our forces should we need to operate there.

### NET ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES AND INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Most net assessment techniques are of the "bean-counting" variety, focusing on the numbers and technical characteristics of the two sides' weapons. That's also true of intelligence reporting. If our theories are correct, this approach may result in serious overestimations of the military effectiveness of potential enemies. As we have argued, the possession of the material products of technology should in no way imply that these products could be used effectively. From our perspective, this approach to net assessment focuses on the wrong level of analysis and, in so doing, confuses latent weapons capability with military effectiveness. This is especially true of assessments at the theater, force-on-force levels that drive much defense programming (and hence defense budgets). The longer, more wide-ranging and more intense a conflict is, the more the effects discussed in this paper will become apparent.

In our ongoing work on skill, technology, and combat outcomes, we have suggested it is imperative that the new generation of combat assessment models now under development include a proper comprehension of how skill and technology interact to produce real combat outcomes. If the hypotheses we explore here are correct, it may be equally important that tools used to forecast future capabilities of foreign forces incorporate civil-military relations and culture lag as factors. And it will be important for the Intelligence Community to have the capability to collect and analyze indicators related to those factors. Failing to do so may result in gross overestimates of the capabilities of potential opponents.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

A consistent recent theme sounded by defense policymakers and commentators is the difficulty of planning under conditions of strategic uncertainty. As Secretary of Defense Cohen wrote in the introduction to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): "[W]hile the prospect of a horrific, global war has receded, new threats and dangers—harder to define and more difficult to track—have gathered on the horizon."

The uncertainty confronting defense planners is said to stem substantially from two causes, often thought to interact. The first is the possibility that sustained economic growth in developing countries may permit significant increases in defense spending and human development over the next 15 to 25 years. Observing the substantial growth in incomes and literacy that occurred in parts of East Asia over the past three decades, many analysts speculate that similar gains could occur in countries such as China. Such sustained growth invested in military budgets could, the argument goes, result in the emergence of one or more regional powers or even "near-peer" competitors to the United States in the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The second cause of uncertainty is the proliferation and sale of militarily useful technology and advanced weapons systems. The fear, again as summarized in the QDR, is that such transfers could shift the military balance in key regions or raise the cost of future U.S. military operations, especially

...in the Middle East, where the proliferation of advanced technologies provides rogue states such as Iran with increasingly sophisticated means to threaten regional security, and in East Asia, where such proliferation threatens to upset delicate military balances in a region rife with long-festering territorial disputes. The civilian marketplace is developing technology that has dual civilian and military applications, and this makes it difficult to slow the diffusion of technology to potentially hostile state and non-state actors. Nations such as the United States that

William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington: Department of Defense, May 1997), Introduction (from online version at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/). Hereinafter cited as QDR Report.

embed such technology in their military forces could be particularly vulnerable to countermeasures if this challenge is not fully considered in system designs.<sup>2</sup>

Some of the concerns about the spread of advanced technologies center on the acquisition by potential adversaries of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, and/or the use of such weapons or other exotic technologies for terrorist attacks or asymmetric counter-value strategies to deter the United States from acting in regional conflicts by threatening large-scale loss of American lives. Those are troubling possibilities and are already properly the subject of study and analysis.<sup>3</sup> But the primary concern regarding arms transfers centers on their potential for dramatically improving the *conventional* military capability of potentially aggressive or destabilizing regional actors. The Secretary of Defense has stated that the ability to defend key allies and regions against this threat is and will remain one of the highest American defense imperatives over the next 15 to 25 years.<sup>4</sup>

[W]e will continue to confront a variety of regional dangers. Foremost among these is the threat of coercion and large-scale, cross-border aggression against U.S. allies and friends in key regions by hostile states with significant military power.

So if it is true that access to better weapons automatically translates into improvements in military capabilities, our security strategy may be at risk over the midto long term.

Taken together, the two sources of uncertainty seem to pose a double dilemma for defense planners. As will be seen later in this paper, economic performance in the developing world (and concomitant improvement in human development) has been highly variable over the past 30 years, but has been quite high over that period in a number of countries. In addition, the number of sources of modern weapons and military technology is increasing. The confluence of these trends has led many to conclude that (1) it is impossible to characterize meaningfully the future capabilities of potential adversaries, but (2) the potential for *at least some* of them to make dramatic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ibid., Section 2.

Nevertheless, for reasons discussed in Chapter 2, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and asymmetric comparative threats fall outside the scope of the argument we present in this paper.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Ibid.

improvements in conventional military capabilities (because they will be able to afford them) cannot be ruled out, and therefore (3) the U.S should pursue prophylactic policies, especially in the form of robust modernization, aggressive pursuit of advanced technologies, and controls on technology and arms transfers.

## **QUESTIONABLE ASSUMPTIONS**

The syllogism in the preceding paragraph may, however, rest upon two questionable assumptions. The first is that possession of advanced weapons leads automatically to improved military capability. Ongoing research at the Institute for Defense Analyses suggests a different relationship: that user skill and operational doctrine interact strongly with weapons technology, and that skill levels therefore profoundly affect combat outcomes. If true, then to increase one's capability, it is not enough simply to be able to acquire advanced weapons—militaries must also be able to develop and maintain high skill levels. (Indeed, in many cases, skill development should come first, for it will provide substantial improvements in capability even with existing weapons.) In addition, the demonstrated robustness of the skill-technology relationship leads us in turn to question the second assumption posited above, i.e., that increased capital and human resources automatically equals increased capability. If military skill is indeed largely a matter of resources invested over some time period, then given a decision to do so and sufficient resources, any government can make substantial improvements in its military's skill, especially over the mid to long term.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of this second assumption. Based on the preliminary research presented here, we believe there may be important systemic impediments in many nations that will retard or frustrate their attempts to translate resources into improved military skill. Moreover, because these impediments are a function of the fundamental nature of systems of governance and cultural norms, they are extremely difficult to change by policy and tend to be stable over even long periods of time. These traits are present in many of our potential adversaries. If our hypothesis is true, it may be the case that future threat levels can in many cases be meaningfully predicted with greater accuracy and may be less severe than currently believed.

But before beginning the analyses of how and why nations may differ in their ability to develop military skill, we need to summarize briefly our ongoing work (undertaken with our colleague Stephen Biddle) on how skill affects combat outcomes.<sup>5</sup>

## THE IMPORTANCE OF SKILL

Evidence is mounting that the *interaction* between technology and its users' *skills* profoundly influences real combat outcomes. Technology (or applied technology in the form of weapons effectiveness) does not in and of itself determine combat results. This is because technology's effects differ radically depending on the countermeasures adopted by its targets—especially how well they use tactical counters. (For ground combat, for example, these include cover, concealment, dispersion, suppressive fire, combined arms, and independent maneuver by small units.)

Survival on the modern battlefield requires the ability to reduce exposure to hostile firepower. Properly implemented, tactical countermeasures are extremely effective at this. Correctly dug defilade vehicle fighting positions, for example, can negate an opponent's advanced sights and long-range gunnery by keeping friendly tanks below grade until the opponent is close. Suppressive fire can reduce hostile firing rates by a factor of 10 or more even if it kills no targets directly. Attackers able to use cover and concealment effectively often can advance to within a few hundred meters of a typical defensive position without extended exposure to defensive fires.<sup>6</sup>

But while such countermeasures are potentially very effective, they are often very difficult to implement properly and are getting more so all the time. To make the most of cover and concealment, for example, each small-unit commander must fashion unique

Readers who wish to know more about the ongoing work on skill-technology interaction and combat outcomes should consult Stephen Biddle, Wade Hinkle, and Michael Fischerkeller, "Skill and Technology in Modern Warfare," forthcoming in *Joint Force Quarterly* (Summer 1999). The results of the ongoing IDA research will be published shortly by the same authors in *Beyond Firepower: Including Skill and Operational Sophistication in Combat Modeling*, IDA Paper P-3477, (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses forthcoming). Results to date were reported in "Modeling Skill-Technology Synergy in Combat Assessments," a paper presented at the 67<sup>th</sup> Symposium of the Military Operations Research Society, West Point, NY, June 23, 1999. The initial basis for this ongoing research can be found in Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Persian Gulf Conflict Tells Us About the Future of Conflict," *International Security*, 21, 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-179.

<sup>6</sup> Stephen Biddle, "The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare," Security Studies, 8, 1 (Fall 1998); idem., "Victory Misunderstood," op. cit., at pp. 166-9.

plans for movement and disposition based on the vagaries of local conditions. Troops cannot simply be laid out in standard, textbook formations and marched toward the objective or be deployed in formulaic cookie-cutter defensive layouts. Proper use of suppressive fire requires very tight coordination between widely separated, moving units and multiple commanding officers. Since the pace of an assault varies unpredictably with terrain and enemy action, maintaining continuous suppression requires a complex combination of planning, adaptation, and communications between harried commanders at many different echelons. Dispersion and independent small-unit maneuver increase the number of independent decision-makers in any given organization. They also demand greater initiative and tactical judgment from junior leaders and make it harder for those leaders to see and communicate with their troops.

As the range and lethality of weapons has increased, so has the depth over which such techniques must be exercised. The advent of long-range weapons and airpower has extended the zone of maximum complexity from front-line units and their immediate supporting elements to, in some cases, entire theaters. But while this is an important change, it is one of degree, not kind. Traditional operational countermeasures employing cover, concealment, dispersion, suppressive fire, combined arms, and independent small unit maneuver still work by exploiting weaknesses of advanced technology. In particular, our ability to engage dispersed targets under cover is still dramatically lower than our ability to destroy massed armor in the open, and will be for some time to come. What is changing is the difficulty of making the countermeasures work over the required span of space and time.

Militaries that can cope with such growing complexity are likely to see their vulnerability change little even as the nominal lethality and reach of modern weapons continue to grow. Militaries that *cannot* cope with such complexity are likely to see their vulnerability grow dramatically. Changing technology thus acts as a wedge by

<sup>7</sup> For recent examples from Operation ALLIED FORCE, see Michael R. Gordon with Eric Schmitt, "War Games in Kosovo: Allies Seek, Serbs Hide," New York Times, April 7, 1999, p. 1, and Joseph Fitchett, "Escalation of Air War Underscores Its Flaws: Low-Tech Serb Tactics Stymie NATO Plan," International Herald Tribune, April 14, 1999, p. 1.

magnifying the consequences of skill differentials over time. Absent a favorable skill overmatch, technology per se cannot be relied upon to produce Gulf War-like results in the future.

If the skill-technology hypothesis is true, it has two profoundly important implications for regional balance assessment and defense planning:

- 1. Knowing a military's skill level is critical to predicting its current capability (in many cases more important than knowing about quantity and types of weapons).
- 2. Understanding how skill is developed is key to predicting future capability.

#### NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN SKILL

We hypothesize that two factors in particular affect a country's ability to attain and sustain military skill and that these factors operate largely independent of resources and deliberate policy. The factors are civil-military relations and a phenomenon called "cultural lag."

Regarding the first, *poor* civil-military relations limit the types and intensity of military training that the government is willing to permit. To sustain their hold on power, threatened regimes also often feel compelled to intervene detrimentally in military promotions and operational planning. As a result, militaries that are distrusted by their regimes often manifest duplicate chains of command, lack horizontal and inter-service communication, practice little or no joint training, and exhibit hyper-centralized decision-making. Each of these retards realistic training at high tempos, and acts as a brake on operational synchronization.

The second factor, "cultural lag," finds its genesis in the differences in culturally based norms of interpersonal behavior in organizations between the designers of modern advanced weapons systems and their users. Most advanced weapons systems (and here the word "systems" should be emphasized), are designed in "Western" countries. Their designs include the designers' culturally-based expectations about the behavioral norms that will predominate in the organizations in which these assets will operate. When these weapon systems are exported to and operated by countries that do not share the same

The term is defined and the rationale for it discussed below.

culture-based organizational behavior norms, a mismatch occurs. This mismatch has a tangible and substantial detrimental effect on operators' ability to train and utilize the *system* (especially on their ability to train intensely or actually employ the system on a sustained basis). This detrimental effect will be increasingly intensified as technology links individual weapons systems together into *systems-of-systems*, thereby intensifying system interdependence and training and operational complexity.

Why should poor civil-military relations and cultural lag matter to defense planners? Because both are enduring national attributes that change only slowly and are not susceptible to direction by policy, i.e., a government cannot legislate trust between military and civilian officials. Also, many developing nations (including many of our potential adversaries) have one or the other characteristic, so even if they grow steadily richer and can find willing weapons suppliers, their military capabilities will probably remain low. Indeed, while it seems somewhat counterintuitive, the acquisition of ever more advanced weapons technologies by many developing nations may actually *decrease* their relative threat to regional stability and U.S. national security.

#### ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

We have divided the discussion and testing of our hypotheses into three chapters. Chapter 2 briefly reviews the arguments by others regarding how economic growth and weapons proliferation may place US security at risk either directly or indirectly by promoting regional instability. It then more fully explicates the cause-and-effect mechanisms through which we hypothesize that poor civil-military relations and cultural lag lead to diminished military skill and hence capability. Chapter 3 presents our research design and some results from a large-*n* test of our hypotheses. Chapter 4 concludes with a discussion of the implications for both defense policy and planning.

#### 2. FACTORS AFFECTING DEVELOPMENT OF SKILL

Measurements of the quantity and quality of weapons available to each side drive most orthodox combat capability assessment techniques. Orthodox assessment techniques intended to portray current regional balances do the same. Forecasts of future capabilities are also heavily influenced by assumptions about the availability of quantities of modern weapons (about which, more in a moment), but they also focus on the role played by economic and human development.

#### ECONOMIC AND HUMAN RESOURCES

Since the advent of the modern state system, economic strength has been held to be an important indicator of potential to develop military capability. Indeed, many consider that, since the beginning of industrialization, economic power has been the single most important leading indicator of future military power (and a decline in economic performance has been seen as a harbinger of a loss of military power). Accordingly, since the end of the Cold War many have regarded the strong economic performance of same developing countries as harbingers of their future military capabilities.

For an early example of the argument, see Patrick Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and Resources of the British Empire (London: Joseph Mawman, 1815). For a treatment on the relationship between economics and military power in pre-industrial Europe, see John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (London: Routledge, 1994).

See, for example, Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Kenneth A. Schultz, The Democratic Advantage: The Institutional Sources of State Power in International Competition (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1996); Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); and John Zysman, Power, Wealth, and Technology: Industrial Decline and American national Security (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, University of California, 1990).

Table 2-1. Variations in Economic Performance

Category of country	GNP per capita, 1965-1990 <u>Average annual rate of change</u>	
	Worst average rate	Best average rate
ow-income economies	-2.4%	5.8%
ower-middle income	-3-3%	8.4%
Ipper-middle income	-3.0%	7.1%
igh-income economies	-4.0%	6.2%

As Table 2-1 shows, economic performance among developing countries has been highly variable over mid- to long-term periods. Compounded over time, these rate differentials can produce astonishing differences in wealth between countries. For all lower-middle income economies, for example, the worst sustained performer (Nicaragua) had per capita real gross domestic product in 1990 that was only 40 percent of its real per capita product in 1965. The best sustained performer (Botswana) had per capita income in 1990 more than 8 times as large as in 1965.

This wide variance in mid- to long-term economic performance for individual countries is one reason that many feel the future military planning environment is so uncertain. Others, however, point to the fact that there have been at least some remarkable instances of sustained growth in past periods. They therefore posit that it is reasonable to assume that at least *some* developing countries (and by extension, countries that may figure in security calculations as friends or adversaries) will have high sustained growth over the next 15 to 25 years. For example, as shown in Figure 2-1, Israel's gross domestic product per capita more than doubled in real terms over a 27-year period beginning in 1965. Egypt's nearly tripled, while South Korea's increased by almost a factor of 7.




Figure 2-1. Economic Performance of Selected Countries

The planning concern regarding potentially strong economic growth in the developing world is that such growth will be translated into military spending in ways that permit single countries or groups of countries to field hardware inventories that rival our own. As Figure 2-2 shows, arms transfers to developing countries averaged \$23 billion annually in constant 1998 dollars from 1991 through 1998. That amount is a little more than 40 percent of the average spent annually by the Defense Department on all procurement during the same period (which was \$53 billion in constant 1998 dollars).<sup>3</sup> And the relative parity between the aggregate developing world and American weapons procurement is even greater than that since the arms transfer totals in Figure 2-2 do not include indigenous production, while DoD's totals include many non-weapons items. If any given developing country devoted just a pro rata share of increased GDP per capita to defense spending and if that country enjoyed just a 4 percent real rate of growth over the next 25 years, that country's defense spending could rise a total of 225 percent. If every

Figures for 1991-1997 are from William M. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington, Department of Defense, 1997). Figures on 1998 are from the DoD Comptroller's office, http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/FY2000budget/FY00P1U.pdf, p. 4.

developing country did it, the aggregate spending in defense procurement would far outstrip DoD's planned procurement spending.




Figure 2-2. Average Annual Arms Transfers to Developing Nations

Of course, it has been argued that the ability to translate economic resources into a capability to utilize advanced weapons is heavily dependent upon human capital. On the importance of human capital, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, wrote in *Joint Vision 2010*:

Attracting people with the intellectual tools, physical skills, and motivation to serve ... was among the foremost requirements in building a professional, robust and ready force. In the late 1970s, over 15 percent of our enlistees scored in the lowest category for military qualifications examinations. Today, less than 1 percent are in that category and over 90 percent of enlistees have graduated from high school.<sup>4</sup>

In theory (precisely the theory we intend to question in the next chapter), even militaries in poor countries could devote substantial financial resources to training and education of recruits and therefore overcome whatever disadvantage in human

John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington: Department of Defense, 1996).

development their underlying civilian economy and society have relative to developed nations. As Table 2-2 shows, much of the developing world has faced such a relative deficit in human resources in the past.

Table 2-2. Variations in Human Development

Category of country	Percentage of eligible school-age population enrolled in 1989	
	Secondary school	Tertiary education
Low-income economies	38%	2%
Lower-middle income	55%	17%
Upper-middle income	56%	17%
High-income economies	95%	42%
Source: World Development Report	1992, op. cit., Table 29	

But as was the case with national income, some developing countries *have* made substantial improvements in their level of human development over the past 25 years. As Figure 2-3 shows, both South Korea and Egypt improved the rate of female enrollment in secondary school from levels near that of low-income economies in 1970 to levels close to those in high-income economies by 1993.<sup>5</sup> In the dataset presented in Table A-1 we report a number of human development and economic resource indicators for use in testing of our hypotheses. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these human resource factors tend to be highly correlated with economic development. For example, the correlation between illiteracy and per capita income in our sample is r = -645 (p < .001, n = 601). The ability of at least some states to couple strong economic performance to human capital improvement buttresses the arguments presented by many that the next 20 to 30 years could well see the emergence of many new regional powers, if not in fact near-peer

For countries in the developing world, rates of female educational enrollment substantially lag those of males, so raising female enrollment to high-income levels is an even more impressive achievement than simply raising the overall national average.

competitors to the United States. China and other nations in East Asia are often cited as candidates in this regard, as is India.<sup>6</sup> Essentially, many commentators feel that the amount of disposable income that developing countries can devote to weapons purchases is going to grow over time, as will their ability to use them.




Figure 2-3. High-School-Aged Females in Secondary School

#### Proliferation of Arms and Technology

There is a widespread belief that proliferation of advanced military technologies and weapons runs the risk of facilitating the rise of a near-peer competitor and promoting regional instability. It has been proposed that the rapid proliferation of highly sophisticated weapons to the Third World may foster militaristic tendencies and encourage national leaders to think of military, rather than political, means for resolving their disputes.<sup>7</sup> Seth Carus, for instance, argues that modern weapons are so highly

See for example, Suisheng Zhao, Dynamics of Power Competition in East Asia: from the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity (London: Macmillan, 1998); and Robert A. Forczyk, "Emergent India and the Assessment of Third World Regional Powers in the Post-Cold War," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland at College Park, 1993.

See, for example, Charles Krauthammer, "Why We Must Contain China." Time, July 31, 1995, p. 72; National Panel on Conventional Arms Control, Controlling the Conventional Arms Race (New York:

capable that they will be inherently destabilizing because of their ability to decisively determine military outcomes.<sup>8</sup> In particular, Carus feels proliferation of command and control systems and other enabling technologies will intensify shifts in regional military power.<sup>9</sup> Steven Rosen agrees that such improved military capabilities could cause shifts in power balances, encouraging opportunistic regimes to capitalize on this advantage by settling an old score or seeking personal or national aggrandizement.<sup>10</sup>

Some analysts have argued that proliferation of advanced weapons systems will not necessarily lead to improved capabilities (and hence increased political instability) unless certain problems attendant to absorption of new technologies are overcome. For example, Geoffrey Kemp argues that recipient countries must solve what he calls the "back-end" problem of arms transfers—dependence on suppliers of platforms and technologies for infrastructure and support. Christopher Parker views collaborative agreements that include co-development and co-production as one possible method to overcome these problems. (Without them, he argues, transfers of advanced systems may not increase capabilities.) Michael Moodie extends this line of reasoning in observing that entire production processes are being shared today. He concludes, therefore, that in the future, buyers will place a greater emphasis on the transfer of intermediate technology

United nations Association, 1976), p. 6; and David Mussington, "Understanding Contemporary International Arms Transfers," *Adelphi Paper 291* (London: Brassey's, 1994).

See W. Seth Carus, "Weapons Technology and Regional Stability," in *Arms Control and Proliferation* in the Middle East and South Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 9-16, 10.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

Steven J. Rosen, "The Proliferation of New Land-based Technologies: Implications for Local Military Balances," in Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, Arms Transfers in the Modern World (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 109-130, 115.

Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms Transfers and the 'Back-end' Problem in Developing Countries," in Uri Ra'anan, Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Geoffrey Kemp, eds., Arms Transfers to the Third World: The Military Buildup in Less Industrial Countries (Boulder: Westview, 1978), pp. 264-275. Kemp also argues that if countries have sole dependency on a reliable supplier or are autarkic, the "back-end" problem is a non-issue.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Christopher S. Parker, "New Weapons for Old Problems: Conventional Proliferation and Military Effectiveness in Developing States," *International Security*, 23, 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 119-147.

capable of generating "enabling technologies." Those enabling technologies will in turn assist recipients in taking full advantage of the abilities of advanced weapons. 13

#### The Skill Factor

The cautionary notes sounded by some of the commentators just mentioned, however, mostly relate to the presumption that the problems that recipients may face with regard to absorbing advanced technology are largely a function of low human capital. The assumption that co-production and co-development can facilitate absorption is in reality an assumption that a lack of training and education is the only impediment to effective use of modern weapons systems. If indeed this is merely a matter of direct and indirect application of resources (the indirect application being that of devoting some resources to general or targeted improvement in human capital), then it may indeed be a slight impediment, at least for some developing countries.

Though most of the sources-of-national-power and arms-transfer literature fails to mention it explicitly, a military's ability to "absorb" advanced technology is really one particular form of skill effect. Obviously, operators and support personnel must be trained on the new equipment. But successful absorption doesn't stop there. Modern weapons operate as weapon systems, and so a complete factor-inputs to weapon-outputs system must be designed and implemented, and the personnel who will staff each part of the system must be trained. These various weapon systems must be meshed with operational doctrine and tactics and with specific operational plans, and the resulting aggregate integrated into a system-of-systems that supplies the ability to identify and engage targets, assess results, and plan next steps. This, as noted by some of the commentators cited above, requires additional enabling systems, which generate their own demands on training and operator skill (and in many cases these "operators" are highly trained staff specialists). As we have argued in our underlying work on the effect of skill on combat outcomes, the evidence indicates that a failure to achieve a high level of skill in each of these levels of system organization will lead to poor overall capabilities. Low-skill militaries, even if equipped with advanced weapons and facing opponents with inferior weapons, will thus perform poorly when confronting highly skilled enemies.<sup>14</sup> Put

Michael Moodie, "The Challenge of Technology Diffusion," Washington Quarterly, 18, 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 183-202, 189.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> See the citations in footnote 5 in Chapter 1.

another way, transfer of advanced technology and weapons may have little influence on future regional balances and instability if recipients fundamentally lack the skill to conduct effective military operations.

This understanding of what skill is (the integration of individual performance, unit performance, and staff performance in a system of systems to reliably produce an intended effect) allows us to focus on what may be the key indicator of future military capability. An important question, then, as shown in Figure 2-4, is whether the only necessary and sufficient conditions for a country to develop and sustain high military skill levels are abundant resources and a will to do so. We hypothesize that there are, in fact, two additional necessary conditions: 1) the presence of good civil-military relations, and 2) congruence between the organizational expectations of the designers of equipment in inventory and the organizational norms of its users. And we note that these two conditions are not present in many of the developing countries that are today seeking advanced weapons systems. How we came to develop this hypothesis is the subject of the next section.

### • Amount of training resources

> Financial, physical, technical

## • Amount of human capital

> Personnel with educational pre-requisites for training

## • Civil-military relations

> Does distrust cause government to intervene detrimentally in decisions on training or promotion?

## Organizational culture (culture lag)

➤ How well do the organizational norms of interpersonal interaction match those assumed in design of integrated, combined arms, system-of-systems?

Figure 2-4. Hypothesized Determinants of Skill Attainment

#### **Civil-Military Relations**

The literature on civil-military relations has focused primarily on explaining why different patterns of relations emerge and the effect of such relations on a country's

propensity for war. Little if any attention has been given to the impact that civil-military relations can have on military readiness.<sup>15</sup> In the next section we offer some cause-effect arguments that speak to this important relationship.

#### Loyalty vs. Competence

As Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle proposed in their seminal work, it seems reasonable to suppose that *poor* civil-military relations may manifest behavior and policy on the part of the government that systematically act to constrain a military's ability to attain and maintain skill. These constraints appear in many forms. If a country has poor civil-military relations, it is likely that political loyalty, rather than military competence, will be the dominant criterion for assignment and/or promotion. Leaders with tenuous holds on power have a propensity to name military officers loyal to them to command assignments regardless of their qualifications. Consequently, many of the best-qualified officers (by objective skill measures such as officer efficiency reports) may be excluded from command, lowering the average skill levels of commanders. And command tenure tends to be brief in these countries, limiting the learning curve for commanders and the ability of talented commanders to improve troop training and operational planning. Moreover, those skilled but less-than-loyal officers who do somehow manage to advance through the command hierarchy are likely to be purged, along with their staff.

Saddam Hussein's regime and its relationship with the Iraqi armed forces are stellar examples of these phenomena. Most commanders in Iraq's military and security forces are Tikriti (as is Saddam) and have been selected for their loyalty. When the loyalty of a commander has been called into question, there has been no hesitation to purge him. In October 1998, 30 officers of the Hammurabi Division of the Republican Guard were reportedly executed for this reason. Similarly, about the time of Operation DESERT FOX at least five officers of the 11<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division of the III Corps were

For a notable exception, see Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 19, 2 (June 1996), pp. 171-212.

The commands of the Special Republican Guard, for example, are populated with officers either drawn from areas noted for loyalty to Saddam, such as Tikrit, or related to him by blood or marriage. "Saddam's Shield: The Role of the Special Republican Guard," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, January 1999, p. 29.

reportedly executed for suspicion of disloyalty.<sup>17</sup> More recently, a former commander of Baghdad's air defense system, along with 23 other officers suspected of disloyalty, was reportedly executed for conspiring against the regime.<sup>18</sup> These are but three of many recent reports of officer purges in Iraq.<sup>19</sup> Transfers of command are just as frequent.<sup>20</sup>

It is also common in Communist, authoritarian, and totalitarian systems to appoint outsiders, often from internal security organizations or the ruling party, to command positions. To use Iraq again as an example, many military commanders are members of the Ba'ath party and/or security elements, and have had only abbreviated military careers or skipped much of the normal combat arms officer career path.<sup>21</sup>

#### **Duplicate Chains of Command and Missions**

Poor civil-military relations can also often result in duplicative organizations and chains of command in the military. This occurs because the regime is unwilling to permit any single military organization to gain a monopoly on the use of force, for fear that it could overthrow the government. The result is a proliferation of organizations that have essentially the same mission (the army and Republican Guards, for instance) and a myriad of security apparatus that watch each other. For example, Iraq has at least three military organizations with substantial ground combat power: the Special Republican Guard—the only force permitted in central Baghdad—consisting of four infantry brigades, armor, air defense, and artillery; the Republican Guard; and the Regular Army.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Ian Black, "Iraqi Resistance Gets Data from Saddam's Intelligence," Washington Times, November 20, 1998, p. 17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> "Iraq Said to Execute 24 Army Officers," Washington Post, March 10, 1999, p. 18.

See, for additional examples, "For the Record," Washington Post, December 1, 1998, p. 19; "Report of Iraqi Executions," New York Times, January 8, 1999; "Iraqi Officers' Arrests said Linked to Security Breach," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 14, 1999, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Near East/South Asia Report (online edition) (hereinafter FBIS), May 14, 1999; and "Baghdad Discovers Coup Plot Cell in the Public Security Service," Al-Zaman, July 8, 1999, in FBIS, July 8, 1999.

See "INC Reports Saddam Shifts Military Commanders," Iraqi national Congress (Internet) WWW, June 6, 1998, FBIS, June 6, 1998. This practice is also prevalent in President Mubarak's relationship with the Egyptian armed forces. See "Military Still Looks to the West for Doctrine," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 28, 1996, p. 22.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> "Qusayy To 'Cleanse' Army by Retiring Senior Officers," London Al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 22, 1997, p. 6, FBIS, May 22, 1997.

A similar situation exists in Cuba, where the Ministry of Interior has Special Troops and other assets with considerable light infantry and military police capability.

Saddam carries this duplication pattern into his security services as well. The Special Security Organization, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, and the Secret Police are all responsible for monitoring each other as well as the behaviors of the officer corps in the parallel military organizations.<sup>22</sup> This system makes conspiracy by the military difficult and provides the regime with the early warning of dissension it needs to expeditiously purge individuals who pose inordinate risk. While this ensures the survival of the regime, it also punishes excellence and initiative in the officer corps and creates an overall environment of fear and distrust that is detrimental to unit cohesion. And it creates an obvious dis-economy of scale in the use of training budgets and resources. These duplicative organizations share few facilities, so double (sometimes triple) sets of training infrastructure and staff are needed. And of course many of these training establishments themselves tend to be commanded by loyalist appointees whose priority is indoctrination, not effective military training.

## Lack of Integration, Tendency Toward Hyper Centralization

Training that is accomplished in regimes with poor civil-military relations is often narrowly focused on small-unit, single service operations. This is because little lateral or horizontal cooperation is permitted between commands (indeed, it is often explicitly prohibited and physically impossible). The same is true of joint training and deliberate planning for joint operations. Most command communications nets hub through central points to facilitate security monitoring and to inhibit plotting. In this system designed explicitly to engender distrust, organization and service component commanders are suspicious of each others' motives. Taking the initiative to improve integrated training can be a career-threatening event.

In keeping with his policy of appointing loyal persons to sensitive posts, Major General Kamal Mustafa Al Tikriti—brother of the husband of Saddam's youngest daughter—was appointed commander of the SRG in 1997; the SSO is headed by Saddam's son Qusay; and the Saddam Fedayeen is led by his eldest son Uday. Recently, Saddam carried out large-scale changes to increase the number of Tikriti officers occupying sensitive positions. See "The Number of Tikriti Officers Increases in the Important Positions," Kuwait Al-Qabas WWW (Internet), March 22, 1999, FBIS, March 22, 1999.

For the same reasons that regimes limit opportunities for integration, they also limit opportunity for realistic and large-scale field training and exercises. "Big" is threatening to these regimes, so most field exercises are either limited in size or rigidly scripted and controlled at very high echelons. (The regime wouldn't want a maneuver division to turn toward the capital.) No-notice readiness exercises are largely excluded for the same reason. And, partly to spare the frequently unqualified unit commanders embarrassment, there is little of the concept of learn-by-failing in the exercises that do occur. Scripting ensures that results match the plan.

All of the above are obvious disadvantages in preparing for modern combat operations, which require that forces be disciplinarily integrated and coordinated. Consequently, in many regimes with poor civil-military relations, competence—where it exists at all—is limited to simplistic planning and small-unit operations.

Regimes that feel threatened by their militaries also tend to hyper-centralize military decision-making. Nearly all decisions regarding training, battle plans, ammunition, logistics, etc., must be approved by the central military authorities and by the regime. Often this centralized control is used to punish politically incorrect unit commanders by denying them ammunition and logistic support. Saddam Hussein reportedly limits supplies to some ground units and rations jet fuel to others, severely restricting their training activity and possibly exerting an even greater impact on operations.<sup>23</sup>

#### Little Overseas Training or Contact with Outsiders

Finally, regimes that feel vulnerable to their militaries frequently restrict or deny their officers any opportunities for interaction with foreign military experts. They will not send personnel overseas for technical training or staff college, they do not invite foreigners for personnel exchanges or extended in-country training, and they carefully monitor all contacts with foreign personnel that do occur. Regimes impose these restrictions in part because of the fear that their officers (particularly junior officers) may become counter-indoctrinated or recruited by hostile intelligence services. But perhaps

more importantly, they fear the development of a network of personal relationships between their own officers and foreign officers. The fear is that such networks make it possible for coup plotters to solicit outside help and support with confidence that their outside contacts will not denounce them. Another fear is that the networks could be used in reverse by other governments interested in fomenting a coup,<sup>24</sup> or at least to subvert officers into becoming unwitting agents of influence for a foreign government.<sup>25</sup>

No-contact policies have predictable results. They deprive the affected militaries of opportunities for technical training and studying cutting edge thinking about operational art. They also sacrifice opportunities for officers to be exposed to critical thinking and challenges to conventional wisdom (not normally part of a political commissar's repertoire).

#### **DE MINIMIS EXCEPTION**

All of the protective behaviors described in this section place fundamental constraints on a military's ability to attain and maintain the skills necessary to perform effectively—even though they may be willing to spend substantial sums on training and readiness. (See Figure 2-5.) But, this is not to say that so-called pockets of excellence capable of operating effectively at the tactical level cannot exist in such militaries. (For

See James Morrison, "State of Paranoia," Washington Times, January 15, 1999, and Con Coughlin, "Saddam Seeks Kamikazi Squad but Doesn't Trust His Pilots," London Sunday Telegraph, March 21, 1999

Bruce W. Farcau, *The Coup: Tactics in the Seizure of Power* (Westport, CT: 1994), pp. 103-100 and passim, and Steven R. David, *Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987). Note, though, that David says such training programs for foreign personnel in the United States intended to help influence foreign attendees may not produce as much influence as commonly supposed (p. 33).

For example, the personal contacts between the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his Indonesian counterpart, which occurred as part of the Defense Department's military-to-military contact efforts, are credited with having helped gain the Indonesian military's agreement to deployment of an international peacekeeping force to East Timor. Elizabeth Becker, "U.S.-To-Jakarta Messenger: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs," New York Times, September 14, 1999. A source quoted in that news report stated, "It was a big plus to have someone who could call the Indonesian military—they were the ones calling the shots," said a senior administration official. "We had a unique asset and I don't see how our military could have done it without their past history with these generals."

## Political loyalty the criterion for assignment and promotion

- > Purges of officer corps
- > Frequent rotation of commanders
- Hyper-centralized decision making
- Little horizontal cooperation among forces
- Duplicate organizations and chains of command
- Minimal joint training
- Few opportunities for interaction with foreign expertise
- All of these factors inhibit skill attainment
  - > So their militaries face significant obstacles to improvements in skill

Figure 2-5. Hypothesized Effects of Poor Civil-Military Relations

example, Syria's Special Forces are regarded as highly capable at light infantry and ambush tactics.)<sup>26</sup> For this reason, we explicitly rule out of our hypothesis the claim that poor civil-military relations make it impossible for affected militaries to make *any* use of advanced technologies. An initial salvo of missiles, the delivery of a few NBC-armed missiles, the lucky shot that brings down an F-117, cannot be ruled out. And so our hypothesis may have less to say about circumstances in which one side has a zero tolerance for casualties, or in which an opponent is willing to use a small number of deliverable weapons of mass destruction in countervalue mode. We argue instead that the prohibitions and impediments to realistic training and operational coordination will quickly degrade such countries' ability for sustained, effective, larger-scale conventional military operations.<sup>27</sup> And to the extent that pockets of excellence exist at all in such

Syrian commandos, for example, conducted one of the most successful ambushes that has occurred against the Israeli Defense Force (in 1982 at Ain Zhalta in Lebanon). Richard A. Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon (New York: Hill & Wang, 1984), p. 97. In addition, reports express concern that Syrian special forces may be capable of destroying Israeli radar sites as the first step of a non-notice Syrian strike against Israel. U. S. House of Representatives, Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, Approaching the New Cycle of Arab-Israeli Fighting, December 10, 1996.

According to the QDR, such operations are the constraining cases for force size and capability in the current defense program.

militaries, the units involved are likely to be small and even themselves unable to maintain high skills for sustained periods.<sup>28</sup>

#### ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Culture (defined as the totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns) is a factor that has received scant attention in the scholarship on military effectiveness.<sup>29</sup> Yet culture has been found to have a significant effect on organizational behavior, and militaries are often the largest organization in any given country.

How does culture affect organizations? Societies develop generally accepted norms of behavior that are transmitted to their members through acculturation. As a matter of social self-preservation, norms regarding behavior that affect others are particularly strong, as are the sanctions for breaking them. People take this imbedded programming with them when they join institutions and organizations. Members of organizations, therefore, generally wish to honor society's norms of behavior even when acting as members of an organization.<sup>30</sup> It is true that organizations can have goals that are not completely co-joint with their host society's, especially over the short term. (Most organizations have a preference for autonomy and accumulation of resources, even, for example, when resource accumulation results in social costs such as environmental pollution.) And some organizations try to create internal norms of behavior that are consciously differentiated from the social average. (Vide the current management literature's fascination with corporate cultures that foster innovation through "out of the box thinking.")<sup>31</sup> The acceptance of such imposed norms is rare, however, as deviations from social norms are usually quite small.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Because of the inherent suspicion in non-democratic systems of elite units.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> The definition is taken from Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary (Boston: Riverside Publishing Co, 1994).

See Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner, Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Cultural Diversity in Global Business (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), pp. 161-185.

Companies such as Apple Computer and Nordstrom are often regarded as having distinct corporate cultures. Guy Kawaski, *The Macintosh Way* (Scranton, PA: Harper Collins, 1990).

So organizations eventually evolve their own culture of behavior or "organizational culture," which is distinct from but usually coupled to underlying societal norms. Organizational culture can thus be defined as a set of strongly established, culturally sanctioned action and interaction patterns and expectations within an organization.

Dysfunction occurs when attempts are made to influence members of an organization to behave in ways that run counter to those culturally sanctioned patterns. This happens frequently when some outside agency attempts to force an organization to undertake activity that goes against its sense of identity and culture. (This has been cited, for example, as the reason why airlift is chronically underfunded in the Defense program.)<sup>32</sup> It can also happen when a "foreign" process or system is introduced into an organization (even in cases when the decision-makers in an organization favor the innovation). If the foreign process carries with it an expectation of behavior that runs counter to the norms of the organizational culture (again, generally matched with those of the host society), massive inefficiency can occur, and even complete system failure is possible. People do not function well for long in situations where their organization is formally insisting they do one thing but every instinct (acculturation) is urging them to do something else. Few people, for example, will happily "re-engineer" their own job out of existence. Large-scale strikes occur in Europe when organizations attempt to shift priority from job security to economies of scale that cut jobs.

#### **Measuring Organizational Culture**

To behavioral scientists and management theorists, organizational culture is thought to result from the interaction of four sets of behavioral norms. Using that set as a taxonomy, the behavior of people within an organization can be measured using the coding criteria shown in Figure 2-6, and a composite description (or "score") can be

John D. Harrington, "Neglected U.S. Military Missions: Contending Theories of Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Culture and the Case of Airlift Mobility," Ph. D. Thesis, Georgetown University, 1996.

developed of the organization's culture.<sup>33</sup> This is a particularly useful concept when comparing behavior in organizations across societies, as we will do in the next chapter.

## Norms for managing others (bases for selection and advancement)

- > Objective qualification and advancement standards, or
- Personal relationships/other criteria

# Norms for managing oneself (bases for loyalty)

- Obedience to hierarchy
  - Individuals to organization and sub-organizations to higher-level organization ("task orientation"), or
- > Obedience to patrimonial/honorific ties
  - Individuals to persons or groups ("personal or sectarian orientation")

## Norms for managing uncertainty

- Acceptance
  - Flexibility in operations, or
- > Avoidance
  - Strict adherence to scripted rules and operational plans

## · Norms for managing time

- > Future oriented, or
- > Immediatist

Figure 2-6. Categorizing Organizational Behavior

Skill can be defined as the ability to reliably produce an intended effect, given that the resources involved are physically capable of it. It follows that organizational skill can then be defined as the ability of an organization to reliably produce an intended effect (again, given that the organization possesses requisite resources). Using this definition, it becomes clear that organizational culture should in theory be an important determinant of skill. Organizational culture can facilitate task accomplishment if the processes through which resources are employed match closely with the organization's behavioral norms. And organizational culture can greatly impede task accomplishment if the processes employed demand that people behave contrary to those norms. Resources must be organized into processes or systems in order to be employed. Systems involving high

See Geert Hofstede; Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-related Values (London: Sage, 1984) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, op. cit.

technology tend to be especially complex, and so the ability to produce intended effects from these systems is even more highly dependent on a close match between the technology's operational expectations and organizational culture.<sup>34</sup>

### "Culture Lag"

While there are few studies focusing directly on "culture lag" in militaries, investigators have examined the question of why developing countries frequently experience difficulty in assimilating advanced technology. Many agree that the source of the problem seems to be cultural mismatch between system designers and operators.

The process of attempting to reconcile imported technology and the cultural norms and expectations of the adopting society is called "technological adaptation." Problems may occur when system designers unknowingly design behavioral expectations into systems. Behavioral norms are deeply ingrained and therefore largely subconscious. Processes—maintenance and operating procedures, for example—are partly normative and are therefore normally less completely expressed in system designs. This makes them difficult to transfer where even small differences in culture exist, and very difficult to adapt when there are large differences. This problem is so common in technology transfer that it has even been given a moniker—"cultural lag."

Why? Because advanced technology tends to be more expensive on a unit basis than the resources it replaces. To improve productivity (and therefore profits) the organization therefore must achieve economies of scale by servicing more customers on a unit basis (internal or external) with the new equipment than the old. Because there is less new equipment to go around, each part of the organization that depends on the new equipment is now more interdependent, and interdependency is an attribute of complexity.

The hoped-for economy of scale will occur only if the people having control of the new improved equipment share the organization's priorities. If instead they give first priority to support for their relatives or ethnic kinsmen, or if they simply sell the new equipment and pocket the proceeds, the organization is worse off than it was before. This is why the behavioral expectations embedded in the process for using the new technology must match the organizational culture in which it is to operate in order for the introduction of new technology to have any prospect of improving overall performance.

William C. Schaniel, "New Technology and Culture Change in Traditional Societies," Journal of Economic Issues, 22 (June 1988), pp. 493-98, at 497.

Arunoday Saha, "Cultural Impediments to Technology Development in India," International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 10, 8 (1990), pp. 25-53, p. 27.

### Military Organizational Culture and Advanced Weapons

Modern military organizations tend to be the epitome of advanced technology and complex, interdependent operational and support systems. So if organizational culture is a skill determinant and if technology magnifies its importance, it is reasonable to suppose that organizational culture is especially important in assessing *military* skill. And as evermore technologically sophisticated weapons systems are introduced into militaries and linked into an evermore interconnected system-of-systems, organizational culture's effect on skill should intensify and the penalty for a mismatch between culture and technology and its operating and support systems should become greater. So we will turn next to why it may be reasonable to suppose that such culture lag exists, particularly for would-be recipients in developing countries.

Most advanced weapons systems are designed in "Western" countries. (This term will be defined in Chapter 3.) For reasons explained above, these systems have embedded within them expectations regarding how the personnel that operate them will behave. Understandably enough, these behavioral expectations derive from the culturally based organizational behavioral norms of the Western designers. Many of the countries that purchase these systems are "non-Western" in terms of their culturally derived behavior norms. So the importation of Western weapons systems into non-Western militaries creates a mismatch between the designers' expectations of how the systems will be operated and the organizational norms of the non-Western users. This results in inefficient operation of those systems.

What does it mean to say that most advanced conventional weapons systems are designed and produced in states that can be characterized as having "Western cultures?" Measured in constant 1998 U.S. dollars the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and other Western European countries were the source of 88 percent of all arms transfers during the period 1991-1998.<sup>37</sup> (Many of the remaining transfers came from Russia, which is more culturally similar to the four "Western" arms suppliers than it is to most developing nations.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing nations, op. cit., p. CRS-81.

The "big four" arms suppliers are quite similar to one another in terms of the four norms of organizational behavior shown in Figure 2-6.<sup>38</sup> For example, with regard to *how leaders manage others*, their bases for selection and advancement in most governmental and business organizations tend to be meritocratic. Regarding *how managers and workers manage themselves*, the expectation in the West is that both will be obedient, loyal to an organization's hierarchy, and task-oriented. They also tend to accept *uncertainty* and to focus on the future in how they *manage time*. Not surprisingly, researchers have found that these expectations shape the approaches taken in designing complex systems. For example, Charles Perrow, a scholar of human factors and system design, has reported the following:

The design of systems, and the equipment that is used, is not entirely determined by technical or engineering criteria; designers have significant choices available to them that will foster some types of social structures and operator behaviors rather than others.<sup>39</sup>

Perrow's conclusions about system design in general have been found to hold true in particular in the design of advanced weapons systems. Chris Demchak studied the U.S. Army's effort to develop its "fully networked," systems-of-systems future fighting force. She found that the design for the networked battlespace implicitly includes assumptions regarding the organizational norms within which the system will operate, including the "Western" norms of meritocratic assignment and promotion, loyalty to the organization, and task orientation.

#### NON-WESTERN RECIPIENTS

Given that Western cultural values are engineered into most weapons systems, there is every reason to expect problems with culture lag when Western systems are

In Chapter 3, we will present research that quantifies those characteristics for the Western suppliers and other nations.

Charles Perrow, "The Organizational Context of Human Factors Engineering," Administrative Science Quarterly, 28 (1983), pp. 521-41.

Chris C. Demchak, "Tailored Precision Armies in Fully Networked Battlespace: High Reliability Organizational Dilemmas in the 'Information Age," *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 4, 2 (June 1996), pp. 93-103.

exported to developing countries, because most of these recipients have markedly different cultures of organizational behavior.

This becomes evident when those countries' norms for organizational behavior are measured against the taxonomy in Figure 2-6, above. Western managers tend to assign and promote using a meritocratic system. Many non-Western managers base those decisions on personal relations. Western managers and workers tend to be hierarchically obedient and task-oriented; non-Westerners tend to be obedient and loyal to non-organizational entities (e.g., individuals, families, tribes, or sects) and are generally relationship oriented. Western managers tend to accept uncertainty; non-Western managers seek to avoid it and prefer, instead, multitudes of scripted rules and plans. Western managers are future oriented, but non-Western managers tend to be immediatist, thinking primarily of the satisfaction of short- term goals.

American security assistance personnel have commented on how these non-Western behavior norms can hinder assimilation of Western military technology and processes. For example, one American advisor to the Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance Corps (SAAOC) who was assisting in the design of a modern combat service support system made the following observations:

Counterpart [Saudi] personnel tended to accept the requirement for short-range planning; mid- and long-range planning requirements were not generally accepted and were often rejected totally. This seemed especially true of senior counterparts ... This proclivity for short range, immediate action was often observed to cause sub-optimizations.

There is a large difference between Western advisers and Saudi counterparts regarding whether one should have his performance evaluated against some objective standard. There is a lack of organizational loyalty: loyalties are personal in nature and are not directed towards achievement of organizational objectives. Thus, performance evaluation techniques along Western lines, if used at all, evaluate and document personal relationships and ties and do not necessarily reflect actual performance.

... rank often appeared to have far less meaning than it does in the US Army. Individual advisors reported witnessing scenes in which privates did not hesitate to 'tell off' an SAAOC colonel, especially if they were of the same tribe. no matter how immature subordinates appeared to be, SAAOC counterparts normally dealt

with them in relationship-oriented terms rather than imposing a more structured task-oriented behavior. 41

These observations illustrate how culturally different many foreign militaries are from their Western counterparts, and highlight the sub-optimizations that can therefore occur when attempting to transfer systems and technology from the latter to the former.

### LARGE OR SMALL EFFECTS?

The logic of the arguments presented in this chapter suggests that civil-military relations and culture lag are determinants of military skill, and therefore combat outcomes. But exactly how important are they? We turn to that question in the next chapter, in which we present the results of testing our hypotheses using a statistical analysis of combat since 1946.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Major J. Mayton, Jr., Cultural Factors in Managing an FMS Case Program: Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance Corps (SOCP) Program (Ft. Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems Management College, 1977), pp. 23-24.

### 3. TESTING THE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES

To test our hypotheses regarding the impact of civil-military relations and culture on military effectiveness, we conducted a large-*n* analysis of performance in 457 military conflicts during the 1946-92 period. Our independent variables were capital resources, human capital, civil-military relations, and culture and our dependent variable was military performance in war. Capital resources and human capital were included in the analysis to control for two obviously important factors in a military's ability to both purchase weapons platforms and technologies and attain skill.

## OPERATIONALIZING THE VARIABLES 2

A state's gross domestic product per capita is widely accepted as an indicator of economic development and spending potential, and was used to define the variable capital resources.<sup>3</sup> We chose literacy rate as the measure of human capital because it is

We express our appreciation to Herb Tillema for granting access to his Overt Military Interventions database. See Herbert K. Tillema, Foreign Overt Military Interventions, September 2, 1945 – December 31, 1991 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri, 1995). Additional casualty data were drawn from Michael Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1619-1991, Volume II, 1900-1991 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1992).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> A codebook with the values for each of our 457 records is printed as an appendix to this paper.

GDP data were drawn from the *Penn World Table (version 5.6)*, The Center for International Comparison at the University of Pennsylvania. Those data are available online at <a href="http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu">http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu</a>; and are described in Alan Heston and Robert Summers, "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, (May 1991), pp. 327-368.

Supplementary data came from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM 1998 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998); International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics [Computer file], 2<sup>nd</sup> release (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund [producer], 197?); Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1979); International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database April 1999, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/1999/01/data/index.htm; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistics and Economic Projections Division, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean [computer file]; and World Bank, Africa Live Database, available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/extpb/aldb.htm.

representative of basic educational achievement and ability to learn in the future.<sup>4</sup> (We investigated other possible measures, such as school enrollment, but data from the 1950s and 1960s were impossible to find for many developing countries.)

Civil-military relations was operationalized as a dichotomous variable, i.e., either good or bad. If a country experienced a coup plot, failed attempt, or successful coup within 2 years prior to a conflict in which it participated, we coded it as having poor civil-military relations. Otherwise, it was coded as having good civil-military relations. <sup>5</sup> (At a future date we plan to perform sensitivity analyses by both adjusting that 2-year window and discriminating between coup plots/failed attempts and coup successes.)

Culture was operationalized based on data from a survey conducted in 1970 of over 72,000 personnel in overseas subsidiaries of a large "Western" multinational business organization with facilities in over 40 countries. The survey asked respondents to characterize the behavioral norms of their host-country business counterparts. In analyzing the results of the responses, Geert Hofstede determined that organizational culture could be characterized in four different dimensions, which he termed *Power* 

Literacy data were drawn from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM 1998 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998); United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, UnESCO Statistics: World Education Indicators, available at <a href="http://unescostat.unesco.org/Indicator/Indframe.htm">http://unescostat.unesco.org/Indicator/Indframe.htm</a>; and U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Database, available at <a href="http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.htm">http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.htm</a>].

Coup data were compiled from Patrick J. McGowan, African Military Intervention Events, January 1, 1956 to December 31, 1985 (Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University, 1986); T.Y Wang, African Coup Events Data, 1986-1990 [Computer file], ICPSR version (Normal, IL: T.Y. Wang, Illinois State University, Dept. of Political Science [producer], 1995, Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1997); Edward Luttwak, Coup D'Etat: A Practical Handbook (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969); Robert H. Dix, "Military Coups and Military Rule in Latin America," Armed Forces & Society (Spring 1994), 439-456; and Harvey G. Kebschull, "Operation 'Just Missed': Lessons from Failed Coup Attempts," Armed Forces & Society (Summer 1994), pp. 565-579.

Geert Hofstede, Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-related Values, op. cit. and Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991). Hofstede's findings have been replicated by others in more recent studies. See, for example, Peter Smith, Shaun Dugan, and Fons Trompenaars, "National Culture and the Values of Organizational Employees," Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology, 27, 2 (March 1996), pp. 231-264.

Distance (how leaders manage others), Individualism, Masculinity (how workers manage themselves), and Uncertainty Avoidance.<sup>7</sup>

Each dimension was defined as representing a spectrum of behavioral tendencies. The survey questionnaire asked a series of questions about worker and manager practices and expectations regarding each dimension of behavior. These responses were averaged by countries, and factor analysis was used to cluster them. Index scores were than constructed to rank these responses relative to each other with reference to the "Western" behavior characteristics shown in Figure 2-6.8

We used these dimensional indices to determine each country's degree of "Western-ness" with respect to a particular dimension. We did so by defining the highest country score to be the baseline for that particular Western cultural norm and calculated a distance score for each country relative to the defined Western norm. This methodology resulted in a quantitative measure of each state's relative Western-ness. The range of distance scores resulting from this approach was from one to 219, where one represents the most Western (that is, closest to the defined Western cultural baseline) and 219 the least Western. The scores were then normalized by calculating z-scores based upon the median score of the top weapons exporting countries in the world. The final rankings had the added virtue of matching intuition in most cases. (For example, the United States,

Hofstede's four dimensions correspond to only three of the four factors governing organizational culture that we posited in Chapter 2, i.e., how leaders manage others, how managers and workers manage themselves, and how they manage uncertainty. We are in the process of obtaining a more recent and comprehensive set of survey data (compiled using the same survey methodology) that will also permit us to code attitudes toward time management.

As an example of the technique, see his detailed example of the construction of his Power Distance Index, Geert Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations*, op. cit., Chapter 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Again, with the exception of time management.

We are focusing on a "Western" culture because nearly all exports of weapons systems and military technology (88 percent on a dollar-value basis over the period 1991-1998) come from the United States and Western Europe. It follows that there is a high probability that exports selected at random originated from one of those sources.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and France.

Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and West Germany scored closest to the Western baseline).<sup>11</sup>

All of the pertinent literature suggests that the cultural norms measured in Hofstede's survey change only very slowly. We therefore assumed that the 1970 survey was a valid measurement of each country's cultural norms over the whole period 1946-1992. A larger survey of international businesses using similar techniques was conducted in the 1990s. We hope to be able to obtain those data (which are unpublished) to test the stability of country scores over time.

There are of course many different ways that one might measure our dependent variable of combat outcomes. We chose *combat fatalities*. This was partly because it has been the measure of greatest interest to our government sponsors in our ongoing skill-technology research, and it was partly a concession to resource limitations. Budgets for internally funded research projects at IDA are small, so we were obliged to use existing databases. This forced us to narrow our focus to casualties suffered only by the intervenor (or initiator) in each conflict, because those are the only casualty statistics in the Foreign Overt Military Intervention dataset. We hope to obtain data on non-intervenor losses soon.

For each conflict in our database, we calculated intervenor fatalities per day of conflict. In addition, each conflict was coded as one of the following five types of military operations:

- Conventional ground force operations using regular military units of company size or larger
- Raids involving units of less than battalion size (larger raids were coded as conventional ground operations)
- Air strikes only
- Shelling only by ground-based artillery or rockets
- Naval bombardment only

The 1970 survey respondents from South African businesses, of course, tended to be part of the white minority business elite.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> This is supported by findings from additional research using Hofstede's methodology cited in footnote 6.

This approach permitted us to test whether the impact of the independent variables varied by type of operation.

### THE EFFECT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

To test our theory of the impact of civil-military relations on combat outcomes we formulated the following formal hypotheses:

H1: Controlling for intervenor and target capital resources, human capital, and culture, countries with good civil-military relations that attack countries with poor civil-military relations will suffer fewer normalized fatalities than when they attack countries with good civil-military relations.

H2: Controlling for intervenor and target capital resources, human capital, and culture, countries with bad civil-military relations that attack countries with good civil-military relations will suffer greater normalized fatalities than when they attack countries with bad civil-military relations.

Applying all of those controls reduced the number of usable records in our dataset from 457 to an n of 77 records. We partitioned the data by type of intervenor and target civil-military relations, calculated average combat fatalities within each sub-group for all conflicts, and tested the significance of the differences between the means. The results including all types of military operations are shown below in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1. Mean Intervenor Fatalities per Day as a Function of Intervenor and Target Civil-Military Relations for All Types of Military Operations (n=77)

		Target Civ-mil	
		Good	Bad
Intervenor Civ-mil	Good	2.1 ( <i>n</i> =50) s.d.=3.9	1.9 (11) s.d.=3.2
	Bad	4.3 (12) s.d.=9.9	0.24 (4) s.d.=.3

The findings displayed in the top row of Table 3-1 offer some support of our first hypothesis. Intervenors having good civil-military relations suffered slightly fewer fatalities against targets with poor civil-military relations than they did when battling states with good civil-military relations (t = .154, p = .878). The second row of Table 3-1 provides strong support for our second hypothesis. Intervenors with poor civil-military relations suffered, on average, nearly 20 times the number of fatalities in conflicts against states with good civil-military relations as they did against states with poor civil-military relations (t = .811, p = .431). As can be seen, these results are difficult to generalize, given the low t scores.

We wondered whether the relatively weak effect suggested by the results in the top row and the high standard deviations might be an artifact of combining in one database many different types of operations. Large-scale, sustained conflicts are of most interest to planners dealing with force sizing issues, so we partitioned the data into two sets, one dealing with conventional operations and one set including all other types of military operations. We paid a penalty in robustness of results in consequence. While imposing our original controls on capital resources, human capital, and culture reduced our original n to the 77 records reported on in Table 3-1, applying additional constraints, as can be seen in Tables 3-2 and 3-3, resulted in cells having very small n or missing cases. This makes generalizing from the results risky, but they are nevertheless suggestive.

Table 3-2. Mean Intervenor Fatalities per Day as a Function of Intervenor and Target Civil-Military Relations for Conventional Military Operations Only (n=12)

		Target Civ-mil	
		Good	Bad
Intervenor Civ-mil	Good	2.2 (n = 6) s.d.=2.1	5.5 (3) s.d. = 4.5
·	Bad	6.6 (3) s.d. = 11.5	(0)

Focusing only on conventional ground operations of company size or larger pared down our 77-record subset to 12 records. The mean intervenor fatalities found in these records are shown in Table 3-2. Unfortunately, the resulting n's are low, making it risky to draw within-condition conclusions. As we continue to build the database, we hope to populate these cells with more cases so such a meaningful analysis can be made. These figures, however, are still useful for the purpose of doing an across-condition analysis to compare the relative impact of civil-military relations on large vs. small size operations. For this, we turn to the analysis in Table 3-3.

Table 3-3. Mean Intervenor Fatalities per Day as a Function of Intervenor and Target Civil-Military Relations for All Types of Military Operations Except Conventional (n=65)

		Target Civ-mil	
		Good	Bad
Intervenor Civ-mil	Good	2.1 (n = 44) s.d. = 4.1	0.5 (8) s.d. = 1.1
	Bad	3.6 (9) s.d. = 9.9	.2 (4) s.d. = .3

Including only records involving small-scale operations resulted in a subset of 65 records. The results in Table 3-3 offer strong within-condition support for our hypothesis. In the partitioned data, countries with good civil-military relations attacking countries with poor civil-military relations suffered three times fewer casualties than when they attacked states with good civil-military relations (t = 2.106, p = .04). And the second row of Table 3-3 shows that countries with poor civil-military relations that attacked states with good civil-military relations suffered nine times as more fatalities per day than when they attacked countries with poor civil-military relations (t = .655, p = .526).

Perhaps even more interesting is a comparison of the results in Tables 3-2 and 3-3. Such a comparison suggests that poor civil-military relations has a stronger impact on performance in larger-scale operations as opposed to smaller-scale operations. A

comparison of the bad-good civil-military relations cells in each table (mean normalized casualties of 6.6 vs. 3.6, respectively, t = .453, p = .660) offers support for this suggestion. This is consistent with our discussion regarding the detrimental effects of denying the military permission for large-scale exercises, joint training, and horizontal communication because the importance of these factors is magnified in conjunction with the scale of a conflict.<sup>13</sup>

#### THE EFFECT OF CULTURE LAG

To test our theory of the impact of culture lag on combat outcomes we formulated the following formal hypothesis:

H3: Controlling for intervenor and target capital resources, human capital, and civil-military relations, Western countries that attack non-Western countries will suffer fewer normalized fatalities than non-Western countries that attack Western countries.

Recall that the cultural distance score of each country was normalized using the z-score method based upon the median score of the top weapons exporting countries. The resulting distribution of normalized culture scores is illustrated in Figure 3-1.




Figure 3-1. Organizational Culture z-scores

Again to ensure the point has been driven home, the p values make generalization difficult.

We categorized countries as "Western" and "non-Western" by working with standard deviation units in this distribution (approximately 1.0). We did two analyses to incorporate a sensitivity test. In our first analysis, those countries that fell within +/- one standard deviation of the mean of this distribution were categorized as "Western" and those beyond +/- one standard deviation were categorized as "non-Western." These results are shown as the first row in Tables 3-4 (where the intervenor is Western) and 3.5 (where the intervenor is non-Western).


Table 3-4. Mean Intervenor Fatalities per Day as a Function of Intervenor and Target Culture for All Types of Military Operations

		Target Culture Non-Western
Intervenor Culture	Western	$0.79 (n = 10)^*$ s.d. = 1.61
		2.18 (22)** s.d. = 3.97

<sup>\*</sup>Western states were within +/- 1.0 standard deviations from the mean \*Western states were within +/- 1.5 standard deviations from the mean

We did a second analysis increasing the spread of the standard deviation units, in which states were considered Western if they fell within +/-1.5 standard deviation units of the mean and non-Western if outside that range. These results are shown in the second row of Tables 3-4 (intervenor is Western) and 3-5 (intervenor is non-Western).

Table 3-5. Mean Intervenor Fatalities Per Day as a Function of Intervenor and Target Culture for All Types of Military Operations



Non-Western states were outside of +/- 1.0 standard deviations from the mean Non-Western states were outside of +/- 1.5 standard deviations from the mean

A review of the first row of numbers in these Tables 3-4 and 3-5 supports our hypothesis. Comparing the entries in each table where we have Western vs. non-Western and non-Western vs. Western states, respectively, we observe that Western states suffered fewer casualties against non-Western (t=.433, p=.670). The results shown in the second row in each table represent a more liberal definition of "Western." These results also support our hypothesis, albeit less strongly (t=.041, p=.968). This is not surprising, as we likely diluted the effect of cultural difference by casting our net wider. A review of the distributions of intervenor and target z-scores shows that as you move to 1.5 standard deviations from the mean, the number of intervenors and targets with culture scores in this range increases significantly. In fact, in most of the conflicts in which states in the range participated, they fought like-cultured states; thus, the cultural effect is diluted.

#### SUMMARY OF RESULTS

All the tests reported in this chapter support our hypotheses. Civil-military relations and culture lag do appear to affect skill, and hence combat outcomes, especially in instances of larger-scale, conventional conflict. They have explanatory power even after the effects of differences in resources and human development are taken into

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> These distributions appear in the appendix as Figures 1 and 2.

account. The magnitude of the effect is somewhat more difficult to assess given the sensitivity that some of the results display. The sensitivity may be an artifact of the relatively small numbers of cases in the data we had available. (Conflict, fortunately, is a relatively rare event.)

The results of our initial investigation certainly demonstrate that further research on these issues is justified. We hope to increase our number of records by adding additional economic and human development data. We also hope to obtain the more recent survey research on organizational culture. (This would also add to our total number of records, as the more recent research covers more countries.) And we also hope to explore alternative definitions of the independent variables (for example, absolute GDP differences). Finally, once we have located data on target state casualties, we hope to use regression analysis to explore the interaction between civil-military relations, culture gap, wealth, and human development on combat outcomes.

# 4. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The results of our preliminary testing are not conclusive, of course.<sup>1</sup> Much more work will need to be done before we can be satisfied that these phenomena are actually affecting combat outcomes in the way we theorize. But the initial results lead to some interesting speculation about implications if indeed our hypotheses are shown to be robustly true.

### PLANNING UNCERTAINTY AND SIZE OF THE THREAT

The conventional wisdom is that the size of tomorrow's defense challenges is extremely uncertain. That may be incorrect. The size of tomorrow's threats may be easier to forecast—and smaller—than generally supposed.

Table 4-1 lists nations that are commonly identified as potential threats to American security or as potential regional powers or even (in the case of a few) as possible near-peer competitors 25 years or more from now. Every country listed has either bad civil-military relations or very non-Western norms of organizational culture or both. If our hypotheses are correct, these characteristics may act as significant brakes on their ability to improve military skills and thus generate combat power. This does not gainsay the possibility that some of these nations may have quite large military establishments. Economic growth may even permit them to have sizable quantities of advanced equipment. And the human raw material available for military service may be better educated. But their ability to integrate those assets into sustained, large-scale military operations may be quite limited. Nations limited in this way will be at a significant military disadvantage vis-a-vis skilled opponents, even skilled opponents equipped with somewhat less modern systems. Recall that the U.S. Marines achieved the

Especially because of the small n for many of them.

same dominant outcome over poorly skilled Iraqis as did U.S. Army counterparts, although the Marines were using equipment that in many cases was a generation or more less modern.<sup>2</sup>

The serendipity of these effects from the perspective of the United States is that authoritarian and totalitarian regimes will find them hardest to change. Most of them earned their poor state of civil-military relations the hard way. Easing up control on the military is thus, for many of them, a risky strategy. And shifts in organizational culture can be especially destabilizing for closed societies. They lack pluralistic outlets for expressions of concern and fear about the changes that are occurring, as for those affected adversely to ask for assistance in the transition. Dictators and authoritarians who attempt to shift behavioral norms as a matter of policy run the risk that the result may reproduce Iran in 1979 or Eastern Europe in 1989.

Are there any alternative strategies that these regimes could employ to try to overcome the disadvantages imposed by culture lag and distrust of their militaries? There are two possibilities, but both have strings attached.<sup>3</sup> First, countries can build-in redundancy to warfighting systems by purchasing redundant equipment. In theory this helps overcome their inability to provide sustained support by replacing end-items needing repair or maintenance with fresh ones. But the costs of such a strategy are becoming prohibitive because the unit costs of modern weapons systems continue to increase. And of course, a redundancy strategy is itself a tax on capability because all of the resources expended on the redundant systems represent resources that more efficient users could devote to purchasing usable capability. Countries could also attempt to rely on outside (Western) specialists to aid in the operations of the systems. Recall, however, that countries with poor civil-military relations tend to restrict interactions with foreign military experts. And this is an expensive strategy as well since a premium over and above their already-high host-country wages often has to be paid to such specialists to get them to agree to relocate. Moreover, their willingness to stay and support systems in the midst of combat must be questioned.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood," op. cit., p. 153.

Drawn from Serge Taylor's discussion of the options available to states importing new technologies. See his "Organizational Complexity in the New Industrial State: The Role of Technology," in Todd R. LaPorte ed., Organized Social Complexity: Challenges to Politics and Policy (Princeton: Princeton University, 1975), pp. 77-116.

**Table 4-1. Characteristics of Potential Planning Cases** 

Country	Civil-Military Relations*	Distance in Std. Dev. from Western Organizational Culture**
Shinasa India	Wally Good	1.70
A SANGANA ANG ANG ANG ANG ANG ANG ANG ANG A		Historia (1900)
North Korea	Wary	3.33
Iran	Wary	2.87
Russia	Wary	Not Scored

Wary – significant monitoring of military by security apparatus and presence of political officers
 Bad – actual coup attempt or reported plotting within last 5 years

Ellis Joffee makes similar observations in "Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect," *The China Quarterly*, 146 (June 1996), pp. 299-314. Joffee reports that the Peoples Liberation Army has "enduring, albeit fluctuating, conflict" with the Chinese Communist party (p. 300), that the post-Deng era "contains the potential for unprecedented military influence on the makeup of Party leadership and on its policies." (p. 309), and that the Chinese military's extensive involvement in starting and running commercial enterprises will debilitate it: "Economic entanglement must also be at the expense of military professionalism." P. 311, and will "undermine unity and subordination to central control" (p. 312). Joffee concludes that, "[The PLA] cannot be a professional army in the Western sense..." (p. 300).

June Teufel Dreyer finds in "The New Officer Corps: Implications for the Future," *The China Quarterly*, 146 (June 1996), pp. 315-335, that there is a "strong emphasis on strengthening the political loyalties of the PLA" (p. 324), that most generals are "political" (pp. 326-327) and that "factionalism" is intense (pp. 329-332). "Corruption within the officer corps is a serious and apparently intractable problem." (p. 335)

Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon find in "China's Hollow Military," *The National Interest*, 56 (Summer 1999), that, "The PLA is still a party army with nepotism and political/family connections continuing to predominate in officer appointment and advancement. The soldiers, for the most part, are semi-literate peasants; there is no professional NCO corps..." Because these characteristics are likely to endure, they conclude that "[the PLA's] capability to act ... is severely limited...and will remain so for years."

<sup>\*\*</sup> A score of +1.0 means 15% of all countries were more Western; +2.0 means 48% of all countries were more Western; and +3.0 means 81% of all countries were more Western.

Because it is so frequently predicted that China is emerging as a significant military power (and occasionally as even a nascent "superpower"), we feel compelled to add a few paragraphs amplifying its entries in Table 4-1. There is a substantial amount of literature on the indicators of, and deleterious effects of. China's civil-military relations and organizational culture. See for example M. Ehsan Ahari, "U.S. Military Strategic Perspectives on the PRC," Asian Survey, XXXVII, 12 (December 1997), pp. 1163-1180. Ahari finds that, "Lest one be left with the impression that the incorporation of I[formation] W[arfare] capabilities is likely to be easy for the PRC, one is advised to consider ...the sociocultural constraints ... of Confucianism and communism..." which "restricts the movement of ideas and labor," creates "resistance to new ideas," military training that emphasizes "staying within the canon and rote memorization at the expense of independent inquiry," and promotes the "chauvinistic concept" of tiyong which "makes integration of foreign ideas difficult" (p. 1177). Ahari finds that the Chinese military lacks "institutionalized horizontal information-sharing," and that "bureaucrats and ideologues" play a dominant role (p. 1178). And these characteristics are likely to endure. "Any large-scale abandonment of the Soviet-style organizational principles would require China to become a more open society.... By the same token, suggestions ... that the Chinese would abandon the principle of ... control and fully incorporate the principle of multiorganizational networks so vital to information-based warfare must be regarded with skepticism" (pp. 1178-1179).

### POLICIES ON ARMS TRANSFER AND CONTROL

If our hypotheses are correct, arms transfers to developing nations are probably much less likely to cause significant shifts in regional conventional arms balances than commonly supposed. (Again, as stated previously, we are not asserting that this is true about transfers of nuclear, biological, or chemical arms or technologies.) Many recipients will simply lack the skill to fully utilize the modern weapon system capabilities. So to the extent that regional powers make realistic assessments of their neighbors' military capability, arms races will not automatically be kindled by the introduction of even advanced systems into a region. Nor would the transfer of such weapons to a potentially hostile power necessarily increase the risk to our allies in the region or to our forces should we need to operate there.

One area that *should* perhaps be of greater concern to us is the transfer of sophisticated technologies for training and simulation. These are increasingly important to the degree that of the high level of skill and readiness maintained by U.S. forces depends on them. (This is especially true in training and skill development of higher echelon staffs and task force commanders.) Acquisition and effective use of these technologies by hostile militaries could in theory pose an acute challenge to our ability to dominate future battlefields. Of course, our hypotheses suggest that the likelihood is low that our potential enemies could assimilate the advanced training and simulation technologies. But the possibility is still troubling.

# NET ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES AND INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Most net assessment techniques are of the "bean-counting" variety, focusing on the numbers and technical characteristics of the two sides' weapons. <sup>5</sup> That's also true of intelligence reporting. If our theories are correct, this approach may result in serious over

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., Paul K. Davis, ed., New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994); U. Candan, L.S. Dewald, and L.R. Speight, Present NATO Practice in Land Wargaming (The Hague: SHAPE Technical Center, 1987), Professional Paper STC-PP-252; Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., ed., Military Modeling (Alexandria, Va.: Military Operations Research Society, 1984); and John A. Battilega and Judith K. Grange, eds., The Military Applications of Modeling (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984).

estimations of the military effectiveness of potential enemies.<sup>6</sup> As we have argued, the possession of the material products of technology should in no way imply that these products could be used effectively. From our perspective, this approach to net assessment focuses on the wrong level of analysis and, in so doing, confuses latent weapons capability with military effectiveness. This is especially true of assessments at the theater, force-on-force levels that drive much defense programming (and hence defense budgets). The longer, more wide-ranging and more intense a conflict is, the more the effects discussed in this paper will become apparent.

In our ongoing skill work we have suggested it is imperative that the new generation of combat assessment models now under development include a proper comprehension of how skill and technology interact to produce real combat outcomes. If the hypotheses we explored here are correct, it may be equally important that tools used to forecast future capabilities of foreign forces incorporate civil-military relations and culture lag as factors. And it will be important for the Intelligence Community to have the capability to collect and analyze indicators related to those factors. Failing to do so may result in gross overestimates of the capabilities of potential opponents.

For a discussion of the over-estimations of Iraqi warfighting effectiveness prior to the Gulf War, see Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood," op. cit., pp. 139-179, 142.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Biddle, Hinkle, and Fischerkeller, "Skill and Technology in Modern Warfare," op. cit.

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# **Appendix**

### **DATASET CONSTRUCTION**

### FOREIGN OVERT MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

In order to test our hypotheses, we needed a set of data on modern military conflict. Funding constraints limited us to adaptation of existing datasets. As completed, our dataset is composed of three main sections: the first includes measures of the various independent variables, such as intervenor and target country financial resources, human capital measures, civil-military indicators, and cultural measures; the second section, based on a dataset constructed by Herbert K. Tillema on foreign overt military interventions, provides information regarding the dependent variable, conflict data and battle outcomes; and the third portion is composed of composite and comparative statistics that provided for hypothesis testing. This appendix describes the construction of the dataset, provides a codebook to interpret the data, and reproduces the dataset in its entirety.

The first step in constructing the dataset involved modifying the Tillema dataset of Overt Military Interventions, hereafter referred to as OMI. The OMI describes 690 foreign overt military interventions initiated between September 2, 1945, the day after Japanese armistice ended World War II, and December 31, 1991, one week after formal dissolution of the Soviet Union. Overt military intervention is operationally defined by Tillema as:

combatant or combat-ready military operations conducted upon foreign territory by units of a state's regular military forces. Overt military intervention includes conventional deployments of ground combat units that involve such actions as alert patrol, offensive maneuver, riot quelling, armed occupation of territory, and battle. It also includes other, usually less intense combatant military operations such as: commando or other small unit raids; aerial bombing, strafing, or rocketry; ground-based artillery or rocketry; and naval gunnery and rocketry. Overt military intervention includes all such operations within territories subject to others' jurisdiction, and also within distinct non-self-governing territories such as colonies, protectorates, mandate and trustee territories or occupied lands not fully integrated

Herbert K. Tillema, "OMILIST: 690 Foreign Overt Military Interventions, September 2, 1945-December 31, 1991," OMILIST Codebook.

within the generally recognized boundaries of a state. It excludes operations conducted by a state within its own integral territory.<sup>2</sup>

The OMI dataset also excludes engagements among vessels at sea and encounters among aircraft in flight.

The OMI data includes 690 individual foreign overt military interventions over the time period examined. For each intervention, it lists an intervening state and target territory; intervention start and end dates; a code for the initial type of military operation; and any subsequent changes in operations, whether the target consents to the intervention, the number of fatalities suffered by the intervenor, whether a resolution within the UN Security Council approving the use of force was passed prior to the initiation of intervention, and a name for the intervention.

To utilize the OMI for the purposes of the present research, we examined only those interventions that involved force-on-force engagements. As a result we followed several coding rules and thus removed a number of cases from the OMI in constructing our dataset. We removed all interventions involving foreign patrolling, rioting and riot suppression, and policing activities meant to assist the target territory in suppressing internal civil disturbances. Similarly, when the true target of an intervention was a rebel group attacking its own government from a foreign territory in an attempt to gain independence (e.g., the PLO or ANC), we excluded the record. If, however, a rebel group attacked its own government from foreign soil and a third state intervened to attack the rebel group in the foreign territory, we included the record, indicated that it was an insurgency movement, noted the target territory as the state from which the group sought independence and indicated the rebel group in parentheses, and listed the place of the attack by the third party, i.e., the foreign territory, in parentheses after the name of the conflict.

Finally, while Tillema lists the target territory as the geographical location of the intervention, we recoded the target to indicate the nationality of the troops being attacked by the intervening force. Thus, the intervenor and target in our dataset represent the attacking and defending forces for each conflict, regardless of the place where the engagement occurred.

Applying these additional coding rules to the OMI resulted in 457 military interventions involving force-on-force engagements, each coded to include the identity of the intervening state,

Tillema, OMILIST Codebook.

the target state (and rebel group when appropriate), inclusive dates of the engagement, type of military operations, and fatalities for the intervenor. These 457 interventions form the basis for our dataset.

### **Dependent Variable**

In order to make comparisons across all interventions and all types of engagements we normalized the fatalities suffered by the intervenor. Based on the start and end dates listed in the OMI we computed the length of the intervention in days and then normalized intervenor fatalities by this time measure. Thus, the dependent variable in our analyses is intervenor fatalities per day of conflict.

### **Independent Variables**

For each dyad we obtained information regarding economic resources, human capital, civil-military relations, and culture. In an effort to minimize unnecessary error variation across the several sources needed to obtain the information for each variable we generally employed the most comprehensive source of data. For financial resources this source proved to be the Penn World Tables, which "displays a set of national accounts economic time series covering many countries. Its expenditure entries are denominated in a common set of prices in a common currency so that real quantity comparisons can be made, both between countries and over time." The Penn World Tables offered the most comprehensive coverage both over time and in the breadth of national financial data covered. The Penn World Tables measures Real GDP per capita in constant 1985 US dollars. When Penn World Tables data was missing for either country in a dyad we used data from the World Bank, expressed as GNP per capita in constant 1987 US dollars. Finally, when World Bank data was unavailable for both nations in an intervention dyad, we employed International Monetary Fund data, expressed as GDP per capita in constant 1975 US dollars.

Penn World Table (version 5.6), The Center for International Comparison at the University of Pennsylvania. Data available online at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/; and described in Heston and Summers, "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988," Quarterly Journal of Economics (May 1991), pp. 327-368.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> World Bank and IMF Financial data were obtained directly from internal databases held at those institutions.

Because we were principally interested in the relative economic disparity between the two combatants, we always used a single source for the financial data for both states. As a result, though we use different economic measurements across the population of interventions, we are able to make across-dyad comparisons because we compare the ratio of one state's economic resources to its adversary's, both expressed in a common currency and controlling for inflation. The use of the ratios, therefore, helps to overcome some of the error introduced by employing different measures. Further, when they overlap, there is a high degree of consistency among the three measures; the correlations between the Penn World Tables and the World Bank and IMF are r = .932 (p < .001, n = 3103) and r = .849 (p < .001, n = 2254), respectively, while the World Bank and IMF figures correlate at r = .863 (p < .001, n = 1053).

Human capital was measured as the illiteracy rate for a nation's total population 15 years of age and older. As with per capita income, due to data constraints, we were forced to use illiteracy estimates from a number of sources. Where possible we used the World Bank World Development Indicators (1998) figures and supplemented this with data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Education Indicators, and the United States Census Bureau's International Database. Within a five year window prior to and following the start of the conflict, we used the illiteracy estimate that was closest to the date of the intervention. When an intervention fell between two estimates, an interpolation based on known data was computed. For interventions prior to 1960, illiteracy data was typically lacking. When possible, backward extrapolation was made based on known data points obtained more recently. These interpolations and backward extrapolations are noted in the dataset.

For comparative purposes, individual illiteracy rates were converted into z-scores based on the mean illiteracy of the four leading weapons exporting nations (US, UK, France, and Germany; mean = 2%) and the average annual standard deviation across all years of World Bank illiteracy data coverage (1960-1995, average annual standard deviation = 24.77). From these individual z-scores an illiteracy difference measure was computed for each dyad using the formula: intervenor illiteracy z-score minus target illiteracy z-score. This composite measure was used to control for the potential impact of illiteracy differences on battle outcomes.

Obtained online from <a href="http://unescostat.unesco.org/Indicator/Indframe.htm">http://unescostat.unesco.org/Indicator/Indframe.htm</a> and <a href="http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html">http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html</a>

Civil-military relations was measured as the presence or absence of coup activity in a country within two years prior to the start of an intervention. For complete global and temporal coverage we referenced a number of coup studies, as noted in Chapter 3, and supplemented this with additional research to expand the coverage of events. While many of the coup studies differentiate between coup plots, failed attempts, and successes, in our analyses we collapsed these categories into one category indicating poor civil-military relations. States were coded as having good civil-military relations if there were no coups, plots or attempts within two years prior to the initiation of the intervention, though a coup, plot, or attempt may have occurred outside that time frame.

The culture scores for each country were obtained from Geert Hofstede's work.<sup>6</sup> In order to compare combatants, each state's culture score was converted into a z-score based on the median culture score of the four leading weapons exporting nations (US, UK, France, and Germany; median = 36) and the standard deviation of the entire distribution of states (s.d. = 59.13). From these z-scores a cultural difference measure was computed for each dyad using the formula: intervenor z-score minus target z-score. It is this cultural difference score that was used both to control for cultural differences and to test for the significance of cultural differences among combatants.

Please direct questions regarding the dataset to: Matthew N. Diascro, Institute for Defense Analyses, Strategy, Forces and Resources Division, 1801 N. Beauregard Street, Alexandria, Virginia, 22311, (703) 845-2298, mdiascro@ida.org.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Geert Hofstede, Culture's Consequences, op. cit.

# **CODEBOOK**

The dataset is presented in Table A1.

The district to presented in Tuest 121.			
NUM	Intervention Number		
INTERVEN	Intervening State		
ILIT	Intervenor Illiteracy Rate		
ILITSO	Intervenor Illiteracy Data Source		
	Value	Label	
	1	World Bank	
	2	UNESCO	
	3	US Census Bureau	
	4	Interpolation using World Bank Data	
	5	Backward projection using World Bank Data	
	6	IDA Estimation	
ICOUP	Intervenor Coup Type		
	Value	Label	
	0	No Coups	
	1	No Coups within 2 years prior to intervention	
	2	Plot within 2 years prior to intervention	
	3	Failed Coup within 2 years prior to intervention	
	4	Successful coup within 2 years prior to intervention	
	8 9	No data within 2 years prior to intervention No coup data for state	

ICSO	Intervenor Coup Data Source	
	Value	Label
	1	Luttwak study
	2	Dix study
	3	McGowan study
	4	Wang study
	5	Kebschull study
	6	IDA Online Research <sup>7</sup>
ICULT	Intervenor Cu	lture Score (from Hofstede)
TARGET	Target State (Name of Rebel Group Target, if applicable)	
TLIT	Target Illiteracy Rate	
TLITSO	Target Illiteracy Data Source	
	Value	Label
	1	World Bank
	2	UNESCO
	3	US Census Bureau
	4	Interpolation using World Bank Data
	5	Backward projection using World Bank Data
	6	IDA Estimation
TCOUP	Target Coup	Туре
	Value	Label
	0	No Coups
	1	No Coups within 2 years prior to intervention
	2	Plot within 2 years prior to intervention
	3	Failed Coup within 2 years prior to intervention
	4	Successful coup within 2 years prior to intervention
	8	No data within 2 years prior to intervention
	9	No coup data for state

Infoplease Encyclopedia <a href="http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopdict.html">http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopdict.html</a> and Library of Congress Country Studies <a href="http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html">http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html</a>.

TCSO	Target Cou	Target Coup Data Source		
	Value	Label		
	1	Luttwak study		
	2	Dix study		
	3	McGowan study		
	4	Wang study		
	5	Kebschull study		
	6	IDA Online Research		
TCULT	Target Cult	ure Score		
ILDIF	Illiteracy Di	fference Score - Intervenor Illiteracy Z-Score Minus		
		Target Illiteracy Z-Score		
CUDIF	Cult	tural Difference Score - Intervenor Culture Z-Score Minus		
		Target Culture Z-Score		
NAME	Name of In	tervention		
DATE	Intervention	Intervention Start Date		
<b>ENDDATE</b>	Intervention	Intervention End Date		
LENGTH	Length of I	Length of Intervention in Days		
MILOPS	Type of Mi	Type of Military Operations		
	Value	Label		
	1	Conventional Ground Operation		
	2	Small Unit Commando Raid		
	3	Air Strike		
	4	Artillery Bombardment		
	5	Naval Bombardment		
IFATAL		Total Intervenor Combat Fatalities for Intervention		
NORMAL	Intervenor	Intervenor Combat Fatalities Normalized by Length of Intervention		
	(in Fatalities per Da	ay)		
RATIO	Financial Re	Financial Resources Ratio (Intervenor / Target)		

RCODE	Financial I	Resources Ratio Code
	Value	Label
	1	Penn World Tables Data
	2	World Bank Data
	3	IMF Data

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Australia	2.0	9	0	9	22	Hep. Of Vietnam (VC & DHV)	25.9	4	4	091	0.1-	-2.3
Belgium	2.0	9	0	9	116	DPRK			6	3		-0.7
Belgium	2.0	9	0	9	116	UPRK			6	160		-0.7
Belgium	2.0	9	0	9	116	Rwanda	8:19	1	0	143	-2.4	-0.5
Belgium	2.0	9	0	9		Rwanda	49.8	4	4	143	-1.9	-0.5
Belgium	2.0	9	0	9		Zaire	28.0	2	3 4	143	-1.0	-0.5
Belgium	2.0	9	0	9		Zaire (FNLC)	34.1	-	2 3	143	-1.3	-0.5
Belgium	2.0	9	0	9		Zaire (Gizenga Faction)	34.1	1	2 3	143	-1.3	-0.5
Burkina Faso	91.2	-	4	3		Mali	90.6	_	1 3	151	0.0	0.0
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Burma (Myanmar)	39.9	5	0	_	160	Taiwan (Kuomintang)	THE STREET, ST	Code and Company of Co	9 0	151		0.2
Burma (Myanmar)	38.8	5	0		160	Taiwan (Kuomintang)			9 0	151		0.2
Burma (Myanmar)	22.0	-	-	9	160	Thailand	9.3	-	1 6	160	0.5	0.0
Cambodia	59.8	4		9	160	Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam	16.6	2	1 6	160	1.7	0.0
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Cambodia	63.9			9	160	Thailand	32.3	Ŧ	1	160	1.3	0.0
Cambodia	63.9	1	-	9	160	Thailand	26.2	4	-	160	1.5	0.0
Cambodia	63.2		-	9	160	Thailand	25.4	4	1	160	1.5	0:0
Cambodia	60.5	4	-	9	160	Thailand	12.0	2	4 6	160	2.0	0.0
Canada	2.0	9	0	9	41	DPRK			6	160		-2.0
Canada	2.0	9	0	9	41	DPRK			6	160		-2.0
Ohad	0.77			7	143	Libya	43.5		1 6	143	4.1	0.0
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China	74.0	5	-	9	151	Burma (Myanmar)	41.6	2	0	160	1.3	-0.2
China	67.9	9		9	151	Burma (Myanmar)	38.8	5	. 0	160	1.2	-0.2
China	50.9	5	Safetie is the standard and the	6	151	Burma (Myanmar)	31.1	4	-	160	0.8	-0.2
China	34.0	2		9	151	Dem: Rep, Of Vietnam	16.6	2	9	160	0.7	-0.2
China	80.0	5	and the contract actions	9	151	Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam (Vietminh)	37.8	5	1 6	160	1.7	-0.2
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China	) (	<b>)</b>	THE CASHLE ASSESS	N. C.		Tion of the second of the seco	202		2	00		0.0

PUSHTUN SEPARATISM  AFGHAN WAR  AFGHAN WAR  GREEK CIVIL WAR  YOM KIPPUR WAR (In Egypt)  TINDOU'F RAIDS  MOROCCAN-ALGS  POLISARIO WAR (In Spanish Sahara)  SINPE ISLAND INCIDENTS	20-Con 1050				大きない とうないできるとのないという	THE PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY	大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大大	
ypt) WAI	20-2eh-1320	30-Sep-1950	-	8	0	0.0		
Vpt)	05-Sep-1981	18-Dec-1981	105	3	0	0'0		
	18-Sep-1983	30-Mar-1987	1290	3	-	0.0	ACCIONES INCIDENCIA (INCIDENCIA) (INCIDENCIA	Control of the second second second
	13-Aug-1949	14-Aug-1949	7.2	2	20	10.0		
	17-Oct-1973	28-Oct-1973	12	-	0	0.0	0.3	2
₹ 5	12~Jul-1962	18-Oct-1962	. 66	2	0	0.0		
둤	08-Oct-1963	04-Nov-1963	28		100	3.6	officer and statementalists is transfilted taken meddellas	
NIPE ISLAND INCIDENTS	27-Jan-1976	29-Jan-1976	3	1	30	10.0	3.5	2
	09-May-1958	09-Aug-1958	93	2	0	0.0	1.6	1
PILCOMAYO INCIDENT	13-May-1962	16-May-1962	4	T.	0	0.0	3.7	·
FALKLANDS WAR	02-Apr-1982	20-Jun-1982	80	and the family and the street had the	700	8.8	0.5	and to recognise acres to the
KOREAN WAR	04-101-1950	27. hil. 1953	1120	3	100		Ether Landston and Antonia	The second second
KORFAN WAR	17-Oct-1950	27- hil-1953	1015	-	100	10	d The Chamber of the Bear and the course	Sand to factories ford
FIRST INDO CHINESE WAR	11-Sen-1945	09-Eah-1048	146		20	0.0	THE RESERVE OF THE PARTY OF THE	an a discourse
	00 00 1000	11 0 1000	210		,	3		A STATE OF THE STA
ONTROINION	Z8-OCI-1804	11-Aug-1900	700	-	-	0.0	7.4.	-
MALAYAN INSURGENCY	15-Aug-1950	30-Jul-1960	3638	3	8	0.0		
SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR	03-Jun-1965	08-Dec-1971	2380	-	200	0.2		
KOREAN WAR	31-Jan-1951	27-Jul-1953	606	_	8	0.1		
KOREAN WAR	01-Jun-1951	27-Jul-1953	788	-	50	0.1	The second of the second secon	
TUTSI-HUTU VIOLENCE	08-Nov-1959	01-Aug-1962	866	1	3	0.0		
TUTS! INVASION	04-Oct-1990	28-Oct-1990	25	-	0	0.0	17.5	A STATE OF THE SECTION OF THE SECTIO
	24-San-1991	30-Oct-1991	26		0	0.0	103.8	6
COLMEN TO DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE P	10 May 1070	10-11-1078	52	-	<b>)</b>	0.00	20.0	-
CONGOLESE CIVIL WAS	24-May-1970	28-Nov. 1964	3		0	7.0	19.9	-
A CHECK THE TAXABLE TO SELECT THE TAXABLE TO	2201-100	100 Les 4076			3			A Section of the sect
AGACHER SHELLING	03-JUN-1975	00-001-19/5	-	4	0	0.0	0.0	-
	20-040-02	CO-DAC-1800		7	3 (	000	6.0	THE PROPERTY AND PARTY AND
	20-Sep-1953	06-Oct-1953	1/	2	O CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF TH	0.0	0.2	
KOOMIN I ANG SUPPHESSION (In Inaliand)	29-Mar-1955	29-Mar-1955		•	0	00	770	
	12-Mar-1984	12-Mar-1984	-	2	15	15.0	0.2	-
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	15-Mar-1977	10~Jul-1978	483	N	2000	10.4		
SECOND INDOCHINESE WAR	01-May-1975	15-Jan-1976	260	7	8	0.1		
PREAH VIHEAR RAIDS	11-Aug-1962	12-Aug-1962	2	2	0	0.0		
PREAH VIHEAR CLASHES	20-Jun-1965	20-Jun-1965	-	2	0	0.0		
PREAH VIHEAR CLASHES	20-Jan-1966	13-Feb-1966	25	2	0	0.0		
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	22-Nov-1976	12-Dec-1984	2943	2	100	0.0	Walter Control of Cont	Optoble of Contraction
KOREAN WAR	19-Dec-1950	27-Jul-1953	952		200	0.2		
kindi merendara biking bilakanggangan katan kahan kahan ban kanan lang menghanan kanantangga KORFAN WAR	28-Mav-1951	27-Jul-1953	792	1	200	0.3		Albanis (Com-m.A.C. Albanis) . Land
I BYAN-CHADIAN WAR	05-Sep-1987	07-Sep-1987	3		02	23.3	0.0	2
LAKE CHAD SKIRMISHES	30-Apr-1983	11-Jul-1983	73	2	80	1.1	0.2	_
ANTI-DEBY RAIDS	10-Apr-1989	20-Apr-1990	376	2	0	0.0	0.5	
KENGTIING BAID	30-Jan-1950	30-Jan-1950	1	2	0	0.0		GOZAMINECE III X SAG
CHINESE BORDER RAIDS	20-Nov-1955	14-Dec-1956	391	2	7	0.0	1.8	3
CHINESE BORDER RAIDS	15-Jan-1969	07-Nov-1969	297	2	0	0.0	1.5	-
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	21-Anr-1978	15-Oct-1987	3465	2	20000	5.8		24,840
	02-Sep-1045	21-1-1046	233			00		Comment of the Control of the Contro
SING INDO-CHINESE WAN	07-400-1940	91-041-1940	78	- 6	<b>,</b>	10		
INCHINE MAD (Chine Leiden)	Of thuy-1505	CI-CUI-1908	105	, E	1000		9.0	
SINO-INDIAIN WAR (Galwan Incident)	Z081-IDC-1Z	7061-NON-77	62	7	0001	0.0	0.0	-
INDO-PAKISTANI WAR (Sino-Indian Skirmishe	s21-Sep-1965	11-Dec-1965	88	4	10	-0	8.0	

Name	Ξ	INTERVEN	Щ	ILITSO	COUP	OSO	ICULT	TARGET	ПП	TLITSO	TCOUP	TCSO	TCULT	ILDIF	CUDIF
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Offmar         618 6 1 1 6 116         1 1 6 116         1 1 6 116         1 1 6 116         1 1 6 116         1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		ina	34.0	7	-	9	151	Laos	58.3	2	-	9	160	-1.0	-0.2
Offman         71.5         1         6         151         Politypal         202.8         1         1         6         151         Politypal           Offman         44.6         5         1         6         151         FOK VMerram         202.8         1         1         6         100         10.0           Offman         74.0         5         1         6         151         TDAK         5         1         6         151         11.0         174         18           Offman         74.0         5         1         6         151         TDAK         50.4         1         2         1         2         1         2         1         2         1         2         1         2         1         2         1         2         1         2         1         2         1		ina ina	61.8	2		9	151	Nepal	91.2		0		151	-1.2	0.0
Offman         44.42         5         1         6         151         Poles, O'Vertrain         20.5         4         1         6         151         Poles, O'Vertrain         20.5         4         1         1         14.4         18         17.4         18           Onna         74.0         5         1         6         151         Their         9         6         151         18         17.4         18           Onna         74.0         5         1         6         151         Their         9         6         151         17.4         18           Onna         50.0         5         1         6         151         Their         9         6         151         18         17.4         18         17.4         18         17.4         18         17.4         18         17.4         18         17.4         18		ina	71.5	5	-	9	151	Portugal	38.1	Canada Turk favorable and each of all all and		6	195	£.	-0.7
Offman         74,0         5         1         11         TOAK         29,4         1         1         TV4         18           Offman         74,0         5         1         6         151         TDAK         29,4         1         1         TV4         18           Offman         74,0         5         1         6         151         TDAK         29,4         1         1         TV4         18           Offman         65,0         5         1         6         151         TDAK         29,4         1         1         148         151         151         151         151         151         151         151         151         151         151         151         151         151         151         152         151         152		ina	44.9	5		9	151	Rep. Of Vietnam	20.5	4		9	160	1.0	-0.2
Orthan         74.0         6         151         TORK         264, 1         1         174, 1 (8)           Orthan         74.0         6         151         Tubet         9         6         151         Tubet           Offsite         23.0         6         1         Tubet         6         151         Tubet         9         6         151         Tubet           Octomble         27.1         1         6         151         Tubet         77.7         8         6         151         150         151         150 <t< td=""><td></td><td>ina</td><td>74.0</td><td>5</td><td>-</td><td>The second second second second</td><td>151</td><td>ROK</td><td>29.4</td><td>en operational contract of the fellowing con</td><td>-</td><td>an de majoritationes espaines es primarios es primarios es primarios es primarios es primarios es primarios es</td><td>174</td><td>1.8</td><td>-0.4</td></t<>		ina	74.0	5	-	The second second second second	151	ROK	29.4	en operational contract of the fellowing con	-	an de majoritationes espaines es primarios es primarios es primarios es primarios es primarios es primarios es	174	1.8	-0.4
Online         57.0         6         151         Thekt         9         6         151           Online         62.0         1         6         151         Thekt         9         6         151           Online         26.0         1         6         151         Thekt         8         6         160           Colombia         27.1         1         8         160         DPRK         7.7.6         4         3         160           Colombia         27.1         1         1         1         1         2         3         143         2.0           Colombia         13.2         1		ina	74.0	2			151	ROK	29.4				174	1.8	-0.4
Offinition         58.0         5         1         6         151         TUBER         9         6         151           Offinition         50.9         5         1         6         151         TUBER         9         6         151           Colorincia         27.1         1         8         6         154         CARTON         75         9         6         150           Colorincia         27.1         8         1         1         1         1         150         CARTON           Cuba         14.9         4         1         1.66         Campoint         8.2         1         1         150         2           Cuba         10.9         2         1         2         1.66         Campoint         8.2         1         4 <td></td> <td>lina</td> <td>74.0</td> <td>5</td> <td>-</td> <td>9</td> <td>151</td> <td>Tibet</td> <td></td> <td>100 000 000</td> <td>6</td> <td>9</td> <td>151</td> <td></td> <td>0.0</td>		lina	74.0	5	-	9	151	Tibet		100 000 000	6	9	151		0.0
Optiona         SEA         In SEA         USSRN         B         6         160           Colombia         27.1         1         6         151         USSRN         9         160           Colombia         27.1         1         1         156         DPHK         77.6         4         3         143         2.9           Cuba         13.9         4         1		ina	63.0	2		9	151	Tibet			6		151		0.0
Conclusion         27.1         B         156         DPRN         4         1         156         Concording         7.2         4         9         160         2.0           Cutha         11.9         4         1         1.56         Concording         65.2         1         1         1.43         2.9         1.00         2.9           Cutha         11.9         4         1         1.56         Sometian         84.1         1         1         2.9         2.9         2.9           Cutha         10.0         2         1         2         1.56         Sometian         84.1         1         2         1.43         2.9           Outha         10.0         2         1         2         1.56         Zaine/FNLAN         84.1         1         2         1.9         2         1.0         1.0         2         1.0         2         1.0         2         1.0         2         1.0         2         1.0         2         1.0         2         1.0         2         1.0         2         1.0         2         1.0         2         1.0         2         1.0         2         1.0         2         1.0         2		iina	50.9	2	-	9	151	USSR			8	9			
October         27.1         8         1         2         2         3         4         1         1         1         1         2         2         3         4         1         1         1         2         2         3         4         1         1         1         4         2         3         4         1         1         1         4         3         4         4         4         4         4         3         1         4         3         1         4         3         1         4		lombia	27.1		8		156	DPAK			6		160		-0.1
Outba         133         4         1         1         169         Cenged         77.5         4         3         3         4         44         2.6           Outba         104         1         1         166         Someta         881         1         1         1         2.9           Outba         106         2         1         2         166         Someta         881         1         2         184         2.9           Outba         106         2         1         2         166         Sameta (NA)         881         1         2         189         199           Outba         106         1         1         2         166         Carricolal         881         4         4         6         199           Dom Rap Of Vietnam         166         2         1         6         160         Carricolal         861         6         160         170         171           Dom Rap Of Vietnam         166         2         1         6         160         Orna         861         6         160         170         171         171         171         171         171         171         171 <t< td=""><td></td><td>lombia</td><td>27.1</td><td>-</td><td>ထ</td><td>A COLON A COLO</td><td>156</td><td>DPRK</td><td>eer zo sosjoos " zerosjoek II julija a</td><td>orderer v. der, at flesskinger, dr. jare er seed er</td><td>o</td><td>shands Manna Blod Sarah Dell'assidante</td><td>160</td><td>Assessed Angelogies et 1950's Editoriorial</td><td>-0.1</td></t<>		lombia	27.1	-	ထ	A COLON A COLO	156	DPRK	eer zo sosjoos " zerosjoek II julija a	orderer v. der, at flesskinger, dr. jare er seed er	o	shands Manna Blod Sarah Dell'assidante	160	Assessed Angelogies et 1950's Editoriorial	-0.1
Outbase         14.9         4         1         15.6         Monoscoo         68.2         1         1         14.9         4         1         15.6         Monoscoo         68.2         1         1         13.4         2.9           Outbase         10.8         2         1         2         1.66         Zaino (Matham)         83.1         1         2         1.9           Outbase         10.8         2         1         2         1.66         Zaino (Matham)         83.8         4         1         6         1.9           Dom. Rep. Of Verterum         16.6         2         1         6         1.00         Carrindola         83.8         4         1         6         1.0           Dom. Rep. Of Verterum         16.6         2         1         6         Orange         77.1         4         6         1.1           Dom. Rep. Of Verterum         16.6         2         1         1.60         Carrindola         77.1         2         1         1.60         Date (Matham)         2.2         1         1.60         1.0         1.1         1         1.7         1.1         1.7         1.1         1.1         1.7         1.7         1.7<	1	ba	13.9	4			156	Cango	77.5	*	3	9	143	-2.6	0.2
Other         108         2         1         2         166         Sometial         881         1         2         139         20           Oute         108         2         1         2         166         Zanic (FNLA)         841         1         2         169         169         Carnicode         841         1         2         169         169         Carnicode         848         4         4         6         169         169         Carnicode         848         4         4         6         169         177	ا ماسخا ب	ba	14.9	4	enessanchessine cond	derir atrecti untulu estadilia 1	156	Morocco	86.2	Check Colonial States of Albertain	ani masharikalikini ani disebilikin	C SVA Terroradistic Sympotherina	143	-2.9	0.2
Ochan         108         2         1 5         Salre         341         1         2         148         0.9           Ochan         Ochan         1 6         2         1         2         166         2 air (FMLA)         341         1         2         3         49         0           Dem Rep Ol Vertram         16.0         1         1         6         100         Cambodia         59.8         4         6         107         178         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0		ba	10.8	2		2	156	Somalia	83.1	_			134	-2.9	0.4
Ochha         Cohha         541         1         2         169         Carinordia         6416         4         2         169         170         Carinordia         6416         4         6         160         171         160         171         171         4         6         160         171         6         160         171         4         6         160         171         6         171         6         171         6         171         6         171         6         171         7         7         7         7         6         171         6         171         7         171         4         6         170         171         9         171         171         171	C may be	iba	10.8	2	-	2	156	Zaire	34.1	-	2	3	143	-0.9	0.2
Denn Fleqo, Ol Veternam         25.9         4         1         6         160         Cararbodies         64.6         4         4         6         160         1.7           Denn Fleqo, Ol Veternam         16.0         1         1         6         160         Chring         34.0         2         1         6         160         1.9           Denn Fleqo Ol Veternam         16.6         2         1         1         6         1.0         0         1.1         6         1.6         1.9           Denn Fleqo Ol Veternam         16.6         2         1         1         6         1.0<		ba	10.8	2		2	156	Zaire (FNLA)	34.1	1	2		143	-0.9	0.2
Dem Rep Ol Vetirem         16.0         1         1         6         180         Carrboole         558         4         1         6         150         -1           Dem Rep Ol Vetiram         16.0         2         1         60         China         44.0         2         1         6         151         -0.7           Dem Rep Ol Vetiram         16.0         2         1         60         China         4.0         2         1         6         151         -0.7           Dem Rep Ol Vetiram         16.0         2         1         6         1         4         0         1         1         0           Dem Rep Ol Vetiram         16.0         2         1         1         6         Rep Ol Vetiral         25.2         4         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         1         1         1         1         0         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1 <td></td> <td>em. Rep. Of Vietnam</td> <td>22.9</td> <td>4</td> <td>-</td> <td>9</td> <td>160</td> <td>Cambodia</td> <td>64.6</td> <td>4</td> <td>4</td> <td>9</td> <td>160</td> <td>-1.7</td> <td>0.0</td>		em. Rep. Of Vietnam	22.9	4	-	9	160	Cambodia	64.6	4	4	9	160	-1.7	0.0
Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam         16.6         China         34.0         2         1         6         China         34.0         2         1         6         15.1         4.7           Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam         36.1         4         9         1         16.0         China         36.0         2         1         6         15.0         14.0           Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam         16.6         2         1         6         4         9         1         16.0         14.0         1         1         16.0         1		m. Rep. Of Vietnam	16.0			9	160	Cambodia	59.8	*		9	160	-1,8	0.0
Dem. Ray Of Verland         166         2         1         60         Ordine         34,0         2         1         60         151         407           Dem. Ray Of Verland         36.1         4         9         1         160         Lates (Hond)         58.3         2         0         1         10         1.13           Dem. Ray Of Victian         156.5         4         9         160         Hase (Hond)         25.9         4         1         1         10         0.0           Dem. Ray Of Victian         156.2         9         160         Hold         1         2         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         2         1         1         4         4         6         1	Pri 1666 P	em. Rep. Of Vietnam	16.6	2	at his constants for different reads.	der proceed being dated at sealing	160	China	34.0	2		9	151	-0.7	0.2
Den. Rep. Of Victnam         30.1         4         9         160         Lack         77.1         4         0         1         160         -1.9           Den. Rep. Of Victnam         25.9         2         1         160         Lack Hindry         58.9         2         1         6         10         0         1	ŏ	m. Rep. Of Vietnam	16.6	2	·		160	China	34.0	2		9	151	7:0-	0.2
Dem. Rep. Of Vertream         15.6         2         1         160         Lace (Hinoral)         683         2         1         6         10           Dem. Rep. Of Vertraam         25.9         4         9         160         Holy Contract         12.0         4         1         1         1         0           Dem. Rep. Of Vertraam         16.5         9         160         HOK         29.4         1         4         6         160         0.0           DPRK         17.9         2         1         2         1         4         6         17.4         1.7           DPRK         17.9         2         1         2         160         HOK         29.4         1         4         1         1         1         1         1         1         2         160         HOK         29.4         1		em. Rep. Of Vietnam	30.1	4	6	and the base's also died.	160	Laos	77.1	4	0	-	160	-1.9	0.0
Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam         25.9         4         9         160         Rep. Of Vietnam         25.9         4         1         160         O. O		m. Rep. Of Vietnam	16.6	2	1		160	Laos (Hmong)	58.3	2		9	. 091	-17	0.0
Dem. Rap Of Neinam         15.6         1         160         Thaland         12.0         2         4         6         160         Dong           DFRK         9         160         ROK         23.4         1         4         1         17.4           DPRK         9         160         ROK         23.1         4         1         1         17.4           DPRK         17.0         1         2         160         POK         21.5         4         1         1         17.4           DPRK         17.0         1         2         160         PoK         21.5         4         1         1         17.4         17.4           Ecuador         17.0         1         2         160         PoK         21.5         4         1         17.4         17.4         17.4           Ecuador         17.0         1         1         2         160         PoK         21.5         4         1         17.4         17.4         17.4         17.4         17.4         17.4         17.4         17.4         17.4         17.4         17.4         17.4         17.4         17.4         17.4         17.4         17.4		em. Rep. Of Vietnam	25.9	4	o	The same of the sa	160	Rep. Of Vietnam	25.9	4	-	-	160	0.0	0.0
OPARK         9         160         ROK         294         1         3         1         774           OPARK         9         160         ROK         294         1         3         1         774           OPARK         178         1         2         160         Peru         21.5         1         2         179         -01           Ecuador         17.8         1         1         2         160         Peru         21.5         1         2         179         -01           Ecuador         17.8         1         1         2         160         Peru         11.0         1 <td></td> <td>am, Rep. Of Vietnam</td> <td>16.6</td> <td>ટ</td> <td>F</td> <td></td> <td>160</td> <td>Thailand</td> <td>12.0</td> <td>2</td> <td>4</td> <td>9</td> <td>991</td> <td>0.2</td> <td>0.0</td>		am, Rep. Of Vietnam	16.6	ટ	F		160	Thailand	12.0	2	4	9	991	0.2	0.0
OPPHK         9         160         ROK         224         1         4         6         174           DPHK         100         POK         211         2         160         PoK         211         2         179         401           Ecuador         17.0         1         1         2         160         Peru         180         1         1         2         179         401           Ecuador         17.0         1         1         2         160         Peru         180         1         1         2         179         401           Ecuador         17.0         1         1         2         160         Peru         180         1         1         2         179         2         179         2         179         2         179         2         1         2         179         2         1         2         1         2         1		»RK			6		160	ROK	29.4	-	3	_	174		-0.2
OPPIK         9         160         ROK         215         4         1         174           Coundor         170         2         160         Peru         211         2         179         0           Coundor         170         1         2         160         Peru         180         1         2         179         0           Eurolor         170         1         1         2         160         Peru         180         1         2         179         0           Egypt         828         6         1         1         43         Israel         188         5         1         7         2         2           Gypt         742         1         1         143         Israel         121         1         7         2	Y.	э <del>н</del> к			6		160	ROK	29.4	7	4	9	174		-0.2
Ecuador         17.9         2         160         Penu         21.1         2         178         -0.1           Eucuador         17.9         1         2         160         Peru         161         1         2         179         -0.1           Egypt         51.6         1         1         6         143         Iraq         40.3         1         1         6         184         5         1         1         6         143         1         1         1         6         143         Iraq         40.3         1         6         143         1         1         6         143         Iraq         11.3         1	-	2RK		a to the second	6		160	ROK	21.5	4	-	-	174		-0.2
Ecuador         17.0         1         2         160         Penu         18.0         1         1         2         179         0.0           Egypt         61.8         1         1         6         143         Gypus         40.3         1         1         6         143         Grad         40.3         1         1         79         2.5           Egypt         742         1         1         143         Israel         17.9         5         1         79         2.3           Egypt         65.8         4         1         143         Israel         17.9         5         1         79         2.2           Egypt         65.8         4         1         143         Statel         12.1         1         79         2.2           Egypt         61.8         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1 <td></td> <td>Nador</td> <td>17.9</td> <td>CV</td> <td></td> <td>\$</td> <td>89</td> <td>Реп</td> <td>21.1</td> <td>7</td> <td>-</td> <td>2</td> <td>179</td> <td>Ģ</td> <td>-0.3</td>		Nador	17.9	CV		\$	89	Реп	21.1	7	-	2	179	Ģ	-0.3
Egypt         618         1         6         143         Cypprus         110         1         6         143         Cypprus         110         1         6         143         Iraq         403         1         1         6         143         Iraq         212         5         1         7         6         143         15         1         143         Iraq         212         5         1         7         7         2.5         2         4         1         143         Iraq         212         5         1         7         9         2.3         2         2         2         4         1         143         Iraq         17.9         5         1         79         2.2         2         1         79         2.2         2	2000	uador	17.0	-	-	2	160	Peru	18.0	-	-	2	179	0.0	-0.3
Egypti         51.6         1         6         143         Iraq         40.3         1         6         143         Iraq         5         1         6         143         0.5           Egypt         78.4         5         4         1         14.3         Israel         18.8         5         1         79         2.4           Egypt         74.2         1         1         14.3         Israel         17.9         5         1         79         2.3           Egypt         65.8         4         1         14.3         Israel         12.1         1         79         2.2           Egypt         65.8         4         1         6         14.3         Israel         12.1         1         79         2.2           Egypt         65.8         4         1         6         14.3         Israel         12.1         1         79         2.2           Egypt         74.2         1         1         4         4         4         6         14.3         0.6           Egypt         74.2         1         1         1         1         1         4         4         4         6		ypt	61.8	_	_	9	143	Cyprus	0.11		-	9	161	_ 	-0.3
Egypt         78.4         5         1         143         Israel         21.2         5         1         79         2.5           Egypt         77.2         1         1         143         Israel         18.8         5         1         79         2.3           Egypt         74.2         1         1         1         143         Israel         17.9         5         1         79         2.3           Egypt         68.8         4         1         1         143         Israel         17.9         5         1         79         2.3           Egypt         65.8         4         1         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         79         2.2           Egypt         61.8         1         1         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         79         2.2           Egypt         61.8         1         1         1         143         Vennen Arab Republic (Royalists)         96.2         4         4         6         143         0.9           Egypt         74.2         1         1         1         1         1         2         1         2	136427	ypt	51.6	T-ORDINAL PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON ADDRESS OF THE PERSON AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON ADDRESS OF THE PERSON AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON ADDRESS OF THE PERSON AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON A	-	9	143	Iraq	40.3	-	-	9	143	0.5	0.0
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Egypt         742         1         143         Israel         184         5         1         79         2.3           Egypt         65.8         4         1         143         Israel         17.9         5         1         79         2.3           Egypt         65.8         4         1         1         143         Israel         12.1         1         79         2.2           Egypt         65.8         4         1         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         79         2.2           Egypt         61.8         1         1         6         143         Librael         46.1         2         3         6         143         0.0           Egypt         61.8         1         1         1         1         1         1         2         3         6         143         0.0           Egypt         73.2         1         1         1         1         1         1         4         6         143         0.0           Egypt         4         2         1         1         1         1         4         1         1         1         1	1	Jypt	78.4	5	4	-	143	Israel	18.8	5	-	CONTRACTOR	79	2.4	1.1
Egypt         74.2         1         14.3         Israel         17.9         5         1         79         2.3           Egypt         65.8         4         1         14.3         Israel         12.1         1         79         2.3           Egypt         65.8         4         1         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         79         2.2           Egypt         65.8         1         1         6         143         Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         0.6           Egypt         74.2         1         1         1         143         Yemen Arab Republic (Royalists)         66.2         4         4         6         143         0.9           Egypt         72.2         1         1         1         1         1         4         4         6         143         0.9           Egypt         72.2         1         1         1         1         1         4         6         143         0.9           Elisabador         37.0         2         1         4         4         6         143         0.2           Elhiopia		Ypr	74.2				143	srae	18.4	5	<b>_</b> .		62	2.3	
Egypt         65.8         4         1         143         Israel         12.1         1         1         79         2.2           Egypt         65.8         4         1         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         79         2.2           Egypt         61.8         1         1         6         143         Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         2.2           Egypt         74.2         1         1         1         143         Yemen Arab Republic (Royalists)         96.2         4         4         6         143         0.9           Egypt         74.2         1         1         1         143         Yemen Arab Republic (Royalists)         96.2         4         4         6         143         0.9           Elypt         72.2         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         0         0         6         143         0         0         6         143         0         2         1         1 <t< td=""><td></td><td>yypt</td><td>74.2</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td>143</td><td> srae </td><td>17.9</td><td>2</td><td>-</td><td></td><td>6/</td><td>2.3</td><td>1.1</td></t<>		yypt	74.2	-			143	srae	17.9	2	-		6/	2.3	1.1
Egypt         65.8         4         1         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         1         79         2.2           Egypt         61.8         1         1         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         79         2         2         3         6         149         2         2         3         6         143         0.0	A	Jypi.	68.8	4	_		143	Israel	13.5	4			8)	7.7	1.1
Egypt         61.8         1         43         Israel         12.1         1         79         2.0           Egypt         61.8         1         1         143         Lbya         46.1         2         3         6         143         2.0           Egypt         74.2         1         1         1         143         Sauch Arabia         66.38         4         0         6         143         0.0           Egypt         74.2         1         1         1         1         4         4         1         2         143         0.0           ElSabador         47.3         4         4         4         1         2         173         0.2           El Salvador         37.7         2         4         4         1         2         173         0.2           El Salvador         37.7         2         4         2         179         0.0           Ethiopia         95.8         1         0         1         134         DPRK           Ethiopia         95.8         1         1         3         134         Somalia         33.1         1         3         134         0.5 <td>1</td> <td>Jypt</td> <td>65.8</td> <td>4</td> <td>-</td> <td>9</td> <td>143</td> <td>Israel</td> <td>12.1</td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td></td> <td>79</td> <td>2.2</td> <td>1.1</td>	1	Jypt	65.8	4	-	9	143	Israel	12.1	-	-		79	2.2	1.1
Egypt         61.8         1         1         6         143         Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         0.6           Egypt         74.2         1         1         143         Saucil Arabia         63.8         4         0         6         143         0.6           Egypt         74.2         1         1         1         4         4         4         4         6         143         0.9           Elsoph         42.9         1         2         187         Honduras         37.7         2         4         2         179         0.2           El Salvador         37.7         2         4         2         179         0.2         179         0.0           Ethiopia         95.8         1         0         1         134         DPRK         9         160           Ethiopia         95.8         1         1         3         154         Somalia         83.1         1         0         3         140           Ethiopia         95.8         1         3         134         Somalia         83.1         1         3         134         0.5		JVDI.	8.6	_		9	143	Srael	12:1	-	_		79	08	
Egypt         74.2         1         1         143         Saudi Arabia         63.8         4         0         6         443         0.4           Egypt         74.2         1         1         143         Yemen Arab Republic (Royalists)         96.2         4         4         6         143         0.9           El Salvador         37.0         2         1         2         187         Honduras         37.7         2         4         2         179         0.0           El Salvador         37.0         2         1         134         DPRK         2         4         2         179         0.0           Ethiopia         95.8         1         0         1         134         Somalia         83.1         1         0         3         144         0.5           Ethiopia         95.8         1         3         134         Somalia         83.1         1         3         134         0.5           Ethiopia         95.8         1         3         134         Somalia         83.1         1         3         134         0.5           Ethiopia         73.4         2         1         4         134	A SHAPA	yypt -	61.8	-	1	ဖ	143	Libya	46.1	2	က	9	143	9.0	0.0
Egypt         74.2         1         1         14.3         Yemen Arab Republic (Royalists)         96.2         4         4         6         143         -0.9           El Salvador         47.9         1         1         2         187         Honduras         47.4         4         1         2         179         -0.2           El Salvador         37.0         2         1         1         2         187         Honduras         37.7         2         4         2         179         0.0           Ethiopia         95.8         1         0         1         13.4         DPRK         2         4         2         179         0.0           Ethiopia          95.8         1         1         3         134         Somalia         83.1         1         0         3         134         0.5           Ethiopia         95.8         1         3         134         Somalia         83.1         1         3         134         0.5           Ethiopia         95.8         1         3         134         Somalia         75.9         1         2         4         134         0.5	100	yypt	74.2	•			143	Saudi Arabia	83.8	4	0	9	<b>\$</b>	0.4	-0.0
El Salvador         42.9         1         2         187         Honduras         47.4         4         1         2         179         -0.2           El Salvador         37.0         2         1         2         187         Honduras         37.7         2         4         2         179         0.0           Ethiopia         95.8         1         0         1         134         DPRK         9         160           Ethiopia         95.8         1         1         3         134         Somalia         83.1         1         0         3         134         0.5           Ethiopia         95.8         1         3         134         Somalia         83.1         1         3         134         0.5           Ethiopia         95.8         1         3         134         Somalia         83.1         1         1         3         134         0.5           Ethiopia         73.4         2         1         4         134         Somalia         75.9         1         2         4         134         0.6	-	yypt	74.2	-	-	-	143	Republic .	96.2	4	4	9	143	-0.9	0.0
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Ethiopia         95.8         1         134         DPRK         9         160           Ethiopia         95.8         1         1         3         134         Somalia         83.1         1         0         3         134         0.5           Ethiopia         95.8         1         1         3         134         Somalia         83.1         1         1         3         134         0.5           Ethiopia         95.8         1         3         3         134         Somalia         83.1         1         1         3         134         0.5           Ethiopia         73.4         2         1         4         134         Somalia         75.9         1         2         4         134         -0.4	de-year	Salvador	37.0	2	-	2	187	Honduras	37.7	2	4	2	179	0.0	0.1
Ethiopia         95.8         1         0         1         134         DPRK         83.1         1         0         3         160           Ethiopia         95.8         1         1         3         134         Somalia         83.1         1         1         3         134         0.5           Ethiopia         95.8         1         3         3         134         Somalia         83.1         1         1         3         134         0.5           Ethiopia         73.4         2         1         4         134         Somalia         75.9         1         2         4         134         -0.4	19	hiopia	95.8	-	0	-	-134	DPRK			6		160		-0.4
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25	IHIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	07-Mar-1979	20-Mar-1982	1110	2	100	0.1		
	MUSTANG INCIDENT	28-Oct-1960	28-Oct-1960	The second second	2	0	0.0	. 0.9	No.
	MACAO BORDER DUELS	29-Jul-1952	30-Jul-1952	2	4	40	20.0	المقامين والمجارفة والمقامية والمعاملية من والمراجعة أوام الما والموادية والمعاملية والمعاملية والمعاملية والمعاملية	Lin facilities
55	PARACELS SEIZURE	19-Jan-1974	20-Jan-1974			50	25.0	A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR	
į	KOREAN WAR	25-Oct-1950	27-Jul-1953	1007		500000	496.5	adas Label Defendan de subsets en amais des destrats est des des la section des des	thanks distributed the
0	KOREAN WAR	26-Dec-1950	27~Jul-1953	945	The second second	500000	529.1		
į	SINO-TIBETAN CONFLICT	15-Sep-1950	09-Sep-1965	5474	2	40000	7.3	habed fred here decided the che and service of schools.	A A
1	GYABRIA RAID (in Nepal)		15-Apr-1959		2	0	00		
	SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT	02-Mar-1969	15-Mar-1969	14	2	300	21.4	0.2	Amerika risko farina
\$1. A	KOREAN WAR	16-Jun-1951	27-Jul-1953	773		20	10		
1	KOREAN WAR	19-Jun-1951	27-Jul-1953	770	Annahira Andrewsky Statement Comment of the Comment	70	0.1	at in this will which inching an use the limb as the first in this	
B:15	CONGO MUTINY	28-Jun-1966	30~Jun-1966	3			0.0		
7	MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN WAR	27-Oct-1963	04-Nov-1963	6	der bild seek well de	0	0.0		Descharitudes
15.	OGADEN WAR (in Ethiopia)	31-Dec-1977	20-Oct-1979	859	A CANADA CONTRACTOR	1000	15		
4	ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR	09-Jan-1976	10-Jan-1976	2	4		0.0	and the state of t	described to the second
7:	ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR	04-Oct-1975	08-Aug-1988	4693		2000	0.4		
-	SECOND INDOCHINESE WAR	29-Mar-1970	17-Anr-1975	1846	energy formatteness and the second	500	0.3	Stand the state of	
10	THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	15.110-1077	26. Sen. 1080	797	-	50000	1.11		CHATTE WAR
1	THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	04-May-1977	04-May-1077	STATES OF THE STATES OF THE STATES					State Section
1	THIBD INDO-CHINESE WAB	05 Aug 1070	4E Oct 1007	0000	7		0.0	The state of the s	
Vo.	CECOND INDO CUNESE WAS	0.00 000 000	00 Aug 4075	0000	-	3			
13	SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAN	23-Dec-1958	23-Aug-19/5	9098		0001	0.2	ed a de la cida el la Cala de Calaba	Maria Car
1.4		0/AC-080-40	30-Dec-1320	90/9		3	1.0		
1	SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR	18-Nov-1965	30-Apr-1975	3451	-	150000	43.5		1
1	THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	04-Mar-1979	15-Oct-1987	3148	CJ.	200	0.2		
1	KOREAN WAR	26-Jan-1949	27-Jul-1953	1644	7	300000	182.5		
4:3	KOREAN CONFLICT	05-Sep-1962	03-Nov-1963	425	2	8	0.0		
-	KOREAN RAIDS	13-Oct-1965	18-Sep-1971	2167	7	200	0.2		
400	OUALQUIZA RAIDS	16-Jan-1978	17-Jan-1978	2	2	0	0.0		
	CORRIENTES INCIDENT	15-Jan-1984	15-Jan-1984	-	2	-	1.0	and an analysis of the control of th	Total Marie Coll Decision of the College of the Col
K	LARNACA AIRPORT RAID	19-Feb-1978	19-Feb-1978	ļ	2	20	20.0	0.3	
	GULF WAR	24-Feb-1991	28-Feb-1991	5	1	20	4.0	1.1	adelities and activities of
E	PALESTINE WAR	15-May-1948	06-Jan-1949	237		2000	8.4		
	EGYPTIAN REPRISALS	25-Mar-1954	25-Mar-1954	Administration of Contraction Perfect	2	0	0.0	0.3	of Participation (Section )
-	EGYPTIAN REPRISALS *	21-Jan-1955	03-Apr-1955	73	2	3	0.0	0.3	
	SUEZ WAR (GAZA SHELLING)	05-Apr-1956	06-Apr-1956	2	4	0	0.0	0.2	deserva arithmetor
Bran's	WAR OF ATTRITION	14-Jul-1967	07-Aug-1970	1121	4	1000	0.0	0.2	
1	CANAL CONFLICT	29-Mar-1971	29-Mar-1971	1	4	0	0.0	0.2	Shakerin (newsorthist 1)
88	YOM KIPPUR WAR (PLAN BADR)	06-Oct-1973	18-Jan-1974	105		4000	38.1	0.2	
4	LIBYAN BORDER CLASH	16-ful-1977	25-Jul-1977		2	50	5.0	00	
91		02-Nov-1962	12-Mav-1967	1653	3		0.0	0.2	
		04-Oct-1962	16-Oct-1967	1839	-	1000	0.5		Service Charles of the Parish
B. Vie	FOOTBALL WAR	08-Jul-1969	29-Jul-1969	22	2	200	1.6	1.6	
1	SALVADORAN RAIDS (Sazalpa Raids)	14-Jul-1976	31-Jul-1976	18	2	2	0.1	1.5	of the same and the same of
8.7	KOREAN WAR	06-May-1951	27~Jul-1953	814			0.1		
A Control	KOREAN WAR	19-Aug-1951	27-Jul-1953	709	1	90	0.1		
1	OGADEN RAIDS	14-Aug-1960	02~Jan-1961	142	2	82	0.1	0,2	
1	OGADEN SKIRMISHES	12-Jan-1964	09-Apr-1964	89	3	30	0.3	0.3	general and the
1	OGADENWAB	16-Aug-1977	04 Jon 400E		SHIP CHANGE CONTRACTOR TO SHIP		Sales and the second se		
					CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF THE	しているからない かんしんかい こうしょう	THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN	The state of the s	No. of Street, or other Persons

Embry   See   1   3   3   3   3   3   4   4   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   4   6   143     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   4   4   4     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   4   4     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   4   4     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4   4     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4   4     Embry   10   3   1   6   128   4     Embry   10   4   4   6   128   4     Embry   10   4   4   6   128   4     Embry   10   4   4   6   128   4     Embry   10   4   6   128   4     Embry   10   5   128   4     Embry   10   6   128	Chicago   Chic	101			00		2		The state of the s			The state of the s	The state of the s			
Figure   10   3   1   6   126   Againt (FLM)   612   1   8   6   143   32   32   32   32   32   32   32	Figures   10   3   1   6   126   Againt (FLM)   612   1   6   613   136   32   143   32   32   32   32   32   32   32	Š	Ethiopia	95.8		•	<b>o</b>	<b>13</b>	le's F	llo 76.4	4	7			8.0	۲. 9
Figure	The control of the		France	1.0	ဗ	-	9	126	Algeria (FLN)	81.2	-	œ			-3.2	-0.3
Figure   10   3   1   6   128   Against (FUM)   6 12   1   4   143   32   1   6   128   Against (FUM)   6 12   1   5   1   6   138   Against (FUM)   6 12   1   5   1   6   138   Against (FUM)   6 12   5   1   6   138   Against (FUM)   6 12   5   1   6   143   32   32   32   32   32   32   32	Figure   1.0   3   1   6   125   Append FLM)   8 12   1   4   143   32   32   42   42   32   42   42	B	France	1.0	3		9	126	Algeria (FLN)	81.2		8			-3.2	-0.3
Figure   1.0   5   1.0	Figure   1.0   2   1.0   2   1.0   2   Carrocold   1.0   2   1.0   2   Carrocold   1.0   2   1	04	France	1.0	3	g profit is the ball particular through	6	126	Algeria (FLN)	81.2	Spatialism distance Seattle	4	Appears 1956 to average a additional	A TON THE PARTY.	-3.2	-0.3
France         1 0         3 1         6         123         Chancoda         817         5         1         6         153         453         453         453         454         453         454         453         454 <td>  Figure   1</td> <td>14.</td> <td>France</td> <td>NAME OF STREET</td> <td>***************************************</td> <td></td> <td>9</td> <td>128</td> <td>Algeria (El N)</td> <td>81.2</td> <td></td> <td>T.</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>.3.2</td> <td>-0.3</td>	Figure   1	14.	France	NAME OF STREET	***************************************		9	128	Algeria (El N)	81.2		T.			.3.2	-0.3
Figure     1   0   3   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0	Figure   10   2   1   1   2   2   1   1   2   2   2	wa.	France		3	a Comercia Salandardanda	6	126	Cambodia	81.7	5	Statement Company of the Statement of th	and a second statement	Contrated S	-3.3	-0.6
France 10 3 1 6 120 Charle (FAM) 57.7 2 3 3 143 25 75 147 14 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Frances   1	20	Fance	0.1	3		A		Camemon (IIPC)	87.6	-	8			.3.5	-0.4
Participa   1	Particular   Par	8	France	10		Andrew States	) (C		Chad (FAN)	67.3	0		seadobilización de desirado	\$12.748.444	-27	-0.3
Particular   1	Particular   1	00	France	0.1	9	The second secon	8	The Later	Chad (EBOI INATI	5 10	7 2			La constant	3.6	E 0
Particular   10   2   1   6   156   Chad (DMV)	Figure   Fig. 2   Fig. 5	3 9	France	10	3	Section of the Control of the Contro	9		Chad (GUNT)	77.0			Secondary Second		-3.1	-0.3
Heaves         1 G	Heartest   1		France	1.0	3		9		Chad (GLINT)	77.0		3	die Sales Alak		3.1	-0.3
Principation   1	Figures   1	0	France	10		The Contractions of the	9	2.5	Dem Ben Of Vietnam	37.2	2		STREET		-1.5	-0.6
Principal Control   1	Figure   1	1 0	France	0.1	o e			138	Difform	58.6	•	· c	Manual States		2.7	-0.1
Figure   1.0   2   1.0	France   1.0   2   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0	4	France	10			The state of the s	126	DPRK		er ( ) v. ben latt den beden in er den	σ	-	April Land His Affect	Aftersion September 1 and 1 an	-0.6
Figure   10   2   1   6   126   Egpti   Fig.   Fi	France         10         0         120         Eppth         76.9         6         1.9         1.9         1.4         3.1           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Gabon         35.1         4         2         3         1.4         3.1           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Gabon         35.1         6         143         1.6           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Independent Month         48.2         5         0         6         143         1.6           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Morocool (AU)         86.2         1         6         143         3.4           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Morocool (AU)         86.2         1         6         143         3.4           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Morocool (AU)         86.2         1         6         143         3.4           France         1.0         3         1         6         126	· u	Flance	1.0				126	DPHK			6				-0.6
France   10   3   1   6   126   Gabon   503   4   9   9   143   515	France   10   3   1   6   126   Cabon   Second	2 (	France	1.0		-		126	Favot	76.0	r L	-	-		-3.1	-0.3
France         10         3         1         6         126         Gaton         983         1         2         4         1.5         -1.5           France         10         3         1         6         126         Image         403         1         6         126         126         143         -1.5         1.6         143         -1.5         1.6         143         -1.6         143         -1.6         143         -1.6         143         -1.6         -1.9         -1.	Parace   10   2   1   6   12	2	France	0.1	0 6	-	9	361	Gabon	80.1	P	- <b>c</b>			-3.5	-0.3
France   10   3   1   6   126   Iraq   403   1   7   6   143   16   145   145	France         10         3         1         6         126         Ind         403         1         6         126         Ind         3         1         6         126         Ind         6         126         1         1         6         143         3.4           France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Morroco (AOL)         86.2         1         1         1.43         3.4           France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Morroco (AOL)         1         6         1.6         1         1.43         3.4           France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Morroco (AOL)         1         1         4         1.43         3.4	- 0				ASSESSED ASSESSED	) (d	106	Cabon	30.3	1	•		STEER STEER STEER	-1 T	-0.3
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France         10         3         1         6         126         Maddgascar (MDRM)         48.2         5         8         -119         -	France         10         3         1         6         126         Maddgascar (MDRM)         48.2         5         6         149         3.4           France         10         3         1         6         126         Morocog (AOL)         86.2         1         1         6         149         3.4           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Morocog (AOL)         86.2         1         1         143         3.4           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Morocog (AOL)         86.2         1         1         4.3         3.4           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Morocog (AOL)         86.2         1         1         4.3         3.4           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Morocog (AOL)         86.2         1         1         4.3         -3.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Part of Verland More Male         3.7         5         1         6         1.0         3.4         4.3         -1.3         3.4	2 2	4001.0	1.0	9		0 4	126	hall Jack	40.0	- 4	- 0			-3.5	-0.6
France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.2   1   1   6   143   3.4     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.2   1   1   143   3.4     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.2   1   1   143   3.4     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.2   1   1   143   3.4     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.2   1   1   143   3.4     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.2   1   1   143   3.4     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.2   1   1   143   3.4     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.2   1   1   143   3.4     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.2   1   1   1   143   3.4     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.2   1   1   1   143   3.4     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.2   1   1   1   1   1   3   1     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.2   1   1   1   1   1   3   1     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.2   1   1   1   1   1   1     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.2   1   1   1   1   1   1     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.3   1   1   1   1   1   1     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.3   1   1   1   1   1   1     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.3   1   1   1   1   1   1     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.3   1   1   1   1   1   1   1     France   10   3   1   6   126   Morrocco (AOL)   96.3   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1	France 10 3 1 6 126 Morocoo (ADL) 862 1 1 1 6 145 3.4 France 10 3 1 6 126 Morocoo (ADL) 862 1 1 1 1 143 3.4 France 10 3 1 6 126 Morocoo (ADL) 862 1 1 1 143 3.4 France 10 3 1 6 126 Morocoo (ADL) 862 1 1 1 143 3.4 France 10 3 1 6 126 Morocoo (ADL) 862 1 1 1 1 143 3.4 France 10 3 1 6 126 Morocoo (ADL) 862 1 1 1 1 143 3.4 France 10 3 1 6 126 Morocoo (ADL) 862 1 1 1 1 143 3.4 France 10 3 1 6 126 Morocoo (ADL) 863 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	200	110	•	י כ	-	<b>)</b>	100	Modernoon (MDDM)	4.00	<b>)</b> (4	) 0			-10	Market 2750 v. bedge
range         10         3         1         6         126         Morocoo (AOL)         66.2         1         1         43         -3.4           France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Morocoo (AOL)         66.2         1         1         1         43         -3.4           France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Morocoo (AOL)         78.6         1         1         4         4.3         -3.4           France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Morocoo (AOL)         78.6         1         9         1.43         -3.4           France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Read (Vernam (Vernam))         78.8         5         1         6         166         1.6	France   1.0   2   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.2   1   1   1   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.2   1   1   1   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.2   1   1   1   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.2   1   1   1   143   3.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.2   1   1   1   143   3.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.2   1   1   1   4   143   3.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.3   1   1   4   143   3.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.3   1   1   4   143   3.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.3   5   1   6   140   1.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.3   5   1   6   140   1.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.3   5   1   6   140   1.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.3   5   1   6   143   1.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.3   5   1   6   143   1.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.3   5   1   6   143   1.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.3   5   1   6   143   1.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.3   5   1   1   4   1.3   1.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.3   5   1   1   4   1.3   1.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.3   1   1   1   2   1.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.3   1   1   1   1   1   1.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Monocoo (AOL)   86.3   1   1   1   1   1   1.3     France   1.0   4   1   1   2   1.7   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1     Honduras   32.0   1   1   2   1.7   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1	7 9	France	0.1	٥,	_ •	٥	97.	Madagascar (MDRIM)	7.04	0	o •			e-1-3	80
France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Morocoo (AUL)   66.2   1   1   143   3.1     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Morocoo (AUL)   78.6   1   1   143   3.1     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Morocoo (AUL)   78.6   1   1   1   143   3.1     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Fabrical (FLKS)   78.6   1   1   1   4   143   3.1     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Fabrical (FLKS)   78.6   1   1   4   143   3.2     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Fabrical (FLKS)   88.3   5   1   6   160   1.16     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Fabrical (FLKS)   88.3   5   1   6   143   3.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Thisial (Menchall (Fabrical Secossolus)   47.1   9   143   3.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Thisial (Menchall (Fabrical Secossolus)   47.1   9   143   3.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Thisial (Menchall (Fabrical Secossolus)   47.1   9   143   3.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Thisial (Menchall (Fabrical Secossolus)   47.1   9   143   3.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   DPRK   3.1   9   143   1.1     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   DPRK   3.1   9   143   1.1     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   DPRK   3.1   9   143   1.1     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   DPRK   3.1   9   143   1.1     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   DPRK   3.1   9   143   1.1     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   DPRK   3.1   9   143   1.1     Greece   1.0   1   4   1.1   5   1.1   5   1.1     Greece   1.0   1   1   4   1.1   5   1.1     Honduras   2.2   1   1   2   1.19   Nacague   4.2   1   1   2   1.11     Honduras   2.7   2   1   2   1.19   Nacague   4.12   1   2   1.11     Honduras   2.0   1   1   2   1.19   Nacague   4.12   1   2   1.11     Honduras   2.0   1   1   2   1.19   Nacague   4.12   1   2   1.11     Honduras   2.0   1   1   2   1.19   Nacague   4.12   1   2   1.11     Honduras   2.0   1   1   2   1.19   Nacague   4.12   1   2   1.11     Honduras   2.0   1   1   2   1.19   Nacague   4.12   1   2   1.11     Honduras   2.0   1   1   2   1.19   Nacague   4.12   1   1   4   1.11   1   4   1.11   1   4	France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Morocoo (AUL)   66.2   1   1   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Morocoo (AUL)   78.6   1   1   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Morocoo (AUL)   78.6   1   1   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Morocoo (AUL)   78.6   1   1   4   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Morocoo (AUL)   78.8   1   1   4   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Morocoo (AUL)   88.3   1   1   3   144   3.3     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Tunisi (Viernini)   88.3   5   0   6   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Tunisi (Viernini)   88.3   5   0   6   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Tunisi (Viernini)   88.3   5   0   6   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Tunisi (Viernini)   89.8   5   0   6   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Tunisi (Viernini)   89.3   5   0   6   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Tunisi (Viernini)   89.3   5   0   6   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Tunisi (Viernini)   89.3   5   0   6   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Tunisi (Viernini)   89.3   5   0   6   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Tunisi (Viernini)   89.3   6   0   6   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Tunisi (Viernini)   89.3   6   0   6   143   3.4     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Tunisi (Viernini)   89.3   1   1   2   143   1.1     France   1.0   3   1   6   126   Tunisi (Viernini)   89.3   1   1   2   143   1.1     Greece   196   1   9   166   Tunisi (Viernini)   89.3   1   1   4   151   0.2     Greece   196   1   9   166   Tunisi (Viernini)   89.3   1   1   4   151   0.2     Greece   196   1   9   188   Tunisi (Viernini)   89.3   1   1   1   1   1   1   1     Honduras   1.0   1   1   2   179   Norangua   13.0   1   1   2   171   0.2     Honduras   2.0   1   1   2   179   Norangua   37.6   2   1   2   171   0.2     Honduras   2.0   1   1   2   179   Norangua   37.6   2   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1	2	France	)  -  -	9		٥ (	9 5	Moroaco (AOL)	7.00		1			† ·	2 0
France   1.0   3   1   6   126   New Calectonia (FLNKS)   18.6   1   1   14.5   2.1	France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Monocoop (Pollsand)         78.6         1         1         13         3.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Monocoop (Pollsand)         78.6         1         9         1.6         1.6           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         New Caledonia (FLNGS)         162         1         9         1.0         1.0         1.0         1.0         3         1         6         126         Nomerous         1.0         1         4         1.43         2.0         1.0         1.0         1.0         1.0         3         1         6         126         Nomerous         1.0         1.0         1.0         1.0         1.0         1.0         1.0         3         1         6         1.26         Somalia (FLCS)         83.1         1         4         1.43         2.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         1.26         Tunisia (Neo-Destro)         3.1         1         4         1.43         2.3           France         1.0         3         1         6 <t< td=""><td>4</td><td>France</td><td>0.1</td><td><b>7</b></td><td></td><td>ی م</td><td>120</td><td>Morocco (AUL)</td><td>80.2</td><td></td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td>4.0.</td><td>-0.5</td></t<>	4	France	0.1	<b>7</b>		ی م	120	Morocco (AUL)	80.2		-			4.0.	-0.5
France	France         1.0         3         1         6         1.26         New Collection (FLNKS)         7.62         1         9         1.45         0.6           France         1.0         3         1         6         1.26         New Collection (FLNKS)         7.8         5         1         6         1.1         1.6         1.6         1.6         1.6         1.1         1.6         1.6<	0 0		O (	2		<b>o</b> (	82	Moreoco (AUL)	7007			•		5 c	2 6
Prance         1.0         3         1         6         120         New Cate Office         1         6         120         New Cate Office         1         6         120         1         6         120         1         6         120         1         6         120         1         6         120         1         6         120         1         6         120         1         6         143         2         0         6         143         2         0         1         6         143         2         0         1         6         143         2         0         6         143         2         0         6         143         3         1         6         140         1         4         143         1         6         143         1         6         144         1         4         143         3         3         3         1         6         126         Tunisia (Mouseasinsis)         9	France	ę į	France	0.1	2	_	ی م	120	Morocco (Polisario)	18.0		- 3			5	5.0
France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Hebrital Vivienam (Vientinn)         37.8         5         1         6         126         Hebrital         1.0         3         1         6         126         Rwanda         1.0         3         1         6         126         Rwanda         1.0         3         1         6         126         Thanse         1.0         9         6         143         3.7           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Vanuatu (Stevens Secessionists)         47.1         1         9         6         143         3.7           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zaire (FNLC)         34.1         1         4         143         -1.3           Greece         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zaire (FNLC)         34.1 <td>France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Rewards         4.88         5         1         6         129         France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Flashand (Vietnam (Vietnam))         3.7.8         1         6         126         Flashand (Vietnam)         48.7         5         1         6         134         3.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Tunisia (Neo-Destinati)         49.7         5         0         6         143         3.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Tunisia (Neo-Destinati)         47.1         1         9         143         3.7           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Varuati (Stevens Secessionists)         47.1         1         9         4.43         3.7           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Varuati (Stevens Secessionists)         47.1         1         4         4.43         -1.1           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Varuati (Stevens Secessionists)         <t< td=""><td></td><td>France</td><td>110</td><td>'n</td><td></td><td>ο (</td><td>] [20]</td><td>New Caledonia (FLNAS)</td><td>7.0.2</td><td></td><td>δ,</td><td></td><td></td><td>)    </td><td>9</td></t<></td>	France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Rewards         4.88         5         1         6         129         France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Flashand (Vietnam (Vietnam))         3.7.8         1         6         126         Flashand (Vietnam)         48.7         5         1         6         134         3.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Tunisia (Neo-Destinati)         49.7         5         0         6         143         3.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Tunisia (Neo-Destinati)         47.1         1         9         143         3.7           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Varuati (Stevens Secessionists)         47.1         1         9         4.43         3.7           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Varuati (Stevens Secessionists)         47.1         1         4         4.43         -1.1           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Varuati (Stevens Secessionists) <t< td=""><td></td><td>France</td><td>110</td><td>'n</td><td></td><td>ο (</td><td>] [20]</td><td>New Caledonia (FLNAS)</td><td>7.0.2</td><td></td><td>δ,</td><td></td><td></td><td>)    </td><td>9</td></t<>		France	110	'n		ο (	] [20]	New Caledonia (FLNAS)	7.0.2		δ,			)   	9
France         10         3         1         6         126         France         149.8         1         1         4         143         2.0           France         10         3         1         6         126         Thalland (Vietnmin)         40.7         5         1         6         160         -16           France         10         3         1         6         126         Tunisia (Neo-Destour)         98.3         5         0         6         143         -3.9           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Tunisia (Vieselis) (Vi	France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Hubiland (Vielminh)         4926         1         1         4         145         20           France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Thailand (Vielminh)         40.7         5         1         6         160         1.6           France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Tunisia (Neo-Destour)         98.3         5         0         6         143         -3.9           France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Tunisia (Neo-Destour)         98.3         5         0         6         143         -3.9           France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Vanualu (Sevens Secessionists)         40.7         5         0         6         143         -1.3           France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Vanualu (Sevens Secessionists)         40.7         5         143         -1.3           Greece         1,0         5         1,0         6         14.8         -1.4         -1.3         -1.3         -1.3         -1.3	28	France	1.0	S		9	126	Hep. Of Vietnam (Vietminn)	3/.8	ç			16.41	-1.5	-0.0
France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Somalia (PLCS)         83.1         1         5         134         -3.5           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Theliand (Viermint)         40.7         5         1         6         143         -3.9           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Tunisia (Nouselists)         91.8         5         0         6         143         -3.9           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Vanuatu (Stevens Secessionlists)         47.1         1         9         6         143         -1.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Vanuatu (Stevens Secessionlists)         47.1         1         9         1.3         -1.3         -1.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zaire (FMLC)         3.1         1         2         3         4         143         -1.3           Greece         196         1         1         1         4         1         4         15         1         4<	France         1,0         3         1,2         Totalization (Neumbril)         83.1         1         6         126         Training (Neumbril)         83.1         1         6         126         Training (Neumbril)         83.1         1         6         126         Training (Neumbril)         83.1         1         6         143         3.7           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Tunisia (Neumbril)         98.3         5         0         6         143         3.7           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zaire         47.1         1         9         6         143         3.7           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zaire         47.1         1         2         3         4         4.43         4.1           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zaire         47.1         1         2         3         143         4.1         3         4         4.43         4.1         3         4         4.43         4.1         4.6         GIPR         Arring         4.6         148	<b>3</b>	France	0,	3		9	8	rivanda	49.8					200	2.5
France         10         3         1         6         126         Thalland (Netminh)         98.3         5         1         6         126         Tunisa (Neu-Destual)         98.3         5         0         6         143         -110           France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Tunisa (Vacseriss)         91.8         5         0         6         143         -3.7           France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Tunisa (Vacseriss)         47.1         1         9         6         143         -3.7           France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Zaire         28.0         2         3         4         4         1.3         -1.3           Greece         19.6         1         9         6         106         DPRK         9         160         1.7         1.3         -1.3	France         10         3         1         6         126         Theiland (Netuninh)         40.7         5         1         6         126         Tunisia (Nec-Destital)         94.7         5         0         6         143         -3.9           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Tunisia (Necessifistal)         91.8         5         0         6         143         -3.7           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Vanuatu (Stevens Secssionists)         47.1         9         6         143         -3.7           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Vanuatu (Stevens Secssionists)         47.1         1         9         4         143         -1.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zaine (FNLC)         34.1         1         2         3         4         43         -1.3           Greece         196         1         9         166         DPRK         34.1         1         4         156         1.0         6         160         156         1.0         160         1.0         1.0	20	France	1.0	3	_	9	126	Somalia (FLUS)	83.1	-			SECTION	-3.0	-0
France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Tunisal (Voussellsts)         96.3         6         126         France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Tunisal (Voussellsts)         91.8         5         0         6         143         -3.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zaire         7.1         1         9         6         143         -1.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zaire         7.1         1         9         6         143         -1.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zaire         FNLC)         3.4         1         2         3         4         1.143         -1.1           Greece         1.0         6         166         Turkey         53.7         1         2         3         1.7         1.0           Greece         15.6         1         4         151         Seregal         6.1.7         1         4         151         1.0           Greece         15.0         1         1         4	France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Tumisa (Nousseliss)         91.8         5         0         6         143         -3.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Tumisa (Nousseliss)         91.8         5         0         6         143         -3.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zaire (FNLC)         34.1         1         9         44         143         -1.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zaire (FNLC)         34.1         1         9         44         143         -1.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         DPRK         9         6         166         DPRK           Greece         1.0         6         166         Turkey         39.7         1         4         160           Greece         1.5         1         4         161         3         6         160         17         160           Greece         1.5         1         4         151         2         17         4	5	France	1.0			9	126	Thailand (Vietminh)	40.7	Ω (	1			0.1.0	0 0
France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Tunisal (Yousselists)         91.8         5         0         6         143         3.7           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Vanualu (Stovens Socessionists)         47.1         1         9         1.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zaire (FNLC)         34.1         2         3         4         143         -1.3           Greece         1.0.6         1         6         1.06         DPRK         9         160         1.3           Greece         1.0.6         1         6         1.06         DPRK         9         160         1.7           Greece         1.0.6         1         6         1.06         Turkey         61.9         1         4         1.5         1.0           Greece         1.0.6         1.06         Turkey         61.0         1         4         1.5         1.0         1.0           Griece         1.0.6         1.0         Turkey         61.0         1         4         1.5         1.0         1.0           Guinea	France         1.0         9         1 6         126         Tunisal (Youssellists)         91.8         5         0         6         143         37.7         1.9         1.9         1.3         3.7         1.1         9         1.43         -1.1         9         1.1         9         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zaire (FNLC)         34.1         1         2         3         4         143         -1.1         9         1.0         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zaire (FNLC)         34.1         1         2         3         143         -1.3 <th< td=""><td>32</td><td>France</td><td>1.0</td><td>က</td><td>-</td><td>9</td><td>126</td><td>Tunisia (Neo-Destour)</td><td>98.3</td><td>5</td><td>0</td><td></td><td>AND REPORTED</td><td>-3.9 -</td><td>-0.3</td></th<>	32	France	1.0	က	-	9	126	Tunisia (Neo-Destour)	98.3	5	0		AND REPORTED	-3.9 -	-0.3
France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Vanuatu (stevens Secessionists)         47.1         1         9         4.13	France   1,0   3   1   6   126   Vanuatu (Stovens Secessionists)   47,1   1   9   131	တ္က	France	1.0	<b>o</b>		9	138	Tunisia (Yousselists)	91.8	2	0			7.5	9-
France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zalle         FNLC)         34.1         1         2         3         143         -1.3           France         1.0         3         1         6         DPRK         34.1         1         2         3         143         -1.3           Greece         19.6         1         9         166         DPRK         9         160         -1.0           Greece         19.6         1         0         6         166         Turkey         39.7         1         1         6         156         -1.0           Guinea         63.5         1         4         151         Senegal         61.7         1         4         151         O         6         156         1.0         C         150         Gridshal         1         4         151         0         1         1         4         151         0         1         1         1         4         151         0         0         1         1         4         151         0         1         1         1         4         151         0         3         1         4         1	France         1,0         3         1         6         126         Zalie (FNLC)         34.1         2         3         14         1.3         1.14         1.14	34	France	1.0	3	-	9 9	126	Vanuatu (Stevens Secessionists)	47.1	-	n (			S	¢ U.
France         1.0         3         1         6         126         Zalie (FNLC)         34.1         2         3         143         -1.3           Greece         19.6         1         9         166         DPRK         9         160         -1.7           Greece         19.6         1         9         166         Turkey         61.9         1         3         155         -1.7           Greece         15.6         1         4         151         Senegal         61.7         1         4         151         9         155         -1.0           Guinea Bissau         63.0         2         1         4         151         Senegal         61.7         1         4         151         9         158         Surnar Leone         73.1         2         1         4         151         9         158         Surnar Leone         73.1         2         1         4         151         0.2           Guyana         8.4         4         1         2         179         158         1         4         151         0.2           Honduras         57.8         5         1         1         2         179	France         1.0         3         1         6         126         DPRK         34.1         1         2         3         143         1.5           Greece         19.6         1         6         DPRK         6         166         DPRK         6         1         6         160         PRK         6         1         6         160         PRK         6         1         6         160         PRK         6         1         6         160         1         6         1         6         160         1         7         1         1         6         160         1         7         1         1         2         1         3         1         1         4         161         5         1         1         4         161         3         1         1         4         161         0         6         1	S	France	<b>)</b>	2	1	٥	<b>8</b> 2	Zalfe -	0.02	ν,	<b>o</b> (				200
Greece         19,6         1         9         100         UTIN         9         160           Greece         19,6         1         9         166         Turkey         51.9         1         3         155         1.7           Greece         15,6         1         4         16,6         Turkey         39.7         1         4         155         -1.0           Greece         15,6         1         4         16,6         Turkey         39.7         1         4         151         0.1           Guinea         63,0         2         1         4         151         2         1         4         151         0.2           Guinea         63,0         2         1         5         151         Sierra Leone         73.1         2         1         4         151         0.2           Guyana         84         1         9         158         Suriname         16.4         1         4         151         0.2           Honduras         32,0         1         1         2         179         Micaragua         47.2         5         1         1         17         104           Hondur	Greece         19,6         1         9         100         UTIN         9         166         DPRK         9         160         160         DPRK         9         160	36	81	1.0	3	-	9	126	Zaire (FNLC)	34.1	-	7			-ا.ن	5.0.
Greece         19.6         1 PRK         DPRK         61.9         1         9         160         17.0           Greece         19.6         1         0         6         166         Turkey         39.7         1         3         155         1.7           Greece         15.6         1         4         6         166         Turkey         39.7         1         4         150         -1.0           Guinea Bissau         63.0         2         1         5         151         Senegal         61.7         1         4         151         0.2           Guyana         8.4         1         9         158         Surname         16.4         1         4         151         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         El Salvador (FMLN)         32.7         5         1         1         2         187         0.0           Honduras         57.8         5         0         1         779         Nicaragua         47.2         5         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1	Greece         19.6         1 PRK         Linkey         66.19         1 PRK         67.10         67.10         1 PRK         1 PRK <t< td=""><td>200</td><td>100</td><td>19.6</td><td></td><td>B</td><td>A Transfer of the Party of the</td><td>90</td><td>UPAK</td><td></td><td></td><td>י מ</td><td></td><td>3 9</td><td></td><td>1.0</td></t<>	200	100	19.6		B	A Transfer of the Party of the	90	UPAK			י מ		3 9		1.0
Greece         19.6         1 ukey         61.8         1         4         6         166         Turkey         61.7         1         4         6         156         1.0         4         155         -1.0           Guinea-Bissau         63.5         1         4         61.7         1         1         4         151         0.2           Guinea-Bissau         63.0         2         1         5         151         Senegal         61.7         1         4         151         0.2           Guinea         69.0         2         1         5         158         Suiname         164         1         4         151         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         El Salvador (FMLN)         32.7         1	Greece         19.6         1 ukey         61.8         1         3         1.5         1.5         1.5         1.6	38	Greece	19.6	-	<b>б</b>		166	DPRK		Birth at the same of the same	ന		091		- 6
Greece         15.6         1         4         6         Turkey         39.7         1         1         6         155         -1.0           Guinea         63.5         1         1         4         151         Senegal         61.7         1         4         151         Old           Guinea         63.0         2         1         5         151         Sierra Leone         73.1         2         1         4         151         -0.2           Guyana         8.4         1         9         1.58         Sumanne         16.4         1         8         1.58         -0.3           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Inicaragua         47.2         5         1         2         187         1.0           Honduras         37.7         2         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         1         2         171         0.0           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179	Greece         15.6         1         4         6         Turkey         39.7         1         1         6         155         -1.0           Guinea-Bissau         63.5         1         1         4         151         Senegal         61.7         1         1         4         151         0.1           Guinea         63.0         2         1         5         151         Sierra Leone         73.1         2         1         4         151         0.2           Honduras         47.4         4         1         2         179         El Salvador (FMLN)         32.7         1         1         2         187         0.2           Honduras         57.8         5         0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         2         171         0.4           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0	9	Greece	19.6	1	0	9	166	Turkey	6. 10		2	A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR	8		2.0 2.0
Guinea-Bissau         63.5         1         4         151         Senegal         61.7         1         4         151         0.1           Guinea         69.0         2         1         5         151         Sierra Leone         73.1         2         1         4         151         -0.2           Guyana         6.4         1         9         158         Sunname         76.2         1         4         15         -0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Nicaragua         47.2         5         1         1         10.4           Honduras         57.8         5         0         1         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         1         2         171         0.4           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua	Guinea-Bissau         635         1         4         151         Senegal         617         1         4         151         0.1           Guinea         69.0         2         1         5         151         Sierra Leone         73.1         2         1         4         151         -0.2           Guyana         8.4         1         9         158         Summane         16.4         1         8         158         -0.3           Honduras         47.4         4         1         2         179         El Salvador (FMLN)         32.7         1         1         2         187         0.2           Honduras         57.8         5         0         1         179         Nicaragua         47.2         5         1         1         1         0.4           Honduras         37.7         2         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         2	<b>Q</b>	Greece	15.6	-	4	9	166	Turkey	39.7	-	-	A CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR	155	-1.0	0.2
Guinea         69.0         2         1         5         151         Sierra Leone         73.1         2         1         4         151         -0.2           Guyana         8.4         1         9         158         Sufriame         16.4         1         8         158         -0.3           Honduras         47.4         4         1         2         179         El Salvador (FMLN)         32.7         1         1         2         187         0.0           Honduras         37.7         2         1         7         Nicaragua         47.2         5         1         1         1         0.4           Honduras         37.7         2         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         2         171         0.8           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.2	Guinea         69.0         2         1         5         151         Sierra Leone         73.1         2         1         4         151         -0.2           Guyana         8.4         1         9         158         Suriname         16.4         1         8         158         0.3           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         El Salvador (FMLN)         32.7         1         1         2         187         0.2           Honduras         37.7         2         1         2         179         Nicaragua         47.2         5         1         1         1         0.4           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         15.0         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.2           Hondras         32.0         1         2	Ŧ	Guinea-Bissau	63.5		_	4	151	Senegal	61.7	-	_	4	51	-	0.0
Guyana         8.4         1         9         158         Suriname         16.4         1         8         158         -0.3           Honduras         47.4         4         1         2         179         El Salvador (FMLN)         32.7         1         1         2         187         0.2           Honduras         57.8         5         0         1         179         Nicaragua         47.2         5         1         1         171         0.4           Honduras         37.7         2         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         1         2         171         0.8           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.2	Guyana         8.4         1         9         159         Suriname         16.4         1         8         158         .03           Honduras         47.4         4         1         2         179         El Salvador (FMLN)         32.7         1         1         2         187         0.2           Honduras         57.8         5         0         1         179         Nicaragua         47.2         5         1         1         171         0.4           Honduras         37.7         2         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         1         2         171         1.0           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         -0.2	42	Guinea	0.69	2		S	151	Sierra Leone	73.1	2	-	4	151	-0.2	0.0
Honduras         47.4         4         1         2         179         El Salvador (FMLN)         32.7         1         1         2         187         0.2           Honduras         57.8         5         0         1         179         Nicaragua         47.2         5         1         1         171         0.4           Honduras         37.7         2         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         1         2         171         0.8           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.8           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.2	Honduras         47.4         4         1         2         179         El Salvador (FMLN)         32.7         1         1         2         187         0.2           Honduras         57.8         5         0         1         179         Nicaragua         47.2         5         1         1         2         187         0.0           Honduras         37.7         2         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         1         2         171         0.8           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.2	ξţ	Guyana	8.4	-	6		158	Suriname	16.4	-	8		8	0.3	0.0
Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         El Salvador (FMLN)         32.7         1         2         187         0.0           Honduras         57.8         5         0         1         179         Nicaragua         47.2         5         1         1         171         0.4           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         1         2         171         0.8           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.2	Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         El Salvador (FMLN)         32.7         1         2         187         0.0           Honduras         57.8         5         0         1         179         Nicaragua         47.2         5         1         1         171         0.4           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         1         2         171         0.8           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         -0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         -0.2	44	Honduras	47.4	4	-	2	179	El Salvador	42.9	-	-		187	0.5	-0.1
Honduras         57.8         5         0         1         179         Nicaragua         47.2         5         1         1         171         0.4           Honduras         37.7         2         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         1         2         171         0.8           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.2	Honduras         57.8         5         0         1         179         Nicaragua         47.2         5         1         1         171         0.4           Honduras         37.7         2         1         2         179         Nicaragua         13.0         1         1         2         171         0.8           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         -0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         -0.2	<b>3</b>	Honduras	32.0	-		ď	179	El Salvador (FMLN)	32.7		1		187	00	<b>.</b>
Honduras         37.7         2         179         Nicaragua         18.0         1         1         2         171         1.9           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         177         0.2	Honduras         37.7         2         179         Nicaragua         18.0         1         2         171         19           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         -0.2	46	Honduras	57.8	5	0	-	179	Nicaragua	47.2	2	-		171	0.4	0.1
Honduras 32.0 1 1 2 179 Nicaragua 13.0 1 1 2 171 0.8   Honduras 32.0 1 1 2 171 0.2	Honduras         32.0         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         0.2           Honduras         32.0         1         1         2         179         Nicaragua         37.5         2         1         2         171         -0.2	47	Honduras	37.7	2	-	2	179	Nicaragua	13.0		-		171	0.	5
Honduras 32.0 1 1 2 179 Nicaragua 37.5 2 1 2 171	Honduras	48	Honduras	32.0	-	-	2	179	Nicaragua	13.0	-	-	CONTRACTOR ACCORDING	171	9.8	0.1
	Honduras 32.0 1 1 2 179 Nicaragua 37.5 2 1 2 171	49	Honduras	32.0		1	~	179	Nicaragua	37.5	2	_		171	-0.2	

IOI SMAILS COILE	96. lin. 1978	N2_111_1078	C C	100 mm				BOOK STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE
A		0.001	010		2001	200		
ALGERIAN WAR (in Algeria)	02-Nov-1954	30-Jun-1962	2/98	_	15000	5.4	5.1	n
ALGERIAN WAR (in Libya)	15-Oct-1957	15-Oct-1957		2	0	0.0	4.6	တ
ALGERIAN WAR (in Tunisia)	15-Sep-1958	15-Mar-1962	1278	2	40	0.0	4.6	3
ALGERIAN WAR (in Morogon)	16-Anr-1980	26- Jan-1962	651	4	U	0.0	7.5	
CIOCH MAD CHINEDE WAS	A Control of the cont	47 044 4050	0000		001		The second secon	and landers of these collection
LINSI INDO-CHINESE WAN	12-OCI-1943	2581-13O-71	2350	-	3	0.0		
BAMILEKE REVOLT	19-Dec-1956	10-Jun-1960	1270		8	0.0		
CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II)	28-Apr-1978	17-May-1980	751	-	თ	0.0	18.0	-
CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (I)	28-Aug-1968	15-Jun-1972	1388			0.0	12.7	
LIBYAN-CHADIAN WAR	13-Aug-1983	10-Nov-1984	456	A. 10 december 20		0.0	39.8	-
I IRYAN-CHADIAN WAR	16-Fah-1986	04-lan-1987	323	E		0.0	8 68	
CIDET INDO CHINESE MAD	ALMONDO ALCONOMICA DE MONTO A DA COMPANSA DE LA COMPANSA DEL COMPANSA DE LA COMPA	14 A 10 10 10 1	2070		60000	10 5	The second secon	Salah Maria sanah
÷	0461-18NI-C1	+CS1-00V-11	2016		00000	19.0		Substitution and the contract of the contract
113 DUIBOUTI CONFLICT	04-Feb-1976	30-Dec-1977	969		0	0.0	6.5	
KOREAN WAR	19-Jan-1951	27-Jul-1953	921		100	0.1		
115 KOREAN WAR	27-Mav-1951	27-Jul-1953	793		100	0.1		
<del></del>	13. have considered to the consideration of the following sections:	16-Nov-1956	17	3	10	0.6	7.1	A CONTRACTOR CONTRACTO
AUBANES COLIS	10 Feb 4064	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1				00	0.0	
	TOP LOOP LOOP TO THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY	10-10-10	8		7	0.0		A Company of the second
GABONESE RIOTS	24-May-1990	31-May-1990	œ	-	0	0.0	3.5	-
GULFWAR	17-Jan-1991	28-Feb-1991	43	9	0	0.0	22.5	5
GULF WAR	24-Jan-1991	28-Feb-1991	36	3	2	0.1	22.5	2
FIRST INDO-CHINESE WAR	14-Sen-104E	22- 1-1-1054	35CF		5000	15	and the second second	
		FO TO 1 001	200			X .	Short and the codesions in the	
MADAGASCAN WAH	29-Mar-194/	U/-Dec-194/	254	_	400	1.6	de mant ou de st. en dije ve de en de distriction	800.000x444444000011400400
MOROCCAN WAR	07-Dec-1952	23-May-1958	1994		200	0.3	4 ئ	
WESTERN SAHARAN REVOLT	F (in Mauritania) 12-Jan-1957	01-Mar-1958	414	-	30	0.1	6.8	<del>-</del>
WESTERN SAHARAN REVOLT	I (in Spanish Sat 20-Feb-1957	25-Feb-1958	371	2	7	0.0	6.8	
	A principle of the forest of the first of the species of the speci	05-May-1078	155	2	A CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY O	00	6.2	-
	Assert and the order and the second	OF May 1370	3		•	0.0	100	-
1	000111000000000000000000000000000000000	U2-Way-1500		0	A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR	20	A series of the	Control of the second
FIRST INDO-CHINESE WAR	20-Sep-1945	23-Jul-1954	3229	-	10000	3.1		A principle of the state of the
TUTSI INVASION	04-Oct-1990	22-Jan-1991		_	0	0.0	55.4	o.
LOYODA RAID	04-Feb-1976	04-Feb-1976	-	2	0	0.0	14.3	-
131 FIRST INDO-CHINESE WAR	24-Mav-1946	10-Oct-1946	140	2	3	0.0		
NEO-DESTOLIR DISORDE	20- Jan-1052	01-Dec-1954	1047	1	100	0.1	Anglistas je aki a diriose dramanik da	detailed base (delection)
VOLISSEER BEBEILION	100 las 105	47 [1] 4050			200			
			876	The second second	7	O'O		Table Charle
VEMARANA SECESSION	24-Jul-1980	18-Aug-1980	56	-	0	0.0		
KINSHASA BIOTS	24-Sep-1991	30-Oct-1991	37		0	0.0	113.1	2
KOI WEZI RESCUE	20-Mav-1978	15-Jun-1978	27	-	4	0.1	21.9	-
KOBEAN WAB	04-Dec-1950	97. hil.1053	062		8	0.1		
	A DO A THE PARTY OF THE PARTY O	07 1.1 4000	700	A Comment of the Comm	200		Section of the Control of the Control	and the second second second
אאי איי	C6 -1100-10	CC61-INC-77	00/	-	90	- 0		
CYPHIOL CIVIL WAH (Cyprus)	25-Dec-1963	09-Aug-1964	88	1	7	0.0	1.4	
TURCO-CYPRIOT WAR	20-Jul-1974	30-Jul-1974	11	_	0	0.0	1.9	-
CASHEU DISPUTE	18-May-1990	21-May-1990	4	4	0	0.0	9.0	
NPFL INVASION	12-Apr-1991	01-Dec-1991	234	dictable spaces and state of the spaces of t	0	0.0	0.8	-
NEW RIVER TRIANGLE	19-Aug-1969	19-Aug-1969		2	0	0.0	9.0	-
111 FOOTBALL WAD	14- hul-1080	18 [4] 1060	ď	2	Secretario de Santa de La Santa de Sant		80	A STATE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF THE
EALWARD BANCIVII WAD	6601 [1] 10	40 In 1982	,	,	0	0.0	0.8	
MOODDAN OFFICE			2	- 0			2 0	4
MOCORAN SEIZURE	04-IMay-1957	05-May-195/	7	9	0	0.0	0.0	
CONINAMAN	U3-May-1981	US-Way-1961	2	4	0	n'n	200	_
	03-Jun-1983	14-Jun-1983	12	4	0	0.0	0.7	-
CONTRA WAR	10C+ C-C C+	100			The state of the s		The second second second	のない。
	2001-120-20-20-20-20-20-20-20-20-20-20-20-20-2	3-7 <del>-09</del> 2-5	大名 大き 一日 子田	•			B.O	Constitution of the second

NON	INTERVEN	Ш	ILITSO	ICOUP	OSO	ICULT	TARGET		LITSO TC	OUP TCSO	TCULT	FOT	CUDIF
151	Honduras	32.0		A Company of the Comp	2	179	Nicaragua	1		7	121	-0.2	0.1
152	India	72.2	-	0	9	66	China	59.4 5	-	9	151	0.5	6.0-
153	India	72.2		0	9	66	China		-	9	151	2.0	6.0
154	India	68.5	4	0	9	66	China	A COLUMN TO THE PARTY OF THE PA	-	9	151	9.0	-0.9
155	India	59,2	2	0	9	66	Ohlna			9	151	1.0	-0.9
156	India	82.7	5	0	9	66	Kashmir (Azad Kashmir)		6	all exceptions of the control of the	66	a in 'a bud bibelled tobach a three	0.0
157	India	82.0	2	0	9	- 66	Pakistan	95.2 5	0		147	-0.5	-0.8
158	India	72.2	1	0	9	66	Pakistan	84.6 1		6	147	-0.5	-0.8
159	India	72.2		0	9	66	Pakistan	84.6		9	147	-0.5	-0.8
160	India	72.2	-	0	9	66	Pakistan	84.6 1	-		147	-0.5	-0.8
161	India	72.2		0	9	- 66	Pakistan	84.6	-	-	147	-0.5	-0.8
162	India	68.5	4	0	9	66	Pakistan	82.0 5	-	-	147	-0.5	-0.8
163	India	62.9		0	9	66	Pakistan	79.3		9	147	-0.5	-0.8
164	India	59.2	1	0	9	66	Pakistan	69.0	-	9	147	-0.4	-0.8
165	India	72.2		0		66	Portugal	38.1	-	9	195	1,4	9.15
166	Indonesia	61.0	The second secon	-	1	152	Malaysia	48.4 5	0	9	150	0.5	0.0
167	Indonesia	61.0				152	Netherlands	1.0	0		83	2.4	1.2
168	Iran	69.7	4	A THE RESIDENCE OF THE PARTY OF	6	119	Iraq	65.9 4	9	5	143	0.2	-0.4
169	lran	63.5			9	119	lrao	59.6	3	9	143	0.2	4.0-
170	Iran	63.5	A W. Well in Laborato America San Sp.	es Principales (1754) and SB (250).	9	119	Kuwait	32.5	0	9	143	1.3	-0.4
171	Iran	52.3	-		9	119	Kuwait	29.4	0	9	143	6.0	-0.4
172	Iran	70.4	dura co usuan vauntsillan, Kel	Annual management	9	119	United Arab Emirates	79.1	0	9	143	-0.4	-0.4
173	Iraq	62.9	4	3	9	143	lan —	69.7		9	119	-0.2	9.4
174	Iraq	59.6	2	-	9	143	Iran	63.5 1	Processor Committee Commit	9	119	-0.2	4.0
175	lraq	95.4	2	0		143	Israel	21.2			79	3.0	
176	Iraq	75.8	April 15 de jour missieres places per servi	4	9	143	(6.6)-6.4-6.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0	13.0 4	Sedden Market was to the same	ANGEL ARGENT STAKEN TACHKOLARRER REPRESENTATION FROM	79	2.5	Coldinate of the property of t
121	lraq	64.6	4	3	9	143	Israel	12.1			- 26	2.1	<b>.</b>
178	Iraq	64.6	4	3	9	143	Israel	12.1	-		79	2.1	1.1
179	Iraq	40.3	Ţ		9	143	Israel	3.6	-		- 22	1.5	-
180	Iraq	64.6	4	-	9	143	Kuwait	40.4	0	9	143	1.0	0.0
181	lraq in the second second	40.3	1	-	9	143	Kuwait	27.0	0	9	143	0.5	0:0
182	Iraq	40.3	-	-	9	143	Saudi Arabia	37.6	0	9	143	0.1	0.0
183	Israel	21.2	2	0		79	Egypt	82.8	0	•	143	-2.5	Ť
184	Israel	20.7	5	0		79	Egypt	81.3	0	-	143	-2.4	-1.1
185	Israel	19,5	2	0		79	Egypt	79.1	4	-	143	-2.4	-1.
186	Israel	12.1	-	0		79	Egypt	68.8	1	-	143	-2.3	-1.1
187	Srae	12.1		0		79	Egypt	58.8		-	143	-23	F.
188	Israel	12.1	-	0	***	79	Egypt	THE REPORT OF THE PERSON NAMED IN	a national services and services are services and services and services and services are services and services are service	9	143	-2.2	-1.1-
<u>8</u>	Israel	12.1		0		79	Egypt			9	143	P.	
190	Israel	8.2	-	0	E. Philip and College	79	Iraq	59.6	C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C	9	143	-2.1	* -
6	Srael	21.2	5	0		29	Jordan		0	g	143	-2.5	-1.1
192	Israel	21.2	5	0		79	Jordan	A CALLURY	***************************************	9	143	-2.4	-1.1
	Israel	15.8		0		7.9	Jordan	67,6	o c	<b>6</b>	143	-2.1	
194	Israel	15.8	-	0		79	Jordan	67.6	2	9	143	-2.1	-1.1
<b>S</b> 2	Israel	3.5. 1.0.		0		<b>6</b> /	Jordan	67.6		٥	143	- K	-
25	Israel	12.1		0		6/ -	Jordan	53.5		0 •	143	7.7-	
S 6	Srael	Z .	<b>6</b> u	6		<b>8</b>	Lebanon	2 2 2	<b>&gt;</b> C	-	145	5.1.	- T
200	Israel	21.2	Ų.		Par Suspension	8/	Syria	85.3	> <		140	0.2-	
199	Israe	20.0	۱ و	0	Laboratory Street Collection	79	Syria	81.8	4		<b>3</b>	c.Z.	-1.1
200	Israel	18.8	ഹ	0		79	Syria	78.2 5	4	-	143	-2.4	[:-

さいことのできない。 これを見る からから こうしゅう かんしゅう かんしゅん かんしん かんし			Secondary Company		いっていることのできるということできることで	The state of the s	からいないとはなっていたいからないのでき	Secretary of a Section of the Section of
SINO-INDIAN WAR	20-Jul-1962	22-Nov-1962	126	αı	2000	15.9	1.7	-
INDO-PAKISTANI WAR	21-Sep-1965	11-Dec-1965	82	<b>*</b>	3	0.0	1.3	
NATU LA-CHO LA DUELS	11-Sep-1967	02-Oct-1967	22	2	80	3.6	1.2	de san i zytherauz addaedd cardy
155 ARUNACHAL PRADESH	20-Oct-1975	20-Oct-1975	L	2	4	4.0	1.1	
-	26-Oct-1947	01-Jan-1949	434		2000	4.6	diskondining bistoniskaskaskaskaskistori ir minitaksk	Self-in factorization and the self-ton
KASHMIRI WAR	20-Aug-1948	13-Nov-1948	98	3	0	0.0		
RANN KUTCH CONFLICT	19-Feb-1956	19-Mar-1956	30	2	4	0.1	1.1	-
159 SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES	04-Jun-1958	26-Aug-1958	84	7	9	0.1	1.2	
TRIPURA SKIRMISHES	27-Sep-1962	17-Oct-1962	21	2	0	0.0	1.1	-
INDO-PAKISTANI WAR	27-Dec-1964	19-Nov-1965	328	2	2000	6.1		
KASHMIRI RAID	19-May-1967	19-May-1967	-	2	2	2.0	0.8	_
BENGALI CIVIL WAR	29-Apr-1971	17-Nov-1972	699	4	2000	3.5	0.8	-
SIACHEN GLACIER	08-Jun-1984	21-Aug-1990	2266	2	100	0.0	0.8	1
165 GOA DEFENSE (in Portugese India)	17-Dec-1961	18-Dec-1961	2	District Land	20	10.0	0.4	J
CONFRONTATION (in Sara		06-Aug-1966	1044	2	009	9.0	0.4	T Table State Control
167 WEST IRIAN CONFLICT (In West Inen)		15-Aug-1962	633	2	100	0.2	0.1	
SHATT FI -ABAB CONFIIC	14-Jan-1972	10-Feb-1975	1124	A Comments of the Comments of	50	0.0	1.2	Alexandren arabbe se
IRANI JIBACII WAR	23-Sen-1980	20-Aug-1988	2889	- B	150000	51.9	0.5	
IRANI-IRAOI WAR	13-Nov-1980	01-Oct-1981	323	3. (1. (1. (1. (1. (1. (1. (1. (1. (1. (1	0	0.0	0.2	A Secretarial designation of the
IBANICIBAOI WAB		18.4nr.1088	766	7	U	0.0	0.3	
TINES ISI ANDS SEIZIBE		20-Nov-1971	Andread Control of the Control of th	Andre Desired Commence	3	30	San Substitute Constitution Con	A CONTRACTOR
473 SHATT EL ABAR CONELICT	00-100-1079	10-Fob-1075	780	6	50		80	
	04-1070	20 100 100	2366	7	60000	17.8	0 -	Application sound the season
PAI ESTINE WAR	15-May-1948	27-Mar-1949	217	•	500	1.8	?:	
WAS OF ATTRITION	02-Dec-1069	10 Dec 1060	273	A A STATE OF	200	0.1	0.0	65.55.55.55.55.55.55.55.55.55.55.55.55.5
177 YOM KIPPLIB WAR		24-Oct-1973	17	4	10	0.6	0.0	
YOM KIPPI IR WAR (in Svria)	11-Oct-1973	24-Oct-1973	14		30	2.1	0.6	Statement Anna - Political
SCIID ATTACKS	18-Jan-1991	26-Feh-1991	40	3	0	00		
SAMETAH SEIZIBE	20-Mar-1973	04-Apr-1973	16		6	0.1	0.1	3
KIWAH INVASION	02-Allo-1990	27.Fah.1991	210		2000	95.2		2
SCHOATTACKS	18. lan-1901	26-Feb-1001	40	3	30	80		0
PALESTINE WAR	22-Mav-1948	06-Jan-1949	230	3	200	6.0		
RAFAH BAID	30-11m-1950	30- lun-1950		٥	C	0.0	A market to the control of the contr	Carried Pictures Conference
SUEZ WAR (GAZA RAIDS)	29-Aug-1953	08-Mar-1957	1288	2	200	0.2	3.4	
SIX DAY WAR	05-Jun-1967	10-Jun-1967	9	-	300	50.0	4.4	
WAR OF ATTRITION	14-Jul-1967	07-Aug-1970	1121	7	500	0.2	4.4	
CANAL CONFLICT	18-Sep-1971	18-Sep-1971	-	4	0	0.0	5.4	Charles Land Company
YOM KIPPUR WAR	06-Oct-1973	21-Feb-1974	139	3	500	3.6	6.1	
OSIRAK REACTOR RAID	07-Jun-1981	07-Jun-1981	-	3	0	0.0	1.7	T A THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPER
191 PALESTINE WAR	15-Dec-1948	03-Apr-1949	110	2	100	6.0		
ISRAELI REPRISALS	20-Mar-1950	02-Sep-1954	1628	2	30	0.0		
OALOILYA RAID	27-Jul-1956	10-Oct-1956	76	4	40	0.5	3.4	
MOUNT SCOPUS II	26-May-1958	26-May-1958		2	4	4.0	3.4	_
195 SIX DAY WAR	27-May-1965	10-Jun-1967	745	2	300	6.4	2.9	
WAR OF ATTRITION	05-Nov-1967	19-Aug-1970	1019	4	100	0.1	2.6	_
197 PALESTINE WAR	22-May-1948	16-Jan-1949	240	3	200	8.0		
PALESTINE WAR	25-May-1948	13-Apr-1949	324	ဗ	0	0.0		
	TO SHARE AND A COLOR OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF THE	Balliote Control of Co	\$26.000.00000000000000000000000000000000	Mark Screening To the property of the property	STATE OF THE PARTY	ひょうしゅうしゅうしゅうしゅう ちゅうへん としゅうしゅうしゅう		The Late of the La
TO STATE OF SHAPE OF THE STATE	05-Anr-1951	05-May-1951	•	•	98	0		

face of the color of	See   5 0 79 8yta   See   154 1 5 0 79 8yta   See   158 1	5         0         79         Syrie         705         5 yre         705         1         1           1         0         79         Syrie         705         1         1         1           1         0         79         Syrie         705         1         4           1         0         79         Syrie         663         1         4           1         0         79         Syrie         600         1         4           1         1         143         Israel         175         5         1           1         1         143         Israel         175         5         1           1         1         143	143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143
State   Stat	Strate    15.8   1 0   79   Syria     Strate    12.1   1 0   14.3     Strate    14.3   14.3     Strate    14	1	143 - 2.2 143 - 2.2 143 - 2.2 143 - 1.9 143 - 1.9 143 - 1.9 143 - 1.9 143 - 1.5 143 - 1.5 143 - 0.1 143 - 0.1 143 - 0.9 160 - 2.1 160 - 2.1 160 - 2.1 179 - 1.0 79 - 1.0 70 - 1.0
Remel         15.8         1         0         79         Sylvia         70.5         1         1         1,43           strated         15.8         1         0         79         Sylvia         70.5         1         4         6         1.43           strated         15.8         1         0         79         Sylvia         66.2         1         4         1         1.43           strated         15.1         1         0         79         Sylvia         66.0         1         3         6         1.43           strated         12.1         1         0         79         Sylvia         66.0         1         1         1.43           strated         12.1         1         0         79         Sylvia         66.0         1         4         1         1.43           strated         12.1         1         0         79         Sylvia         60.0         1         1         1.43           strated         1.2         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1	largel         15.8         1         0         79         Shita           stratel         15.8         1         0         79         Shita           stratel         15.8         1         0         79         Shita           stratel         12.1         1         0         79         Shita           stratel         1.1         0         79         Shita           bordan         2.2         1         1         43         Israel           bordan         2.2         1         1         1.3         Israel <trr< td=""><td>  1</td><td>143 - 2.2 143 - 2.2 143 - 1.9 143 - 1.9 143 - 1.9 143 - 1.9 143 - 1.5 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 1.6 143 - 0.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 143 - 0.9 143 - 0.9 150 - 0.9</td></trr<>	1	143 - 2.2 143 - 2.2 143 - 1.9 143 - 1.9 143 - 1.9 143 - 1.9 143 - 1.5 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 1.6 143 - 0.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 143 - 0.9 143 - 0.9 150 - 0.9
(a)         (a)         79         Sylvin         70.5         1         4         6         14.5           (a)         (a)         79         Sylvin         70.5         1         4         6         14.5           (a)         (a)         79         Sylvin         60.5         1         4         6         14.5           (a)         (a)         79         Sylvin         60.0         1         4         6         14.5           (a)         (a)         79         Sylvin         60.0         1         4         6         14.5           (a)         (a)         79         Sylvin         60.0         1         4         6         14.5           (a)         (a)         79         Sylvin         60.0         1         6         14.5           (a)         (a)         (a)         (a)         14.2         (a)	Israel         15.8         1         0         79         Syria           Israel         15.6         1         0         79         Syria           Israel         12.1         1         0         79         Syria           Jordan         2.2         1         0         79         Syria           Jordan         2.2         1         0         79         Syria           Jordan         6.5         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         6.6         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         6.7         1         1         6         143         Israel           Lordan         6.7         1         2 </td <td>  1</td> <td>143 - 2.2 1443 - 1.9 143 - 1.9 1443 - 1.9 1443 - 1.3 1443 - 1.3 79 2.2 79 2.2 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 1.6 143 - 0.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 143 - 0.9 143 - 0.9</td>	1	143 - 2.2 1443 - 1.9 143 - 1.9 1443 - 1.9 1443 - 1.3 1443 - 1.3 79 2.2 79 2.2 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 1.6 143 - 0.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 143 - 0.9 143 - 0.9
Biggetted         15.56         1         0         779         Synthe         667.5         1         4         1         14.3           Biggetted         15.2         1         0         779         Synthe         660.0         1         4         6         14.3           Biggetted         12.1         1         0         779         Synthe         600.0         1         3         6         14.3           Biggetted         12.1         1         0         779         Synthe         600.0         1         3         6         14.3           Biggetted         2.2         1         0         779         Synthe         600.0         1         1         6         14.3           Montal         2.2         1         0         1.43         Biggetted         1         0         14.3         Biggetted         1         0         14.3         Biggetted         1         0         1         0         14.3         Biggetted         1         0         1         0         14.3         Biggetted         1         0         1         0         14.3         Biggetted         0         1         0         14.3 <t< td=""><td>stratel         15.6         1         0         79         Syria           stratel         15.6         1         0         79         Syria           stratel         12.1         1         0         79         Syria           Jordan         82.2         5         1         6         143         israel           Jordan         67.6         1         1         1         1         1         1         1</td><td>  1</td><td>1443 - 2.2 143 - 1.9 1443 - 1.9 1443 - 1.9 1443 - 1.8 143 - 1.8 143 - 1.8 143 - 1.6 143 - 0.1 160 0.3 179 1.1 160 0.3 179 1.1 179 1.1</td></t<>	stratel         15.6         1         0         79         Syria           stratel         15.6         1         0         79         Syria           stratel         12.1         1         0         79         Syria           Jordan         82.2         5         1         6         143         israel           Jordan         67.6         1         1         1         1         1         1         1	1	1443 - 2.2 143 - 1.9 1443 - 1.9 1443 - 1.9 1443 - 1.8 143 - 1.8 143 - 1.8 143 - 1.6 143 - 0.1 160 0.3 179 1.1 160 0.3 179 1.1 179 1.1
strated         (5.6)         <	Israel         155         1         0         79         Syna           Israel         121         1         0         79         Syna           Jordan         229         1         0         79         Syna           Jordan         676         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         676         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         676         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         676         1         2         6         143         Israel           Jordan         670         1         2         6         143         Israel           Jordan         40.4	1	143 -2.0 143 -1.9 143 -1.9 143 -1.9 143 -1.8 143 -1.5 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 1.1 143 -0.1 143 -0.9 143 -0.9
Harman   1.2.   1	Bistel         12.1         1         0         79         Syria           Israel         12.1         1         0         79         Syria           Jordan         28.2         5         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         28.2         5         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         73.9         5         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         28.4         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         56.5         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         66.0         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         40.4         1         0         6         143         Israel           Jordan         40.4         1         0         6         143	1 0 0 7.9 Syria 600 11 3	1443 -119 143 -119 143 -119 143 -113 143 -115 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 1.6 143 -0.4 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 151 -0.3
strate         12.1         1         7         Syria         60.0         1         4         6         143           strate         12.1         1         0         7.9         Syria         60.0         1         4         6         143           strate         12.1         1         0         7.9         Syria         40.9         1         1         6         143           broad         2.2         1         0         6.7         1         0         1.43         1         6         1.43           broad         2.2         1         0         1.43         strate         1.73         6         1.43         1.44         6         1.43         1.44         6         1.43         1.44         6         1.43         1.44         6         1.43         1.44         6         1.43         1.44         6         1.43         1.44         1.44         6         1.43         1.44         1.44         6         1.43         1.44         1.44         1.44         1.44         1.44         1.44         1.44         1.44         1.44         1.44         1.44         1.44         1.44         1.44         1.44	Street   12.1   1   0   7.9   Syria     Street   12.1   1   0   7.9   Uganda     Street   12.1   1   0   7.9   Uganda     Street   12.1   1   0   7.9     Street   12.1   1   0   1.43     Street   12.1   1   0   1.43     Street   12.1   1   0   0     Street   12.1   1   0     Street   12.1   0   0     St	1	143 -1.9 143 -1.9 143 -1.18 143 -1.5 143 -1.5 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 1.1 79 1.16 79 1.16 79 1.13 79 1.1
strate         2.2         1         0         79         Sylvin         40.9         1         1         6         14.3           Branel         2.2         1         0         7.9         Uppindig         60.0         1         3         6         14.3           Branel         2.2         1         0         7.9         Uppindig         67.2         1         3         6         14.3           Jordan         2.2         1         0         1.43         Israel         17.5         5         1         7         7           Jordan         55.6         1         1         6         1.43         Israel         17.5         5         1         7         7           Jordan         55.6         1         1         6         1.43         Israel         17.5         5         1         7         7           Jordan         55.6         1         1         6         1.43         Israel         17.5         6         1.43         Israel         17.5         6         1.43         Israel         17.5         6         1.43         Israel         17.2         1         6         1.43         Israel	stratel         12.1         1         0         79         Syria           stratel         8.2         1         0         79         Syria           israel         12.1         1         0         79         Upande           israel         12.1         0         6         5         Irad           Jordan         2.9         1         6         14.3         israel           Jordan         73.9         5         1         6         14.3         israel           Jordan         67.6         1         1         6         14.3         Syria           Jordan         40.4         1         0         6         14.3         Syria           Jordan         40.4         1         0         6         14.3         Syria           Lordan         40.4         1         0         6         14.3	1 0 0 79 Syria   600 1 1 1   1 0 0 79 Syria   600 1 1   1 1 0 0 79 Syria   600 1 1   1 1 0 0 6 5   Indones   672 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 43 Syria   672 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	143 -119 143 -118 143 -15 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 1.6 143 -0.4 143 -0.9 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 179 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.0 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 150 1.0 160 1.9
Instant         ER. 1         0         79         Sylvia         40.9         1         1           Stratel         ER. 1         0         79         Sylvia         40.9         1         1           Instant         2.9         1         0         6.5         Inpanding         57.2         1         6         14.3           Jordan         52.9         6         1         6         14.3         intend         21.2         1         6         14.3           Jordan         57.6         1         1         6         14.3         intend         17.5         6         1         7           Jordan         57.6         1         1         6         14.3         intend         17.5         6         1         7           Jordan         27.6         1         1         6         14.3         Intend         17.5         6         1.4         17.5         6         1.4         17.5         6         1.4         17.5         6         1.4         17.5         6         1.4         17.5         6         1.4         17.5         6         1.4         17.5         6         1.4         17.5 <th< td=""><td>  Street   St. 2   1   0   79   5   5   5   5   5   5   5   5   5  </td><td>  1</td><td>143 -1.3 143 -1.3 143 -1.5 79 -2.2 79 -2.0 79 -2.0 79 -2.0 79 -2.0 79 -2.0 79 -1.1 143 -0.4 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 151 -0.2</td></th<>	Street   St. 2   1   0   79   5   5   5   5   5   5   5   5   5	1	143 -1.3 143 -1.3 143 -1.5 79 -2.2 79 -2.0 79 -2.0 79 -2.0 79 -2.0 79 -2.0 79 -1.1 143 -0.4 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 151 -0.2
Institution         12.1         0         79         Upgradig         67.2         1         9         143           Jordan         2.9         1         6         143         inned         40.7         1         6         143         143           Jordan         77.2         6         1         6         143         inned         77.2         6         1         78         1         6         143         Jordan         77.2         6         1         7.8         1         7.9         7.9         1         7.9         7.9         7.9         1         7.9 <t< td=""><td>larget         12.1         1         0         7.9         Ugandg           Jordan         83.2         5         1         6         65         Iraq           Jordan         83.2         5         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         67.6         1         1         6         143         Syria           Jordan         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Kwwalt         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Kwwalt         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Kwwalt         40.4         <td< td=""><td>  1 0 0 65   Iraq   672   1 3     1 0 0 65   Iraq   603   1 1     1 1 0 0 65   Iraq   2012   1 1     1 1 0 0 143   Israel   17.5   5   1     1 1 0 0 143   Israel   17.5   5   1     1 1 0 0 143   Israel   17.5   5   1     1 1 0 0 0 143   Israel   17.5   1     1 1 0 0 0 143   Israel   17.5   1     1 1 0 0 0 0 143   Israel   12.1   1     1 1 0 0 0 0 143   Israel   12.1   1     1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1     1 1 1 1</td><td>1443 - 148 143 - 15 79 - 2.5 79 - 2.0 79 - 2.0 79 - 2.0 79 - 1.6 143 - 0.4 143 - 0.4 140 - 2.1 160 - 2.1 160 - 2.1 160 - 2.1 160 - 2.1 179 - 1.3 79 - 1.0 143 - 0.5 143 - 0.5 143 - 0.5 143 - 0.5 150 - 0.5 160 - 1.2 174 - 0.5 174 - 0.5 175 - 0.5 175 - 0.5 176 - 0.5 177 - 0.5 178 - 0.5 179 - 0.5 170 - 0.5 171 - 0.5 172 - 0.5 173 - 0.5 174 - 0.5 175 - 0</td></td<></td></t<>	larget         12.1         1         0         7.9         Ugandg           Jordan         83.2         5         1         6         65         Iraq           Jordan         83.2         5         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         67.6         1         1         6         143         Syria           Jordan         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Kwwalt         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Kwwalt         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Kwwalt         40.4 <td< td=""><td>  1 0 0 65   Iraq   672   1 3     1 0 0 65   Iraq   603   1 1     1 1 0 0 65   Iraq   2012   1 1     1 1 0 0 143   Israel   17.5   5   1     1 1 0 0 143   Israel   17.5   5   1     1 1 0 0 143   Israel   17.5   5   1     1 1 0 0 0 143   Israel   17.5   1     1 1 0 0 0 143   Israel   17.5   1     1 1 0 0 0 0 143   Israel   12.1   1     1 1 0 0 0 0 143   Israel   12.1   1     1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1     1 1 1 1</td><td>1443 - 148 143 - 15 79 - 2.5 79 - 2.0 79 - 2.0 79 - 2.0 79 - 1.6 143 - 0.4 143 - 0.4 140 - 2.1 160 - 2.1 160 - 2.1 160 - 2.1 160 - 2.1 179 - 1.3 79 - 1.0 143 - 0.5 143 - 0.5 143 - 0.5 143 - 0.5 150 - 0.5 160 - 1.2 174 - 0.5 174 - 0.5 175 - 0.5 175 - 0.5 176 - 0.5 177 - 0.5 178 - 0.5 179 - 0.5 170 - 0.5 171 - 0.5 172 - 0.5 173 - 0.5 174 - 0.5 175 - 0</td></td<>	1 0 0 65   Iraq   672   1 3     1 0 0 65   Iraq   603   1 1     1 1 0 0 65   Iraq   2012   1 1     1 1 0 0 143   Israel   17.5   5   1     1 1 0 0 143   Israel   17.5   5   1     1 1 0 0 143   Israel   17.5   5   1     1 1 0 0 0 143   Israel   17.5   1     1 1 0 0 0 143   Israel   17.5   1     1 1 0 0 0 0 143   Israel   12.1   1     1 1 0 0 0 0 143   Israel   12.1   1     1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1     1 1 1 1	1443 - 148 143 - 15 79 - 2.5 79 - 2.0 79 - 2.0 79 - 2.0 79 - 1.6 143 - 0.4 143 - 0.4 140 - 2.1 160 - 2.1 160 - 2.1 160 - 2.1 160 - 2.1 179 - 1.3 79 - 1.0 143 - 0.5 143 - 0.5 143 - 0.5 143 - 0.5 150 - 0.5 160 - 1.2 174 - 0.5 174 - 0.5 175 - 0.5 175 - 0.5 176 - 0.5 177 - 0.5 178 - 0.5 179 - 0.5 170 - 0.5 171 - 0.5 172 - 0.5 173 - 0.5 174 - 0.5 175 - 0
Insight   1	Italy	1	79 2.5 79 2.2 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 1.6 143 0.4 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 1.9 179 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.3 143 0.9 143 0.9 143 0.0 160 1.9 143 0.0 160 1.9 174 1.2 174 1.2 175 1.0 160 1.9 175 1.0 160 1.9 176 1.0 177 1.0 178 1.0 179 1.0 170 1
Jordan         882         6         1         9         143         listed         212         5         1         79           Jordan         739         6         143         israel         178         5         1         79           Jordan         276         1         1         6         143         israel         175         5         1         79           Jordan         224         1         2         6         143         Oran         1         1         6         143           Jordan         224         1         2         6         143         Oran         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         <	Jordan         83.2         5         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         73.9         5         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         67.6         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         83.6         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         82.6         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         87.6         1         2         6         143         Syria           Jordan         87.6         1         0         6         143         Syria           Kuwalt         40.4         1         0         6         143         Israel           Lass         56.0         1         3         6         160         Thalland           Lass         56	5         1         6         143         Israel         27.2         5         1           1         6         143         Israel         17.8         5         1           1         1         6         143         Israel         17.5         5         1           1         1         6         143         Israel         17.5         5         1         1           1         2         6         143         Onnan (PELOAG)         70.6         1         1           1         2         6         143         Sixel         1<	79 2.5 79 2.2 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 143 -0.4 143 -0.4 143 -0.4 160 0.3 160 0.3 160 0.3 179 1.1 160 0.3 179 1.0 79 1.0 70
Jordan         73.9         6         14.3         Israel         18.6         5         1         79           Jordan         67.6         1         1         6         14.3         Israel         17.9         5         1         79           Jordan         25.5         1         1         6         14.3         Israel         17.0         6         1.4         Israel         17.0         6         1.4         Israel         17.0         6         1.4         Israel         1.7         6         1.4 </td <td>Jordan         73.9         5         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         67.6         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         67.6         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         53.6         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         92.4         1         2         6         143         Israel           Jordan         49.2         4         1         6         143         Syria           Jordan         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Lass         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Lass         65.0         1         3         6         143         Israel           Lass         66.0</td> <td>5         1         6         143         Israel         188         5         1           1         6         143         Israel         17.5         6         1           1         1         6         143         Strael         17.5         6         1           1         1         6         143         Onan (PELOAG)         70.5         1         1           1         1         6         143         Syria         60.0         1         3           1         1         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         1           1         0         6         143         Israel         12.0         2         1           1         1         6         160         Thalland         12.0         2         1           1         1         6         160         Thalland         12.0         2         1           2         1         1         143         Israel         12.1         1         1           2         1         4         143         Israel         12.2         2         1           2         1         4<td>79 2.2 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 143 -0.1 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 151 0.0</td></td>	Jordan         73.9         5         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         67.6         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         67.6         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         53.6         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         92.4         1         2         6         143         Israel           Jordan         49.2         4         1         6         143         Syria           Jordan         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Lass         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Lass         65.0         1         3         6         143         Israel           Lass         66.0	5         1         6         143         Israel         188         5         1           1         6         143         Israel         17.5         6         1           1         1         6         143         Strael         17.5         6         1           1         1         6         143         Onan (PELOAG)         70.5         1         1           1         1         6         143         Syria         60.0         1         3           1         1         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         1           1         0         6         143         Israel         12.0         2         1           1         1         6         160         Thalland         12.0         2         1           1         1         6         160         Thalland         12.0         2         1           2         1         1         143         Israel         12.1         1         1           2         1         4         143         Israel         12.2         2         1           2         1         4 <td>79 2.2 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 143 -0.1 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 151 0.0</td>	79 2.2 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 79 2.0 143 -0.1 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 151 0.0
Updam         67.6         1         1.43         strate         1.73         6         1.43         strate         1.75         6         1.43         Syriat         7.75         6         1.43         Syriat         7.75         7.	Jordan         67.6         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         67.6         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         32.4         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         32.4         1         2         6         143         Syria           Jordan         49.2         4         1         6         143         Syria           Kuwalt         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Trailand           Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Trailand           Los         66.0         1         1         4         143         Israel           Los         66.0 <td>1         1         6         143         Israel         17.5         5         1           1         1         6         143         Israel         17.5         5         1           1         1         6         143         Syrla         60.0         1         1           1         2         6         143         Syrla         60.0         1         1           1         2         6         143         Syrla         60.0         1         1           1         2         143         Syrla         60.0         1</td> <td>79 250 79 2.0 143 .0.1 143 .0.4 79 1.1 79 1.1 79 1.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 179 1.0 79 0.1 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 150 0.1</td>	1         1         6         143         Israel         17.5         5         1           1         1         6         143         Israel         17.5         5         1           1         1         6         143         Syrla         60.0         1         1           1         2         6         143         Syrla         60.0         1         1           1         2         6         143         Syrla         60.0         1         1           1         2         143         Syrla         60.0         1	79 250 79 2.0 143 .0.1 143 .0.4 79 1.1 79 1.1 79 1.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 179 1.0 79 0.1 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 150 0.1
Jordan         67.6         1         6         143         Israel         17.5         5         1         79           Jordan         25.5         1         6         143         Syria         17.5         6         1	Jordan         67.6         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         32.5         1         1         6         143         Israel           Jordan         32.5         1         1         6         143         Syria           Jordan         49.2         4         1         6         143         Syria           Jordan         49.2         4         1         6         143         Syria           Jordan         49.2         4         1         6         143         Syria           Jordan         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Kuwait         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Lacas         65.0         1         1         6         143         Syria           Lacas         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Lacas         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Lacas         65.0         1         3         6         143         Streel           Libya         461         2	1   1   6   143   Israel   175   5   1     1   1   6   143   Oman (PELOAG)   13,5   4   1     1   2   6   143   Oman (PELOAG)   70,5   1   1     1   0   6   143   Syria   60,0   1   3     1   0   6   143   Syria   60,0   1   1   1     1   0   0   0   143   Israel   12,1   1   1     1   1   0   0   0   Thalland   12,0   2   1     1   1   0   0   0   Thalland   12,0   2   1     1   1   0   0   0   Thalland   12,0   2   1     1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1	79 2.0 79 1.6 143 -0.1 143 -0.1 143 -0.4 79 1.1 79 1.1 79 1.1 79 1.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 151 0.0
Discription         25.5         1         1         6         143         Grand (PLOAG)         70.6         1         1         6         143         Syria         60.0         1	Jordan         35.5         1         1         6         143         Sirriel           Jordan         32.4         1         1         6         143         Oman (PFLOAG)           Jordan         97.6         1         2         6         143         Oman (PFLOAG)           Jordan         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syring           Kuwait         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syring           Kuwait         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syring           Kuwait         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syring           Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Laos         56.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Laos         56.0         1         3         6         143         Strael           Libya         46.1         2         1         6         143         Chad           Libya <td>1         1         6         143         Grade         155         4         1           1         1         6         143         Oman (PFLOAG)         1         1           1         1         6         143         Syring         60.0         1         1           1         0         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         1         1           1         0         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         2         2         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         2         1</td> <td>79 1.6 143 .0.1 143 .0.1 143 .0.4 79 1.1 79 1.1 79 1.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 143 .0.9 143 .0.9 143 .0.9 143 .0.0 160 1.8 160 1.9 160 1.9 160 1.9 160 1.9 160 1.9 161 1.0 161 1.0 161 1.0</td>	1         1         6         143         Grade         155         4         1           1         1         6         143         Oman (PFLOAG)         1         1           1         1         6         143         Syring         60.0         1         1           1         0         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         1         1           1         0         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         2         2         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         2         1	79 1.6 143 .0.1 143 .0.1 143 .0.4 79 1.1 79 1.1 79 1.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 143 .0.9 143 .0.9 143 .0.9 143 .0.0 160 1.8 160 1.9 160 1.9 160 1.9 160 1.9 160 1.9 161 1.0 161 1.0 161 1.0
Jordan         22.4         1         143         Omen (PLOAG)         70.5         1         1         143           Jordan         67.6         1         2         143         Syria         70.5         1         1         1         1         143           Jordan         49.2         1         6         143         Sirgel         1.2.1         1         1         7.9           Kowell         40.4         1         0         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         1         7.9           Kowell         40.4         1         0         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         1         7.9           Lace         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thalland         12.0         2         1         7.9           Lace         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thalland         12.0         2         1         6         160           Lace         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1	Jordan         32.4         1         1         6         143         Oman (PFLOAG)           Jordan         47.6         1         2         6         143         Syria           Jordan         49.2         4         1         6         143         Syria           Jordan         49.2         4         0         6         143         Syria           Kuwalt         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Kuwalt         40.4         1         0         6         143         Stratel           Laos         65.0         1         1         6         160         Thalland           Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thalland           Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thalland           Laos         65.0         1         1         4         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         4         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         4         143         Chad	1	143 143 -0.1 143 -0.1 143 -0.4 160 0.3 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 179 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.0 79 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 150 0.0 151 0.0
Jordan         6776         1         2         6         143         Syria         70.5         1         1         143           Jordan         40.4         1         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         1         179           Kvivelit         40.4         1         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         1         79           Lass         65.0         1         6         160         Carribodia         584         4         3         6         160           Lass         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thalland         12.0         2         1         6         160           Lass         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thalland         12.0         2         1         6         160           Lass         6.0         1         4         1         4.3         Israel         27.2         2         1         6         160           Lass         6         1         4         4.3         Israel         67.3         2         1         6         160           Lass         1 <td>Ordan         676         1         2         6         143         Syria           Moundard         492         4         1         6         143         Syria           Kuwait         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Kuwait         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Kuwait         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Laos         65.0         1         1         6         160         Damboda           Laos         65.0         1         2         6         160         Thailand           Laos         66.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Laos         66.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         43         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         43         Israel           Libya         46.1         2         1         6         143         Israel           Libya         46.1</td> <td>1         2         6         143         Syria         60.0         1</td> <td>79 1.14 79 1.14 79 1.14 79 1.14 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 1.9 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.0 79 0.1 143 0.0 143 0.0 143 0.0 143 0.0 143 0.0 160 1.2 174 0.0 175 1.2 176 1.2 177 1.2 178 1.3 178 1.3 1</td>	Ordan         676         1         2         6         143         Syria           Moundard         492         4         1         6         143         Syria           Kuwait         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Kuwait         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Kuwait         40.4         1         0         6         143         Syria           Laos         65.0         1         1         6         160         Damboda           Laos         65.0         1         2         6         160         Thailand           Laos         66.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Laos         66.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         43         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         43         Israel           Libya         46.1         2         1         6         143         Israel           Libya         46.1	1         2         6         143         Syria         60.0         1	79 1.14 79 1.14 79 1.14 79 1.14 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 1.9 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.0 79 0.1 143 0.0 143 0.0 143 0.0 143 0.0 143 0.0 160 1.2 174 0.0 175 1.2 176 1.2 177 1.2 178 1.3 178 1.3 1
Mordan         49.2         4         1         6         14.3         Syriation         60.0         1         3         6         14.3         Syriation         60.0         1         3         6         14.3         Israel         12.1         1         1         79           Lacks         65.0         1         0         6         14.3         Israel         12.1         1         1         79           Lacks         65.0         1         0         6         160         Cambridge         684         4         3         6         160           Lacks         65.0         1         0         6         160         Thaland         12.0         2         1         6         160           Lacks         65.0         1         1         6         160         Thaland         12.0         2         1         6         160           Lacks         66.0         1         1         1         14.3         Israel         22.0         1         6         160           Lacks         1         2         1         4         43         Israel         17.0         1         1         143	Monococo         Monococo         Monococo         1         3         Sylvar           Live         1         0         6         143         Israel           Kuwait         40.4         1         0         6         143         Israel           Kuwait         40.4         1         0         6         143         Israel           Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Laos         66.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Laos         66.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         4         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         4         1         4         1         1         4         1         1         143         Israel         1         1         1         1         1         1	4         1         5         143         Syna         60.0         1	79 1.1 79 1.1 79 1.1 160 0.3 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 2.1 179 1.0 79 1.3 79 1.0 79 0.1 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 160 1.8 160 1.9 170 0.0 171 0.0 181 0.0
Kuvest         40.4         1         0         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         79           Movest         40.4         1         0         6         143         Israel         12.0         2         1         6         160           Loss         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand         12.0         2         1         6         160           Loss         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand         12.0         2         1         6         160           Losenon         56.0         1         1         4         Israel         22.2         5         1         6         160           Lebenon         35.8         5         0         1         143         Israel         22.2         5         1         6         160           Lebanon         35.8         5         0         1         1         4         1         7         1         1         7         1         1         7         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1	Kuwait         40.4         1         0         6         143         Israel           Kuwait         40.4         1         0         6         143         Israel           Laos         65.0         1         1         6         160         Cambodia           Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thalland           Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thalland           Laos         65.0         1         1         143         Israel           Laosnon         56.0         1         1         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         43         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         43         Israel           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Israel           Libya         46.1         2	1	79 1.1 79 1.1 79 1.1 160 0.3 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 1.9 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 1.0 79 1.0 79 1.0 79 1.0 79 1.0 79 1.0 79 1.0 79 1.0 79 1.0 143 -0.0 143 -0.0 143 -0.0 143 -0.0 143 -0.0 143 -0.0 143 -0.0 143 -0.0 151 0.0
Kuwatt         404         1         0         6         143         Israel         121         1         1         79           Leos         650         1         2         6         160         Camboda         684         4         3         6         160           Lacs         650         1         3         6         160         Thalland         120         2         1         6         160           Lacs         650         1         3         6         160         Thalland         120         2         1         6         160           Lebanon         538         5         1	Kuwait         40.4         1         0         6         143         Israel           Laos         65.0         1         1         6         160         Cambodia           Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thalland           Laos         66.0         1         3         6         160         Thalland           Laos         56.0         1         3         6         160         Thalland           Laos         56.0         1         3         6         160         Thalland           Labanon         36.6         4         1         1         43         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         43         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         43         Israel           Libya         43.5         2         1         6         143         Chad         (FAN)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tunisia           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Innisia <td< td=""><td>1         0         6         143         Israel         12.1         <td< td=""><td>79 1.1 160 0.3 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 1.9 79 1.3 79 1.0 79 0.1 143 -1.2 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.2</td></td<></td></td<>	1         0         6         143         Israel         12.1         1 <td< td=""><td>79 1.1 160 0.3 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 1.9 79 1.3 79 1.0 79 0.1 143 -1.2 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.2</td></td<>	79 1.1 160 0.3 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 1.9 79 1.3 79 1.0 79 0.1 143 -1.2 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.2
Lakes         650         1         6         160         Cambdda         584         4         3         6         160           Laces         650         1         3         6         160         Thailand         12.0         2         1         6         160           Laces         650         1         3         6         160         Thailand         12.0         2         1         6         160           Laces         650         1         3         6         160         Thailand         12.0         2         1         6         160           Lacendon         553         5         0         1         143         Israel         21.2         5         1         6         160           Libya         46.1         2         1         6         143         Israel         17.0         1         1         7           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad         77.0         1         1         3         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad         77.0         1         1	Laos         65.0         1         6         160         Cambodia           Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Laos         56.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Lebanon         56.0         1         1         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         43         Israel           Lebanon         46.1         2         1         6         143         Israel           Lebanon         46.1         2         1         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Mozambourg           Libya         46.1         2	1         1         6         160         Cambodia         584         4         3           1         3         6         160         Thailand         120         2         1           1         3         6         160         Thailand         120         2         1           4         1         143         Israel         121         5         1           2         1         143         Israel         121         1         1           2         1         6         143         Chad         121         1         1           2         1         6         143         Chad         67.3         2         1           2         1         6         143         Chad (FAN)         77.0         1         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (FAN)         77.0         1         1           2         3         6         143         Tarzania         63.7         2         1           2         1         4         143         Mozambigue (Fanamo)         72.4         1         1           3         9         16	160 0.3 160 2.1 160 2.1 160 1.9 79 1.3 79 1.0 79 0.1 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 151 0.0
Lacks         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand         12.0         2         1         6         160           Lacks         56.0         1         1         160         Thailand         9.3         1         6         160           Lacks         56.0         1         1         143         Israel         21.2         5         1         6         160           Labranon         58.6         4         1         143         Israel         21.2         5         1         6         160           Labranon         58.6         4         1         143         Israel         12.1         1         1         7         9         7         9         7         9         7         9         7         9         7         9         1         4         1<	Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Laos         15.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Laos         55.0         1         1         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.0         4         1         1         143         Israel           Lebanon         46.1         2         1         6         143         Israel           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzania           Libya         45.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzania           Libya         4         4	1         3         6         160         Thailand         12.0         2         1           1         3         6         160         Thailand         12.0         2         1           1         1         143         Israel         21.2         5         1           2         1         1         143         Israel         12.1         1         1           2         1         6         143         Grad         67.3         2         1           2         1         6         143         Chad         77.0         1         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Tanzaria         67.3         1         1           <	160 2.1 160 2.1 160 1.9 79 1.3 79 1.0 79 0.1 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 151 0.0
Lass         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand         12.0         2         1         6         160           Lass         56.0         1         1         160         Thailand         9.3         1         1         6         160	Laos         65.0         1         3         6         160         Thailand           Labaron         56.0         1         1         6         160         Thailand           Lebaron         56.0         1         1         143         Israel           Lebaron         38.6         4         1         143         Israel           Lebaron         46.1         2         1         6         143         Israel           Lebaron         46.1         2         1         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         3         6	1         3         6         160         Thailand         9.3         1         1           5         1         6         160         Thailand         9.3         1         1           4         1         143         Israel         21.2         5         1           2         1         6         143         Chad         12.1         1         1           2         1         6         143         Chad         12.1         1         1           2         1         6         143         Chad         77.0         1         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Lanzania         67.3         2         1           2         1         6         143         Lanzania         67.3         1         1           3         9         1.16         DPRK         72.4         1         1           1         1         4	160 2.1 160 1.9 79 1.3 79 0.1 72 0.1 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.2 151 0.0
Lebenor         56.0         1         6         160         Thalland         9.3         1         6         160           Lebenor         55.8         5         0         1         143         Israel         21.2         5         1         7           Lebanor         36.6         1         1         143         Israel         121         1         1         7           Lebanor         46.1         2         1         6         143         Israel         121         1         7         7           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad         77.0         1         1         6         73           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad         77.0         1         1         4         43           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad         77.0         1         1         4         4         4           Libya         4         4         1         4         143         Tonkid         4         143         4         143           Libya <t< td=""><td>Lebanon         56.0         1         6         160         Thailand           Lebanon         53.8         5         0         1         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         43         Israel           Lebanon         46.1         2         1         6         143         Israel           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad         Chal           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tainsia           Luxembourg</td><td>1         1         6         160         Thalland         9:3         1         1           5         0         1         143         Israel         21.2         5         1           4         1         1         43         Israel         12.1         1         1           2         1         6         143         Chad         77.0         1         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Millita)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Millita)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Millita)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Millita)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Tunisia         49.3         1         1           3         6         143         Mozambique (Renamo)         72.4         1         4           1         1         4         143         Mozambique (Renamo)         72.4         1         4</td><td>160 1.9 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 0.1 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.1 151 0.0</td></t<>	Lebanon         56.0         1         6         160         Thailand           Lebanon         53.8         5         0         1         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         43         Israel           Lebanon         46.1         2         1         6         143         Israel           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad         Chal           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tainsia           Luxembourg	1         1         6         160         Thalland         9:3         1         1           5         0         1         143         Israel         21.2         5         1           4         1         1         43         Israel         12.1         1         1           2         1         6         143         Chad         77.0         1         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Millita)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Millita)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Millita)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Millita)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Tunisia         49.3         1         1           3         6         143         Mozambique (Renamo)         72.4         1         4           1         1         4         143         Mozambique (Renamo)         72.4         1         4	160 1.9 79 1.3 79 1.3 79 0.1 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.1 151 0.0
Lébenon         55.6         5         0         1         14.3         Israel         21.2         5         1         79           Lebanon         38.6         4         1         1         43         Israel         12.1         1         1         79           Lebanon         48.6         2         1         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         1         6         79           Libya         46.1         2         1         6         143         Chad         77.0         1         1         3         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Haire Milla)         67.3         2         1         3         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Haire Milla)         67.3         2         1         3         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzania         67.3         2         1         3         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzania         66.1         1	Lebanon         53.8         5         0         1         143         Israel           Lebanon         36.6         4         1         1         143         Israel           Lebanon         139         2         1         6         143         Israel           Libya         46.1         2         1         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Millia)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Millia)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Millia)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Millia)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Millia)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzania           Libya         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK           Ma	5         0         1         143         Israel         21.2         5         1           4         1         1         143         Israel         12.1         1         1           2         1         6         143         Chad         12.1         1         1           2         1         6         143         Chad (Habre Militia)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Militia)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Militia)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Militia)         67.3         2         1           2         3         6         143         Tanzania         67.3         1         1           2         1         43         Tanzania         67.3         1         1         1           3         9         116         DPRK         67.3         1         1         1         1           1         1         4         143         Mozambique (Ranamo)         72.4         1<	79 1.3 79 1.0 79 1.0 79 0.1 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.6 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 150 -0.2 151 0.0
Lebanon         36.6         4         1         14.3         Israel         12.1         1         1         79           Lebanon         13.9         2         1         6         14.3         Chad         12.1         1         6         79           Lebanon         46.1         2         1         6         14.3         Chad         77.0         1         1         6         79           Libya         48.1         2         3         6         14.3         Chad (FAN)         77.0         1         1         3         14.3           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         14.3         Chad (FAN)         77.0         1         1         3         14.3           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         14.3         Chad (Habre Millian)         67.3         2         1         3         14.3           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         14.3         Tonical         4         1         1         4         4         14.3           Libya         Libya         Libya         Chad (Habre Millian)         77.0         1         1         4<	Lebanon         36.6         4         1         14.3         Israel           Lebanon         15.9         2         1         6         14.3         Israel           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         14.3         Chad           Libya         48.1         2         3         6         14.3         Chad (Habre Milita)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         14.3         Chad (Habre Milita)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         14.3         Chad (Habre Milita)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         14.3         Chad (Habre Milita)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         14.3         Chad (Habre Milita)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         14.3         Tarzaria           Libya         4.6.1         2         1         6         14.3         Traisia           Lixembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK           Malawi         77.3         1         1         14.3         Mozambique Reso	4         1         143         Israel         12.1         1         1         1         143         Israel         12.1         1	79 1.0 78 0.1 143 0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 0.0 143 0.0 160 160 160 151 0.0
Libya         46.1         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         6         73         1         1         6         73         1         1         6         73         1         1         3         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)         67.3         2         1         3         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)         67.3         2         1         3         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)         67.3         2         1         3         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzania         67.3         2         1         3         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzania         67.3         2         1         3         160           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         146         DPRK         72.4         1         4         143 </td <td>Libya         46.1         2         1         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         1         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzanta           Libya         43.5         1         3         6         143         Tanzanta           Lixembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK           Malawi         77.3         1         1         4         143         Mozantibique (Renamo)           M</td> <td>2         143         Israel         12.1         <th< td=""><td>79 0.1 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 160 -0.2 160 -0.2 151 0.0</td></th<></td>	Libya         46.1         2         1         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         1         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzanta           Libya         43.5         1         3         6         143         Tanzanta           Lixembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK           Malawi         77.3         1         1         4         143         Mozantibique (Renamo)           M	2         143         Israel         12.1         1 <th< td=""><td>79 0.1 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 160 -0.2 160 -0.2 151 0.0</td></th<>	79 0.1 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 160 -0.2 160 -0.2 151 0.0
Libya         46.1         2         1         6         143         Chad Orad (FAN)         Grad T70         6         143         Chad (FAN)         67.3         2         1         3         143           Libya         48.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (FAN)         77.0         1         1         9         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Egypt Egypt File         61.8         1         1         6         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Egypt Egypt File         61.8         1         1         6         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzania         63.7         1         1         6         143           Libya         45.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzania         63.7         1         1         6         143           Libya         45         1         4         143         Mozambourg         72.4         1         1         4         143           Malawi	Libya         46.1         2         1         6         143         Chad           Libya         43.5         1         1         6         143         Chad (FAN)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzania           Libya         46.1         2         1         6         143         Tunisia           Lixembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK           Malawi         9.6         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mauritania         6.0         1         2	2     1     6     143     Chad     67.3     2     1       1     1     6     143     Chad (Habre Milita)     77.0     1     1       2     3     6     143     Chad (Habre Milita)     67.3     2     1       2     3     6     143     Farzania     67.3     2     1       2     3     6     143     Tunisia     49.3     1     0       3     9     116     DPRK     49.3     1     0       3     9     116     DPRK     9     0       1     1     4     143     Mozambique (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambique (Renamo)     72.4     1     4       1     1     4     143     Mozambique (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambique (Renamo)     72.4     1     4       1     1     4     151     Spain     7.6     1     4       1     1     4     151     Spain     7.6     1     1       2     1     3     15     Spain     7.6     1     1	143 -0.9 143 -1.2 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 160 -0.2 160 -0.2 151 0.0
Libya         43.5         1         6         143         Chad         T7.0         1         1         3         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)         77.0         1         1         6         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Egypt         61.8         2         1         6         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Egypt         61.8         1         1         6         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzania         63.7         1         1         6         143           Libya         45.5         1         3         6         143         Tanzania         63.7         1         1         4         143           Libya         43.5         1         4	Libya         43.5         1         6         143         Chad (FaN)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (FaN)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habie Militia)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Egypt           Libya         43.5         1         3         6         143         Tunisia           Libya         43.5         1         3         6         143         Tunisia           Lixembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK           Lixembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK           Malawi         37.7         1         1         4         143         Mozambique (Renamo)           Malawi         90.6         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mauritania         65.0         1         2         4         151         Spain           Morocco         66.2         1         2         1         5         1         151         China <td< td=""><td>1     1     6     143     Chad (FAN)     77.0     1     1       2     3     6     143     Chad (Habre Milita)     67.3     2     1       2     3     6     143     Tanzania     67.3     2     1       2     3     6     143     Tunisia     49.3     1     1       3     9     116     DPRK     49.3     1     9       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     151     Burkina Faso     91.2     1     4       1     1     3     151     Spain     7.6     1     1     4       2     1     3     151     Spain     7.6     1     1       1     1     6     143     Spain     7.6     1     1       2     1     6     143     Spain</td><td>143 -1.4 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 160 -0.2 160 -1.4 151 0.0</td></td<>	1     1     6     143     Chad (FAN)     77.0     1     1       2     3     6     143     Chad (Habre Milita)     67.3     2     1       2     3     6     143     Tanzania     67.3     2     1       2     3     6     143     Tunisia     49.3     1     1       3     9     116     DPRK     49.3     1     9       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     151     Burkina Faso     91.2     1     4       1     1     3     151     Spain     7.6     1     1     4       2     1     3     151     Spain     7.6     1     1       1     1     6     143     Spain     7.6     1     1       2     1     6     143     Spain	143 -1.4 143 -0.9 143 -0.9 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 160 -0.2 160 -1.4 151 0.0
Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)         77.0         1         1         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Egypt (Habre Milita)         67.3         2         1         6         143           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tunisia         61.3         1         1         6         143           Libya         43.5         1         3         6         143         Tunisia         65.7         1         1         6         143           Libya         43.5         1         3         6         143         Tunisia         65.7         1         1         6         143           Libya         Libya         1         6         143         Tunisia         65.7         1         1         6         143           Libya         Libya         1         1         4         143         Morambillo         6         143         160         6         143           Libya         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1 <td>Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Militia)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Militia)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Militia)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzania           Libya         43.5         1         3         6         143         Tanzania           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         116         DPRK           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         116         DPRK           Malawi         37.7         1         1         4         143         Mozambique (Renamo)           Malawi         90.6         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mauritania         60.0         1         2         4         151         Senegal           Morocco         66.0         1         2         1         5         151         China           Morocco         86.2         1         1         3         4         151</td> <td>2     3     6     143     Chad (FAN)     77.0     1       2     3     6     143     Chad (Habre Milita)     67.3     2     1       2     1     6     143     Tanzania     67.3     2     1       2     1     6     143     Tanzania     67.3     1     1       3     9     16     DPRK     9     9       3     9     16     DPRK     9       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     3     151     Burkina Faso     85.5     1     2       1     1     3     151     Spain     7.6     1     1       2     1     3     15     Spain     7.6     1     1       1     1     6     143     Spain     7.6     1     1     1       2     <td< td=""><td>143 -1.2 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.2 160 -1.4 143 -1.4 151 0.0</td></td<></td>	Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Militia)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Militia)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Militia)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzania           Libya         43.5         1         3         6         143         Tanzania           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         116         DPRK           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         116         DPRK           Malawi         37.7         1         1         4         143         Mozambique (Renamo)           Malawi         90.6         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mauritania         60.0         1         2         4         151         Senegal           Morocco         66.0         1         2         1         5         151         China           Morocco         86.2         1         1         3         4         151	2     3     6     143     Chad (FAN)     77.0     1       2     3     6     143     Chad (Habre Milita)     67.3     2     1       2     1     6     143     Tanzania     67.3     2     1       2     1     6     143     Tanzania     67.3     1     1       3     9     16     DPRK     9     9       3     9     16     DPRK     9       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambigue (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     3     151     Burkina Faso     85.5     1     2       1     1     3     151     Spain     7.6     1     1       2     1     3     15     Spain     7.6     1     1       1     1     6     143     Spain     7.6     1     1     1       2 <td< td=""><td>143 -1.2 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.2 160 -1.4 143 -1.4 151 0.0</td></td<>	143 -1.2 143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.2 160 -1.4 143 -1.4 151 0.0
Libya         46:1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milita)         67:3         2         1         9         143           Libya         46:1         2         1         6         143         Enpht         61:8         1         1         6         143           Libya         46:1         2         1         6         143         Tunzania         65:3         1         1         143           Lubya         43:5         1         3         6         143         Tunisania         49:3         16         143           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK         49:2         1         6         143           Malawit         37.7         1         4         14.3         Mozambique (Renamo)         72.4         1         4         3         151           Mali         77.3         1         1         4         14.3         Mozambique (Renamo)         72.4         1         4         3         151           Mali         70.2         1         3         151         Burkina Faso         91.2         1         4         151	Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Chad (Habre Milital)           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Egypt           Libya         46.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzania           Libya         46.1         2         1         6         143         Tunisia           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         116         DPRK           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         116         DPRK           Malawi         37.7         1         1         4         143         Mozambigue (Renamo)           Malawi         90.6         1         1         4         151         Burkina Faso           Mali         77.3         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mauritania         66.0         1         2         4         151         Spain           Morizozo         27.7         2         9         151         China           Morizozo         86.2         1         1         3         Ageria           Morizozo         86.2         1	2     3     6     143     Chad (Habre Milita)     67.3     2     1       2     3     6     143     Tanzania     61.8     1     1       1     3     6     143     Tunisia     49.3     1     0       3     9     116     DPRK     9     9       3     9     116     DPRK     9       1     1     4     143     Mozambique (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambique (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     3     151     Burkina Faso     91.2     1     4       1     1     3     151     Burkina Faso     85.5     1     2       1     2     4     151     Spain     7.6     1     1       2     1     3     151     Spain     80.0     5     1       1     1     6     143     Spain     7.6     1     1       2     1     3     143     Spain     7.6     1     1       1     1     6     143     Spain     7.6     1     2       1     1     143	143 -0.9 143 -0.6 143 -0.2 143 -0.2 160 160 151 0.0 151 0.2
Lubya         40,1         2         3         6         143         Egypti         61.8         1         1         143           Lubya         45.1         2         3         6         143         Tanzania         63.7         1         1         6         143           Lubya         43.5         1         6         143         Tunsen         6         143	Libya         40.1         2         3         6         143         Egypt           Libya         46.1         2         1         6         143         Tanzaria           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         116         DPRK           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         116         DPRK           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         116         DPRK           Malawi         37.7         1         1         4         143         Mozambigue (Renamo)           Mali         90.6         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mali         77.3         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mauritania         66.0         1         2         4         151         Senegal           Morizozo         86.2         1         3         151         China           Morizozo         86.2         1         1         6         143         Ageria           Morizozo         86.2         1         1         3         151         China           Morizozo         86.         143	2     3     6     143     Egypt     6     143     Tunisia     53.7     1     1       1     3     6     143     Tunisia     49.3     1     0       3     9     116     DPRK     9     9       1     1     4     143     Mozambique (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambique (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     3     151     Burkina Faso     91.2     1     4       1     1     3     151     Spain     7.6     1     1     1       2     1     3     151     Spain     80.0     5     1     1       1     1     6     143     Algeria     81.2     1     1       1     1     6     143     Spain     7.6     1     1       2     1     6     143     Spain     7.6     1     1       1     1     6     143     Spain     7.6     1     2	143 -0.0 142 -0.3 143 -0.2 160 -1.4 143 -1.4 151 0.0
Libya         49.5         1         0         14.3         Tunisia         49.3         1         0         6         14.3           Libya         43.5         2         6         14.3         Tunisia         49.3         1         0         6         14.3           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK         6         14.3         16         0         6         14.3           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK         6         14.3         160         6         14.3           Malawi         37.7         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso         91.2         1         4         14.3           Mall         77.3         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso         91.2         1         4         3         151           Mauritania         66.0         1         2         4         151         Senegal         61.7         1         4         151           Moracco         86.2         1         4         3         151         China         80.0         5         1         6         <	Luyar         40.1         2         1         0         143         Tunisia           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         116         DPRK           Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         116         DPRK           Malawi         37.7         1         1         4         143         Mozambigue (Renamo)           Mali         90.6         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mali         77.3         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mauritania         66.0         1         2         4         151         Senegal           Mongolia         27.7         2         1         3         151         China           Moricoco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Argeria           Morocco         78.6         1         3         6         143         Siriel	2     1     3     143     Tunisia     90       3     9     116     DPRK     9       3     9     116     DPRK     9       1     1     4     143     Mozambique (Renamo)     72.4     1       1     1     4     143     Mozambique (Renamo)     72.4     1     1       1     1     3     151     Burkina Faso     91.2     1     4       1     1     3     151     Spain     7.6     1     1       2     1     3     151     Spain     80.0     5     1       1     1     6     143     Algeria     81.2     1     1       1     1     6     143     Spain     7.6     1     1       2     1     6     143     Spain     7.6     1     2       1     1     6     143     Spain     7.6     1     2	143 -0.2 160 -0.2 160 -1.4 143 -1.4 151 0.0
Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         16         DPRK         40.0         16.0         DPRK         9         16.0         16.0         16.0         DPRK         9         16.0 <td>Luxembourg 1.0 3 9 116 DPRK Luxembourg 1.0 3 9 116 DPRK Luxembourg 1.0 3 9 116 DPRK Malawi 37.7 1 1 4 143 Mozambigue (Renamo) Mali 77.3 1 1 3 151 Burkina Faso Mali 77.3 1 1 3 151 Burkina Faso Mauritania 66.0 1 2 4 151 Seala Mauritania 70.2 2 1 3 151 China Mongolia 27.7 2 9 151 China Morocco 86.2 1 1 6 143 Ageria Morocco 86.2 1 1 6 143 Ageria</td> <td>3         9         146         DPRK         72.4         1         9           3         9         116         DPRK         9         9           1         1         4         143         Mozambique (Renamo)         72.4         1         1           1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso         91.2         1         4           1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso         85.5         1         2           1         2         4         151         Spain         7.6         1         1         1           2         3         151         Spain         80.0         5         1</td> <td>160 160 143 11.4 151 0.0 151 0.2</td>	Luxembourg 1.0 3 9 116 DPRK Luxembourg 1.0 3 9 116 DPRK Luxembourg 1.0 3 9 116 DPRK Malawi 37.7 1 1 4 143 Mozambigue (Renamo) Mali 77.3 1 1 3 151 Burkina Faso Mali 77.3 1 1 3 151 Burkina Faso Mauritania 66.0 1 2 4 151 Seala Mauritania 70.2 2 1 3 151 China Mongolia 27.7 2 9 151 China Morocco 86.2 1 1 6 143 Ageria Morocco 86.2 1 1 6 143 Ageria	3         9         146         DPRK         72.4         1         9           3         9         116         DPRK         9         9           1         1         4         143         Mozambique (Renamo)         72.4         1         1           1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso         91.2         1         4           1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso         85.5         1         2           1         2         4         151         Spain         7.6         1         1         1           2         3         151         Spain         80.0         5         1	160 160 143 11.4 151 0.0 151 0.2
Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         116         DPRK         9         160           Malawi         37.7         1         1         4         143         Mozambique (Renamo)         72.4         1         4         143           Mali         37.7         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso         91.2         1         4         143           Mali         77.3         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso         91.2         1         4         151           Mauritania         66.0         1         2         4         151         Senegal         61.7         1         4         151           Monocco         86.2         1         3         151         Ohina         80.0         5         1         6         143           Morocco         86.2         1         6         143         Algeria         81.2         1         6         143           Morocco         78.6         1         3         6         143         Spain         76         1         6         143           Morocco         76         1         7         1	Luxembourg         1.0         3         9         116         DPRK           Malawi         37.7         1         1         4         143         Mozambigue (Renamo)           Mali         90.6         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mali         77.3         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mauritania         66.0         1         2         4         151         Senegal           Mongolia         27.7         2         9         151         China           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Ageria           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Ageria           Morocco         86.2         1         3         6         143         Israel	3         9         116         DPRK           1         1         4         143         Mozambique (Renamo)         72.4         1         1           1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso         91.2         1         4           1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso         85.5         1         2           1         2         4         151         Spain         7.6         1         1         1           2         9         151         Spain         80.0         5         1         1         1           1         1         6         143         Algeria         81.2         1         <	160 143 11.4 151 0.0 151 0.2
Male         37.7         1         4         143         Mozambique (Renamo)         72.4         1         4         143           Mail         90.6         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso         91.2         1         4         3         151           Mauritania         66.0         1         2         4         151         Senegal         61.7         1         4         151           Mauritania         70.2         2         1         3         151         Spain         7.6         1         1         6         136           Morizoco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria         81.2         1         6         143           Morizoco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria         81.2         1         6         143           Morizoco         78.6         1         3         6         143         Israel         76         1         6         143           Morizoco         78.6         1         6         143         Spain         76         1         6         143	Malawir         37.7         1         4         143         Mozambigue (Renamo)           Mali         90.6         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mali         77.3         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mauritania         66.0         1         2         4         151         Senegal           Monocoolia         27.7         2         9         151         Spain           Moriocoo         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria           Moriocoo         86.2         1         1         6         143         Israel	1         1         4         143         Mozamblique (Renamo)         72.4         1         1         4           1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso         91.2         1         4           1         2         4         151         Senegal         61.7         1         1         2           2         1         3         151         Spain         7.6         1         1         1           2         9         143         Algeria         81.2         1         1         1           1         1         6         143         Algeria         81.2         1         1         1           1         3         6         143         Spain         7.6         1         1           2         1         6         143         Spain         7.6         1         2           2         1         6         143         Zaire (FNLC)         34.1         1         2	143 -1.4 151 0.0 151 -0.3 151 0.2
Mail         90.6         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso         91.2         1         4         3         151           Mauritania         66.0         1         2         4         151         Senegal         61.7         1         1         4         151           Mauritania         70.2         2         1         3         151         Spain         7.6         1         1         6         136           Mongolia         27.7         2         9         151         China         80.0         5         1         6         143           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria         81.2         1         1         6         143           Morocco         78.6         1         3         6         143         Israel         81.2         1         6         143           Morocco         78.6         1         1         6         143         Spain         7.6         1         1         6         143	Mail         90.6         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mauritania         77.3         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mauritania         66.0         1         2         4         151         Senegal           Mongolia         27.7         2         9         151         China           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria           Morocco         86.2         1         3         6         143         Israel	1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso         91.2         1         4           1         2         4         151         Senegal         65.5         1         2           2         4         151         Spain         61.7         1         1           2         9         151         China         80.0         5         1           1         1         6         143         Algeria         81.2         1         1           1         6         143         Spain         81.2         1         1           1         1         6         143         Spain         7.6         1         1           2         1         6         143         Spain         7.6         1         2	151 0.0 1510.3 151 0.2
Mauritania         66.0         1         2         4         151         Burkina Faso         86.5         1         2         3         151         Burkina Faso         61.7         1         4         151         Anergal         61.7         1         4         151         Anergal         61.7         1         1         6         136         136         151         Anergal         6         151         China         80.0         5         1         6         143         Anergal         80.0         5         1         6         143         Anergal         81.2         1         1         6         143           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Angeria         81.2         1         1         6         143           Morocco         86.2         1         3         6         143         Spain         76         1         1         6         143           Morocco         78.6         1         1         6         143         Spain         76         1         1         6         143	Mair         77.3         1         1         3         151         Burkina Faso           Mauritania         66.0         1         2         4         151         Senegal           Mauritania         70.2         2         1         3         151         Spain           Mongolia         27.7         2         9         151         China           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria           Morocco         86.2         1         3         6         143         Israel	1     1     3     151     Burkina Faso     65.5     1     2       2     4     151     Senegal     61.7     1     1       2     9     151     Spain     7.6     1     1       1     1     6     143     Algeria     81.2     1     1       1     6     143     Israel     81.2     1     1       1     1     6     143     Spain     7.6     1     1       2     1     6     143     Zaire (FNLC)     34.1     1     2	151 - <b>0.3</b> 151 0.2
Mauritania         66.0         1         2         4         151         Senegal         61.7         1         1         4         151           Mauritania         70.2         2         1         3         151         Spain         7.6         1         1         6         136           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria         81.2         1         1         6         143           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria         81.2         1         1         6         143           Morocco         78.6         1         3         6         143         Spain         7.6         1         1         6         143	Mauritania         66.0         1         2         4         151         Senegal           Mauritania         70.2         2         1         3         151         Spain           Mongolia         27.7         2         9         151         China           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria           Morocco         78.6         1         3         6         143         Israel	1         2         4         151         Spain         61.7         1         1           2         9         151         China         80.0         5         1           1         1         6         143         Algeria         81.2         1         1           1         1         6         143         Israel         81.2         1         1         1           1         3         6         143         Israel         12.1         1         1         1           2         1         6         143         Zaire (FNLC)         34.1         1         2	151 0.2
Mauritania         70.2         2         1         3         151         Spain         7.6         1         1         6         136           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Ageria         81.2         1         1         6         143           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria         81.2         1         1         6         143           Morocco         78.6         1         3         6         143         Spain         7.6         1         1         6         143           Morocco         78.6         1         1         6         143         Spain         7.6         1         1         6         143	Mauritania         70.2         2         1         3         151         Spain           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Ageria           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria           Morocco         86.2         1         3         6         143         Israel	2         1         3         151         Spaln           2         9         151         China           1         1         6         142         Algeria           1         3         6         143         Israel           1         6         143         Spain           2         1         8         143         Zăire (FNLC)	
Morocco         86.2         1         6         143         Ageria         80.0         5         1         6         143           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria         81.2         1         1         6         143           Morocco         78.6         1         3         6         143         Spain         7.6         1         1         6         143           Morocco         78.6         1         1         6         143         Spain         7.6         1         1         6         143	Morgolia         27.7         2         9         151         China           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria           Morocco         78.6         1         3         6         143         Israel	2 9 151 China 1 1 6 143 Algeria 1 1 6 143 Israel 1 1 6 143 Spain 2 1 8 148 Zăire (FNLC)	2.5
Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria         81.2         1         1         6         143           Morocco         78.6         1         3         6         143         Srael         12.1         1         1         79           Morocco         78.6         1         1         6         143         Spain         7.6         1         1         6         143	Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria           Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria           Morocco         78.6         1         3         6         143         Israel	1 1 6 143 Algeria 1 1 6 143 Algeria 1 3 6 143 Israel 1 1 6 143 Spain 2 1 8 144 Zăire (FNLC)	-2.1
Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria         81.2         1         1         6         143           Morocco         78.6         1         1         6         143         Spain         7.6         1         1         6         143           Morocco         78.6         1         1         6         143         Spain         7.6         1         1         6         143	Morocco         86.2         1         1         6         143         Algeria           Morocco         78.6         1         3         6         143         Israel	1 1 6 143 Algeria 1 3 6 143 Israel 1 1 6 143 Spain 2 1 6 144 Zaire (FNLC)	0.2
Morocco	Morocco	.1. 3 6 143 Israel 1 1 6 143 Spain 2 1 6 145 Záire (FNLC)	of the same of the
Morocco 78.6 1 1 6 143 Spain 7.6 1 1 6 143	C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C	1 1 6 143 Spain 2 1 6 14 <b>3 Záire (FNLC</b> )	2.7
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KINNERET CONFLICT (I) BORDER SHELLING BETT KATZIR CONFLICT KINNERET CONFLICT KINNERET CONFLICT KINNERET CONFLICT KINNERET CONFLICT SIX DAY WAR WAR OF ATTRITION GOLAN CONFLICT YOM KIPPUR WAR BEINT OFFENSIVE ENTEBBE AIRPORT RAID GULF WAR PALESTINE WAR BATTIR INCIDENT GALQILYA RAID MOUNT SCOPUS I	22-Oct-1955 31-Jan-1960 31-Jan-1960 31-Jan-1960 31-Jan-1960 31-Jan-1963 09-Jun-1963 09-Jun-1963 09-Jun-1962 09-Jun-1962 24-Feb-1969 18-Jan-1991 25-Apr-1948 25-Apr-1957 05-Jul-1956 25-Apr-1957 14-Apr-1959 05-Nov-1967 05-Nov-1967 05-Nov-1967 05-Nov-1967 05-Nov-1967 05-Nov-1967 05-Nov-1967 05-Nov-1967 05-Nov-1967	11-Dec-1955 03-Dec-1958 13-Dec-1958 17-Mar-1962 09-Jun-1967 27-Jun-1973 06-Jun-1973 06-Jun-1974 09-Jun-1982 03-Jun-1994 28-Feb-1991 28-Rov-1954 22-Aug-1975	513 13 13 2 2 1 1070 314 244 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	6 0 6 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9	0.0 0.0 2.5 2.5 0.0	2.2 2.1 2.8 2.1	
BORDER SHELLING BEIT KATZIR CONFLICT KINNERET CONFLICT KINNERET CONFLICT KINNERET CONFLICT SIX DAY WAR WAR OF ATTRITION GOLAN CONFLICT YOM KIPPUR WAR BEIRUT OFFENSIVE ENTESSE AIRPORT RAID GULF WAR BATTIR INCIDENT OALOILLY RAID MOUNT SCOPUS I		03-Dec-1958 12-Feb-1960 17-Mar-1962 10-Jun-1967 27-Jun-1976 08-Jun-1974 09-Jun-1982 06-Jun-1982 03-Jun-1982 03-Jun-1982 03-Jun-1982 28-Feb-1991 03-Apr-1956 21-Jun-1970 21-Sep-1975 21-Sep-1976	513 13 2 2 486 344 244 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1			22 2.1 2.1 2.1	
BEIT KATZIR CONFLICT KINNERET CONFLICT (I) EL DOUGA RAID SIX DAY WAR WAR OF ATTRITION GOLAN CONFLICT YOW KIPPUR WAR BEIRUT OFFENSIVE ENTEBBE AIRPORT RAID GULF WAR BATTIR INCIDENT OALOILYA RAID MOUNT SCOPUS I		12.Feb-1960 17.Mar-1962 10-Jun-1963 10-Jun-1973 10-Jun-1973 08-Jan-1974 09-Jun-1982 03-Jun-1982 03-Jun-1982 03-Jun-1984 28-Feb-1991 03-Apr-1949 22-Aug-1955 21-Sep-1970 21-Sep-1970	2 2 1070 489 314 1 1 1 1 1 809			2.2 2.1 2.1 5.5	
KINNERET CONFLICT (II)  EL DOUGA RAID SIX DAY WAR SIX DAY WAR GOLAN CONFLICT YOU WAR BEINT OFFENSIVE ENTERBE AIRPORT RAID GULF WAR PALESTINE WAR BATTIR INCIDENT OALOILYA RAID MOUNT SCOPUS I		17-Mar-1962 09-Jun-1963 17-Jun-1973 08-Jan-1973 06-Jun-1974 09-Jun-1974 09-Jun-1974 10-Cat-1976 28-Feb-1991 03-Apr-1949 21-Jan-1977 21-Jan-1975 21-Sep-1975 21-Sep-1975 22-Apr-1959	2 1070 1070 314 314 1 1 1 1 1 1 80 80 80			2.1 2.1 5.5	
EL DOUGA RAID SIX DAY WAR WAR OF AITRITION WAR OF AITRITION GOLAN CONFLICT YOM KIPPUR WAR BEIRUT OFFENSIVE ENTEBBE AIRPORT RAID GULF WAR PALESTINE WAR BATTIR INCIDENT OALOILYA RAID MOUNT SCOPUS I		09-Jun-1963 10-Jun-1967 27-Jun-1970 08-Jun-1974 09-Jun-1982 03-Jun-1982 03-Jun-1982 03-Jun-1982 28-Feb-1991 03-Apr-1956 21-Jun-1970 21-Jun-1970 21-Sep-1975 22-Apr-1959	1070 1070 486 314 1 1 1 42 343 1 800			2.6 2.1	
SIX DAY WAR WAR OF ATTRITION GOLAN CONFLICT YOM KIPPUR WAR BEIRUT OFFENSIVE ENTEBBE AIRPORT RAID GULF WAR PALESTINE WAR BATTIR INCIDENT OALOILYA RAID MOUNT SCOPUS I		10-Jun-1967 27-Jun-1973 08-Jun-1974 09-Jun-1982 03-Jul-1976 28-Feb-1991 03-Apr-1949 28-Nov-1954 111-Oct-1956 22-Aug-1957 21-Jun-1975 21-Sep-1975 22-Sep-1975	1070 486 314 314 1 1 42 42 809			2.1	-
WAR OF ATTRITION GOLAN CONFLICT YOM KIPPUR WAR BEINCY OFFENSIVE ENTEBE AIRPORT RAID GULF WAR PALESTINE WAR BATTIR INCIDENT OALOILYA RAID MOUNT SCOPUS I		27. \(\text{un-1970}\) 08. \(\text{un-1973}\) 06. \(\text{un-1974}\) 06. \(\text{un-1974}\) 06. \(\text{un-1982}\) 03. \(\text{un-1949}\) 28. \(\text{vor-1956}\) 21. \(\text{du-1970}\) 21. \(\text{du-1970}\) 21. \(\text{Sep-1970}\) 22. \(\text{Sep-1970}\) 22. \(\text{Sep-1970}\) 20. \(\text{Sep-1970}\)	244 244 244 1 1 1 42 80 80 80 80			LC	
GOLAN CONFLICT YOM KIPPUR WAR BEIRUT OFFENSIVE ENTEBE AIRPORT RAID GULF WAR BATTIR INCIDENT OALOILYA RAID MOUNT SCOPUS I		08-Jan-1973 06-Jun-1974 09-Jun-1982 03-Jul-1976 28-Rov-1954 21-Jan-1970 21-Jan-1970 21-Sep-1975 21-Sep-1970 21-Sep-1970	314 244 1 1 42 343 80		0.1	6.7	The state of the s
YOM KIPPUR WAR BEIRUT OFFENSIVE ENTEBBE AIRPORT RAID GULF WAR PALESTINE WAR BATTIR INCIDENT OALOILYA RAID MOUNT SCOPUS I		06-Jun-1974 09-Jun-1982 03-Jul-1976 28-Feb-1991 28-Feb-1954 11-Oct-1956 22-Aug-1957 21-Jan-1970 21-Sep-1976 21-Sep-1976	244 1 2 42 1 343 1 800			2.4	-
Mar Vid Will	09-Jun-1982 03-Jul-1976 18-Jan-1991 56-Apr-1948 28-Nov-1956 24-Jul-1956 25-Nov-1957 25-Nov-1957 11-Oct-1973 16-Oct-1973	09-Jun-1982 03-Jul-1976 28-Reb-1991 28-Nov-1954 11-Oct-1956 21-Jan-1970 21-Sep-1975 21-Sep-1975 20-Sep-1970	1 42 42 80 80 809			2.8	-
	33-\u03a-1976 8-\u03a-1991 56-\u03a-1948 28-\u03a-1956 24-\u01a-1956 24-\u03a-1957 55-\u03a-1957 56-\u03a-1975 14-\u03a-1970 11-\u03a-1973 16-\u03a-1973	03-Jul-1976 28-Feb-1991 03-Apr-1949 28-Nov-1954 11-Oct-1956 21-Jan-1970 21-Sep-1975 21-Sep-1975 23-Apr-1959	42 42 1 1 809			<del>1</del> .8	-
	18-Jan-1991 26-Apr-1948 28-Nov-1954 24-Jul-1996 26-Jul-1995 25-Nov-1957 27-Feb-1975 14-Apr-1959 11-Oct-1973 16-Oct-1973	28-Feb-1991 03-Apr-1949 128-Nov-1956 122-Aug-1957 21 Jan-19770 21 Sep-1975 22-Apr-1959 20-Sep-1979	42 343 1 80 809	2	20	12.2	
	26-Apr-1948 88-Nov-1954 44-Jul-1956 222-Aug-1957 227-Feb-1975 14-Apr-1959 11-Oct-1973 16-Oct-1973	03-Apr.1949 28-Nov-1954 22-Aug-1957 21 Jan-1970 21-Sep-1975 20-Sep-1975 20-Sep-1979	343 809	3	0.0	18.7	2
C	28-Nov-1954 24-Jul-1956 24-Jul-1957 25-Nov-1967 27-Feb-1975 0-Sep-1970 11-Oct-1973 16-Oct-1973	28-Nov-1954 11 Oct-1956 22-Aug-1957 21-Sep-1975 23-Apr-1959 20-Sep-1970	808 1 809	10	00 2.9		
Ç	24-Jul-1956 22-Aug-1957 55-Nov-1967 527-Feb-1975 14-Apr-1959 50-Sep-1970 11-Oct-1973 16-Oct-1973	11-Oct-1956 22-Aug-1957 21-Jan-1970 21-Sep-1975 23-Apr-1959 20-Sep-1970	809	2 4	4.0	0.3	-
MOUNT SCOPUS I	22-Aug-1957 55-Nov-1967 27-Feb-1975 14-Apr-1959 20-Sep-1970 11-Oct-1973 16-Oct-1973	22-Aug-1957 21-Jan-1970 21-Sep-1975 23-Apr-1959 20-Sep-1970	1 809	2		0.3	
	25-Nov-1967 27-Feb-1975 14-Apr-1959 20-Sep-1970 11-Oct-1973 16-Oct-1973	21-Jan-1970 21-Sep-1975 23-Apr-1959 20-Sep-1970	808	2		0.3	-
217 WAR OF ATTRITION	27-Feb-1975 14-Apr-1959 20-Sep-1970 11-Oct-1973 16-Oct-1973	21-Sep-1975 <b>23-Apr-1959</b> 20-Sep-1970	The state of the s	4	0.1	0.4	
218 DHOFAR REBELLION	14-Apr-1959 20-Sep-1970 11-Oct-1973 16-Oct-1973 15-Mar-1979	<b>23-Apr-1959</b> 20-Sep-1970	207	1 0	0.0	0.3	
219 UAR UNION CONFLICT	20-Sep-1970 11-Oct-1973 16-Oct-1973 15-Mar-1979	20-Sep-1970	10	2	0.0		
PLO-JORDANIAN WAR	11-Oct-1973 16-Oct-1973 15-Mar-1979		1	2 0	0.0	9.0	-
221 YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Syria)	16-Oct-1973 1 <b>5-Mar-1979</b>	24-Oct-1973	14	4	0.0	4.0	2
222 YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Egypt)	15-Mar-1979	28-Oct-1973	13	1	0.8	4.0	2
223 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	THE RESERVE THE PARTY OF THE PA	15-Aug-1980	520	0			
	17-Nov-1975	17-Nov-1975	-	4 0			A G. C. Lander, S. C.
	17-May-1976	17-Oct-1976	154	2			
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	15-Apr-1984	19-Feb-1988	1406	2 100		0.5	1
PALESTINE WAR	5-May-1948	30-Oct-1948	169	1 500		District of American States of the States of	and the second second
LEBANESE SHELLING	02-Jan-1969	02-Jan-1969	-	4 0		0.4	က
229 LEBANESE SHELLING	3-Jan-1975	18-Jan-1975	9	0			
	26-Jun-1979	30-Jul-1979	35	1 60		96.4	2
	31-Jul-1983	11-Sep-1987	1504	3	1	59.3	2
CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan)	10-Sep-1981	13-Oct-1981	34	3		81.4	7
CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II)	26-Apr-1980	15-Nov-1981	569	300		103.5	2
LIBYAN BORDER CLASH	16-Jul-1977	25-Jul-1977	01	2 30		22.9	2
VR (in Uganda)	09-Mar-1979	07-Apr-1979	30	70			
LIBYAN-TUNISIAN STRIFE	08-May-1984	15-May-1984	œ	2 0		6.4	2
KOREAN WAR	31-Jan-1951	27-Jul-1953	606	. 0	0.0		
KOREAN WAR	01-Jun-1951	27-Jul-1953	788	1 0	0.0		
RENAMO INSURGENCY	15-Apr-1987	15-Dec-1991	1706	4	0.0	0.7	
AGACHER RAIDS		16-Dec-1974	3	2 0	0.0	1.1	-
AGACHEH BAILLE	25-Dec-1985	30-Dec-1985	9	8	0.3	1.1	
MAURITANIA-SENEGAL	09-Jan-1990	02-Mar-1991	418	4 0		0.7	-
POLISARIO WAR (in Spanish Sahara)	10-Dec-1975	05-Aug-1979	1335	8	0.7	0.1	-
PEITASHAN AFFAIR	05-Jun-1947	15-Jul-1948	407	30			
2.62	4-Oct-1962	18-Oct-1962	5	2 0	0.0	1.0	co.
	14-Oct-1963	04-Nov-1963	22	100		0.8	3
X	1-Oct-1973	24-Oct-1973	14	1 50	3.6	0.2	-
248   POLISARIO WAR (in Spanish Sahara) 3	31-Oct-1975	06-Sep-1991	5790	1 80(	1.4	0.2	-
249 FIRST SHABA INVASION	38-Apr-1977	22-May-1977	45	0	0.0	3.2	_

5	INTERVEN	Ш	ILITSO	O ANOOI	SO ICULT	TARGET	TLIT TUTSO	TCOUP TCSO	TCULT	ILDIF	CUDIF
251	Netherlands	0.	က	0	88	DPRK		6	160		 3
252	Netherlands	1.0	e	0	83	DPRK		6	160		-1.3
253	Netherlands	1.0	8	0	83	Indonesia	61.0		152	-2.4	-1.2
254	Netherlands	1.0	တ	0	83	Indonesia (Republicans)	61.0 1	0	152	-2.4	-1.2
255	New Zealand	2.0	9	9	20	<b>DPAK</b>		6	160		-2.4
256	New Zealand	2.0	9	9 0	20	DPRK	n - n is determined the first state of the first section of the new profits and the section of t	6	0.00	And the state of t	-2.4
257	New Zealand	2.0	9	9 0	20	Indonesia	61.0			-2.4	-2.2
258	New Zealand	2.0	9	9 0	20	Malaysia (MPABA)	56.4 5	0 6		-2.2	-2.2
259	New Zealand	2.0	9	9	20	Rep. Of Vietnam (VC & DRV)	25.9 4	4		-1.0	-2.4
260	Nicaragua	52.6	5	4	171	Costa Rica (National Liberation Art	m; 20.3 5	89		1.3	0.0
261	Nicaragua	47.2	2		171	Honduras	5.78	0		-0.4	<b>-</b> .0
262	Nicaragua	50.4	-	-	171	Honduras	55.0 1	0	TO PARTIE AND THE	-0.2	-0.1
93	Nigeria	57.3		2	151	Chad	77.0	1 3		-0.8	0.1
¥	Nigeria	49.3	12 A Laboratoria The \$1,000 to	2 5	151	Sierra Leone	79.3	1 4	Tr db Edb dooi), T	-1.2	0.0
	Oman		100 Charles 15 C 14 L	9	143	lrao	40.3	. 9			0.0
	Oman	Manta Service and Action Front	Condition of the contribution of the Contribut	1 6	143	Saudi Arabia	69.8 5	9 0	143	Calebra Company Control	0.0
	Oman			9 4	143	Yemen People's Republic	83.8	9	143		0.0
9	Pakistan	69.0	and discharge medical Act.	1 6	147	Afghanistan	75.9	1 6	147	-0.3	0.0
269	Pakistan	84,6			147	Burma (Myanmar)	36.6	1 0	160	1.9	-0.2
270	Pakistan	93.1	5	2	147	India	79.9 5	0 6	66	0.5	0.8
271	Pakistan	84.6		1 8	147	India	72.2	9 0	- 66	0.3	0.8
272	Pakistan	84.6		1 6	147	India	72.2 1	9 0	66	0.5	0.8
273	Pakistan	84.6			147	India	72.2	9 0	. 66	9:0	0.8
274	Pakistan	84.6	Action of a linearistic cost	Care Contract Contrac	147	India	72.2 1	9 0	66	0.5	0.8
275	Pakistan	79.3			147	India	68.5 4	9 0	66	0.4	0.8
276	Pakistan	79.3	A contraction of the parties of	1 6	147	India	65.9 1	9 0	66	0.5	0.8
277	Pakistan	69.0		9	147	India	55.9	9 0	- 66	0.5	8.0
2	Pakistan	95.2	5	0 1	147	Kashmir	ISSN 1008-16-addistic 20070-74 -0CEDITIES Anton-CE SACTRETAL (All third. 1777)	Q	66		9.0
	Peru	45.2	2		179	Ecuador	40.7 5	-	160	0.2	0.3
	Peru	18.1	-	1 2	179	Ecuador	19.8 1	1 2	160	-0.1	0.3
281	Philippines	28.1	-	8	128	DPAK		6	160		-0.5
282	Philippines	28.1	-	8	128	DPRK		6	160		-0.5
	Ponugal	29.0	-	<b>-</b>	195		64.3		151	<b>-1</b> .4	0.7
1800	Portugal	38.1	-	1 6	195	Angola (MPLA, FNLA, UPA)	64.3 1	1 3	151	-1.1	0.7
285	Portugal	29.0		9	195	Angola (MPLA, FNLA, UPA)	- 643		151	+1+	0,7
The same of	Portugal	38.1	-	1 6	195	China	71.5 5	1 6	151	-1.3	0.7
2	Portugal	29.0			195	Congo	77.5 4		545	-2.0	5 0
	Portugal	38.1	-	1 6	To the contract of the contrac	Guinea (PAIGC)	91.4 1	-	151	-2.2	0.7
	Portugal	38.1		9		Guinea (PAIGC)	91.4	•	151	-2.5	20
290	Portugal	29.0	-	1 6		Guinea (PAIGC)	91.4 1	2 3	151	-2.5	0.7
23	Portugal	38.1	-	1		Mozambique (FRELIMO)	92.3 1	0 3	143	-2.2	6.0
292	Portugal	29.0	-	1 6		Mozambique (FRELIMO)	92.3	0	143	-2.6	0.0
293	Portugal	29.0	-	9		Mozambique (FRELIMO)	92.3	0	143	-5.6	6.0
294	Qatar	25.5	4	1 6		Bahrain	22.6 4	2 6	143	0.1	0.0
292	Qatar	22.8	<b>4</b>	9		Iraqı	40.3		143	-0.7	0.0
296	Rep. Of Vietnam	30.1	5	0	160	Cambodia	72.8 5	1 6	160	-1.7	0.0
297	Rep. Of Vietnam	28.9	9	0	160	Cambodia (VC & Cambodian Reb	iels 63.9 1	. 6	160	7.	0.0
ě	Rep. Of Vietnam	16.0	-	1 6	160	China	44.9 4	1	151	-1.2	0.2
wet.	Rep. Of Vietnam	28.3	4	0	160		28.3 4	-	160	0:0	0.0
300	Rep. Of Vietnam	28.3	4	0	160	Laos (VC & DRV)	71.7	4	160	<del>-</del> . 8:	0.0

	737 THE REPORT OF THE RESIDENCE OF THE R			The same of the sa	The second secon	Carried Control of the Control	Control of the contro	Charlet In Co
KOREAN WAR	24-Oct-1950	27-Jul-1953	1008	•	8	0.1		
	27-May-1951	27-Jul-1953	793	-	90	0.1		
253 WEST IRIAN CONFLICT (In West Inan)	29-Mar-1962	15-Aug-1962	140	_	0	0.0	9.8	
INDONESIAN WAR	25-Oct-1945	02-Nov-1949	1470	-	400	0.3		
KOREAN WAR	29-Jan-1951	27~Jul-1953	911	1	8	0.0		
KOREAN WAR	01-Jun-1951	27-Jul-1953	788	1	20	0.0		
CONFRONTATION	04-Sep-1964	11-Aug-1966	707	-	0	00	14.0	
MALAYAN INSURGENCY	31-Oct-1955	30-Jul-1960	1735	<b>-</b>	20	0.0	5.4	
SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR	21-Jul-1965	08-Dec-1971	2332		0	0.0		
QUESADA OCCUPATION	17-Apr-1948	21-Apr-1948	5	-	0	0.0		
MOCORAN SEIZURE	25-Apr-1957	05-May-1957			<b>0</b>	3.6	1.5	
CIFUENTES INCIDENT	14-Aug-1962	14-Aug-1962	-	2	4	4.0	1.7 1	
LAKE CHAD SKIRMISHES	02-Jun-1983	11-Jul-1983	40	2	6	0.2	4.2	
NPFL INVASION	12-Apr-1991	01-Dec-1991	234	A The work of the section of the sec	0	0.0	And Williams Street Content of Man Co. or Substituted Street or Street	Brish Annie Charles
GULEWAR	24-Feb-1991	28-Feb-1991	2		0	0.0	6.6	
BURAIMI OASIS SEIZURE	26-Oct-1955	26-Oct-1955	A The State of the	a of grand device conditions conductions to make	0	0.0	oskende obligable and transidad disculdible is seconds filmera is despited in	A No. of the Control
DHOFAR REBELLION	05-Mav-1972	24-Mav-1972	20	3	0	0.0		
TAPLE CONTROL MEN ACTION WAR	30-Sep-1985	04-Oct-1985	5	4	0	0.0	المعالية المهاكل تلك الله المراسطة فالمناسقة المازيان الدارك الرئيسة	At to still the still some
Z69 TAUNGBRO RAID	21-Aug-1959	21-Aug-1959		2	0	0.0	2.0	
	25-Jun-1951	25-Jun-1951	onnadidenski miski sakistelikariki (17. 300)	Sections and the second second second	0	0.0	Andrewson Charles Control of the Con	And Samuel Samuel Land
RANN KUTCH CONFLICT	18-Mar-1956	18-Mar-1956		_ _	10	10.0	1 60	Eliza Access
SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES	07-Aug-1958	26-Aug-1958		2	7	0.3		and the second second
TRIPLIFA SKIRMISHES	26-Sen-1962	17-Oct-1962	20		ò	0.0		
INDO-PAKISTANI WAR	21-Feh-1964	19-Nov-1965	638		2000	3.1	000	
KASHMIRISHELING	19-May-1967	19-May-1967	900	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		0.0		
BENGAL CIVIL WAR	27-Anr-1971	17-Nov-1972	571	0	2000	25	1.2	The second
SIACHEN GLACIER	08-1110-1984	21-Aug-1990	2266		100	0.0	1.0	
KASHMIRI WAR	15-Mar-1948	01-Jan-1949	293	-		0.0		
GUALINGO RAIDS	09-Aug-1951	14-Aun-1951	9	2	0	0.0		
PAOLISHA INCIDENT	28. lan. 1081	02-Feb-1081		2	1	0.0	101	Pratument
KOBEANWAR	10.Sep. 1050	97. [11].1059	1048		20	7.0	-	
KORFAN WAR		27- Inf-1053	005	The state of the s	50		Challestan states in the contract of the contr	Section of the sectio
202 ANGOLAN INSTITUTE (In Zaira)	96-110 10ca	45 Nov. 1060	500	•	200		2-1	Mark Andrews
	15 Jun 1080	10 Nov 1076	5007		0000	7.7		Straight Library
7	0061-1100-01	10-1004-1973	1700	- (	2004	\.O	- 6.0	
MAGOLAIN CIVIL WAR (III Zambia)	0051-In-02	42-Mpr-1974	7605	۷,	2 ,	) )	-	
MACAO BORDER DUELS	Z9-JUI-195Z	30-Jul-1952	2	4	2	2.5		SALIDAY METAL PARK INVINCENT
ANGOLAN INSURGENCY	08-Jun-1966	08-Jun-1966		3	0	0.0	. 22	
PAIGC INSURGENCY (in Se	08-Apr-1963	08-Apr-1963	-	က	0	0.0	3.7	
289 PAIGC INSURGENCY (in Senegal)	10-Feb-1965	12-Oct-1972	2802	.2	0	0'0	4.4	
PAIGC INSURGENCY	24-May-1969	04-Jun-1969	12	3	0	0.0	5.8	
MOZAMBIQUE INSURGENCY	21-Oct-1964	25-Jun-1975	3900	-	4000	1.0	1.8	
MOZAMBIQUE INSURGENC	29-Oct-1966	25-Apr-1974	2736	2	വ	0.0	1.9	
293 MOZAMBIQUE INSURGENCY (in Tanzania)	14-Apr-1972	14-Apr-1972		3		1.0	2.5	
	26-Apr-1986	26-Apr-1986	-	8	0	0.0	1.8	
295 DESERT STORM	30-Jan-1991	31-Jan-1991	2	1		0.5	20.8 2	
	25-Jun-1958	01-Jul-1958	7	-	0	0.0		
SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR	03-May-1960	10-Jun-1975	5517	2	2000	6.0		
PARACELS SEIZURE	19-Jan-1974	19-Jan-1974	-	2	9	3.0		
	Charles of the Control of the Contro	Section of the Control of the Contro	CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR	THE PARTY OF THE P	20000000000000000000000000000000000000	A. M. C.	THE SALE CONTROL OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPER	CHEST CONTRACTOR
			CUCU	STATE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE P	100	CO		CAN STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE P

MON	INTERVEN	ILT	ILITSO I	COUP	l oso	CULT	TARGET	TUT	TCOUP TCSO	TCULT ILL	OIF CUDIF
301	ROK	29.4		<b>6</b>		74	DPAK		6	160	0.2
302	ROK	12.4	-	-	_	174	DPRK		6	160	0.2
303	ROK	6.2	7		9	74	DPRK		G	c	
304	ROK	21.5	4	-	_	74	Rep. Of Vietnam (VC & DRV)	25.9 4	1		
305	Saudi Arabia	37.6	The state of the s	0	9	83	Iraq	40.3	9		
306	Saudi Arabia	75.8	ည	0	9	-	Israel	15.8 1	The state of the s		
307	Saudi Arabia	54.3	4	0	9		Israel	12.1			
	Saudi Arabia	56.9	4	0	9	The said of	Yemen Arab Republic	86.3 5	1 6		
308	Senegal	94.4	State Constitution of the		3		Gambia	94.0	1 3		
310	Senegal	94.4	-	-	3	and the latest special states of the latest states	Gambia	94.0	1 3	151 0.0	
311	Senegal	67.9			3		Gambia (Sanyang Rebels)	79.9	3		
312	Senegal	61.7	-	-	4	151	Guinea-Bissau	63.5 1	1 4		
313	Senegal	61,7	-		7	121	Mauntania	1 0.99	2		
314	Somalia	83.1	-	3	3	134	Ethiopia	95.8 1	1 3	1000	the steel state of the
315	Somalia	83.1			3	34	Ethiopia	37.6	3		
316	Somalia	83.1	-			134	Ethiopia	37.6 1	1 3	areach vectoration	a Lydelly L
317	Somalia	83.1			3	छ	Kenva	52.9	1 3	100	
318	Somalia	75.9	And American States of the Control	2		34	Kenva	31.0	1 4	evidence con	on the board of the
319	South Africa	24.3	2	0	9	96	Angola	54.3	1 3		
320	South Africa	43.0	A TO A SHALL SHOW THE PER	C	9	56	DPRK		o o	Service of Paper	W. A. A. M. L.
321	South Africa	43.0		0	9	96	DPRK		6		
322	South Africa		Z	0	9	26	Namibia (SWAPO)	61.6	6	a Cel Policiale.	PROGRAMIC B
323	South Africa		S. Continue	0	9	92	Namibia (SWAPO)	61.6	6		
324	South Africa		2	O	9	56	Namibia (ZANU)	61.6	O	ACCEPTAGE OF THE PARTY OF THE P	ACI Assessing
325	South Africa		- 6	0	9	99	Zimbahwe (ZANI.))	6 176	0 3	200	
326	Spain	13.3		0	9	136	Morocco	86.2	1 6		7
327	Spain	7.6		0	9	36	Morocco	78.6	3		
328	Spain	13.3		0		136	Morocco (AOL)	86.2 1	1 6		
329	Spain	13.3		0	9	36	Morocco (AOL)	86.2	9 1		
330	Sudan	70.1	2	3	3	134	Ethiopia	37.6 2	3 3		
331	Sudan	72.9		2	4	134	Uganda	51.7	3		
332	Syria	35.5	-	1	9	143	Iraq	40.3 1	1 6		
333	Syria	35.5			9	43	Iraq	40.3	1 6		
334	Syria	85.3	വ	0		143	Israel	21.2 5	-		
335	Syria	81.8	5	<b>4</b>	-	143	Israel	20.0			
336	Syria	78.2	2	4		143	Israel	18.8 5	_		ACREC MEDITORS
337	Syria	70.5		1		(43	Israel	15.8	-		
338	Syria	70.5	-	-	_	143	Israel	15.8 1	-	CONTRACTOR	Sherike Sales
338	Syria	70.5		7		<b>.</b>	Israel	15.8	_		
340	Syria	70.5	-	4	-	143	Israel	15.8 1	_		
34.	Syria	0.09		9	9	₹ 2	israel	12.1			
342	Syria	0.09	-	4	9	143	Israel	12.1 1	-	STORES CONTROL	No.
343	Syria	0.09			9	143	lsrael	12,1			
344	Syria	0.09	-	3	9	143	Israel	12.1 1	1	26322652454	CCLEAGUAGE
345	Syria	9.09	•	3	9	143	Jordan	49.2 4	1 6		
346	Syria	70.5	ACCEPTANCE STATE OF THE STATE O	4	-	143	Lebanon	41.5 4	3 1	36/342394	0.00
347	Syria	46.2	7		9	143	Lebanon (Rebel Groups)	13.9 2	3 6		
348	Tanzania	63.8	4	-	3	143	Burundi	100.0 5	1 3	143 -1.5	.5 0.0
349	Tanzania	44.7	2		7	143	Mozambique (Renamo)	72.4	1 4		
350	Tanzania	65.2	4	2	က	143	Uganda	61.2 4	3		

1			THE STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE P	The state of the s				Contract Chi
301 KOREAN WAR	26-Jan-1949	27-Jul-1953	1644	2	300000	182.5		
302 KOREAN CONFLICT	13-Apr-1967	05-Dec-1970	1333	5	10	0.0	And a large conference of the	To the same of the
I KOREAN CONFLICT	05-Aug-1976	05-Aug-1976		7	0	0.0		
	10-Oct-1965	27-Jan-1973	2667	and the state of t	4000	1.5	AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF THE PART	of definition of the second seconds and
305   GULF WAR	17-Jan-1991	28-Feb-1991	43	3		0.5	7.8	
	19-Oct-1948	20-Oct-1948	2	-	0	0.0		
307 YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Syria)	12-Oct-1973	24-Oct-1973	13		2	0.2	1.6	
	14-Jan-1970	14-Jan-1970	-	က	0	0.0		
n 18	31-Jan-1971	31-Jan-1971		2	0	0.0	1.3	
	10-Jul-1974	24-Jul-1974	15	2	0	0.0	1.2 1	
311 SANYANG COUP	31-Jul-1981	07-Aug-1981	8		10	1.3	1.3	Carlo Maria
	18-May-1990	21-May-1990	4	4	0	0.0	1.7	The Act of the State of the Sta
313 MAURITANIA-SENEGAL	09-Jan-1990	02-Mar-1991	418	4	0	0.0		
	20-Nov-1963	09-Apr-1964	142	2	50	0.4	4.5	
315 OGADEN WAR	27-Jun-1977	14-Mar-1978	261	2	8000	7.06	3.1	
OGADEN RAIDS	27-May-1980	17-Jul-1980	52	2	10	0.2	2.3	
317 OGADEN WAR	27-Jun-1977	27~Jun-1977	1	2	7	7.0		
	20-Sep-1989	20-Sep-1989	-	2	0	0.0	0.8	A Company of the Comp
319 ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR	10-Jun-1975	31-Aug-1988	4832	2	200	0.1	4.9	
	26-Nov-1950	27-Jul-1953	975	3	10	0.0	المارية والمارية والمواجعة والمعارضة والمعارضة والمراجعة والمراجعة والمراجعة والمعارضة والمارية والمار	State Linesees Canbridge
£	09-May-1951	27-Jul-1953	811	3	10	0'0		
	11-Jul-1976	11-Jul-1976	_	2	0	0.0	0.0	
111	25-Aug-1978	27-Apr-1980	612	2	0	0.0	7. 8.0	
324 NAMIBIAN CONFLICT	04-Feb-1972	26-Apr-1989	6292	September 166 to 166 miles and	500	0.1	0.9	and refer to only the same of
	30-Nov-1979	30-Jan-1980	62		0	0.0	2.8	
	26-Nov-1957	28-Nov-1957	က	က	0	0.0	3.7 1	
327   POLISARIO REVOLT (in Spanish Sahara)	26-Jan-1974	08√Jan-1976	713		8	0.0	5.1	
Î	10-Aug-1957	01-Mar-1958	204	-	9	0.3	3.7 1	
329 WESTERN SAHARAN REVOLT (in Spanish S	at 26-Nov-1957	01-Mar-1958	98		8	0.5	3.7	
ERITREAN WAR (II)	10-Apr-1977	30-Jun-1977	82	4	0	0.0	24.3	
			81	3	0	0.0	1.5	
- 6	04-Feb-1991	04-Feb-1991	_	2	0	0.0	1,4 2	
41	24-Feb-1991	28-Feb-1991	5	-	0	0.0	1,4	
-	15-May-1948	13-Apr-1949	334	-	1000	3.0	ET PET BY AN ADDITION TO SERVICE THE SERVICE S	
335 SYRIA-ISRAEL CONFLICT	04-Apr-1951	09-May-1951	36	2	8	9'0		
-	15-Mar-1954	11-Dec-1955	637	4	20	0.0		Store Store Store Store
44	09-Jul-1957	03-Dec-1958	513	4	0	0.0		
-	24-Jan-1960	12-Feb-1960	20	4	4	0.2	0.5	A CONTRACTOR OF THE PERSON OF
339 KINNERET CONFLICT (II)	۵	17-Mar-1962	45	4	8	2.0	0.5	
No.		10-Jun-1967	1465	4	09	0.0	0.4	PACIFIC BATTERIORS
0.00	08-Dec-1969	27-Jun-1970	202	4	8	0.5	0.4	
	02-Mar-1972	02-Mar-1972	+	တ	0	0.0	0.4	
343 GOLAN CONFLICT	10-Nov-1972	08-Jan-1973	- 09	4	2	0.1	0.4	
	06-Oct-1973	24-Oct-1973	19	-	2000	105.3	0.4	
	19-Sep-1970	23-Sep-1970	5	1	8	20:0	1,6	
UAR AGENTS CRISIS	18-Oct-1963	18-Oct-1963	-	2	0	0.0		
347   LEBANESE CIVIL WAR	09-Apr-1976	22-May-1991	5522	-	2000	5.4		
	12-Jul-1973	12-Jul-1973	-	2	0	0.0	1.0	
349   RENAMO INSURGENCY	05-Mar-1987	01-Jan-1988	303		8	0.1	0.7	
ŕ	adoptions you will to be seen and an executive or passed to the plants.	ade Venenae, and the Land of the Land of Confession of the Confess	Charges (with X and to personal Particular Ending	4×Coloratory designation designations	CONSCIONATION AND AND AND AND AND ASSESSMENT	Mathematic Applications of the control of the second	TOTAL TOTAL CONTROL OF THE PARTY OF THE PART	The second state of the second

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Traillation         22.3         4         1         100         Cambodia         65.3         1         6         160         163         1.3         1         6         160         Cambodia         65.3         1         1         6         160         Cambodia         65.3         1         1         6         160         7.5         1         1         6         160         7.5         1         1         6         160         7.5         1         1         6         160         7.5         1         7         6         160         7.5         1         7         6         160         7.5         1         7         6         160         7.5         1         7         6         160         7.5         1         7         7         7         7         7         9         1.0         7         7         1	1	53.7		က	143	Uganda	57.2	တ	က		
Traillation         29.23         1         1         180         Cambode         63.6         1         6         100         1.5           Traillation         2.14         1 <td></td> <td>32.3</td> <td>4</td> <td>-</td> <td>160</td> <td>Cambodia</td> <td>63.9</td> <td>-</td> <td>9</td> <td></td> <td></td>		32.3	4	-	160	Cambodia	63.9	-	9		
Trailand         22.4         1         6         180         Cambodia         64.6         4         6         160         1.5           Trailand         2.9         1         4         6         160         Cambodia         77.2         4         6         160         1.5           Trailand         2.2.3         1         4         6         160         Cambodia         77.2         4         6         160         2.5           Trailand         2.2.3         1         1         6         160         Los         160         2.5           Trailand         2.2.3         1         4         6         160         Los         160         2.5           Trailand         1.2.0         1         4         6         160         Los         160         2.5         1         1         6         160         2.5           Trailand         1.2.0         1         4         6         160         Los         160         2.5         1         160         2.5           Trailand         1.2.0         1         4         6         160         160         160         160         160         160		32.3			.091	Cambodia	63.9		9		
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Thisland   120   1 4   6   160   Lucos   550   1   1   6   160   Lucos   150   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1		12.0 1	4	9	160	Laos	65.0 1	-	9		
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Phalland         21,4         1         6         190         Lace (Patriol Like)         68.9         4         1         6         190         Lace (Patriol Like)         68.9         4         1         6         190         Lace (Verlent MO, C, DEV)         22.7         4         1         6         190         Lurisey         6         13.5         DRMK         1 <td></td> <td>21.4</td> <td>To the second se</td> <td>9</td> <td>160</td> <td>(Pathet</td> <td>67.7</td> <td>-</td> <td>9</td> <td></td> <td></td>		21.4	To the second se	9	160	(Pathet	67.7	-	9		
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Unitable         62.2         1.4         6.43         Straid         12.1         1         1         9         100           Unively         51.9         1         0         1         15.5         DPRK         9         100           Unively         51.9         1         0         1         15.5         DPRK         9         100           Unively         51.9         1         1         1         1         1         6         16         0         1           Unively         51.9         1         1         1         1         1         6         16         0         1           Univel Mingoli         55.2         2         3         1.43         Tanzania         65.2         4         4         9         16         1           United Kingoli         55.3         4         0         6         1         Agenthe Mingoli         1 </td <td><u>,                                     </u></td> <td>21.4</td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td>160</td> <td>O</td> <td>24.7 4</td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td></td> <td></td>	<u>,                                     </u>	21.4	-	-	160	O	24.7 4	-	-		
Unifely         61:9         1         155         DPRK         9         160           Unifely         61:9         1         1         155         Cheece         196         1         160         144         160         144         160         144         160         140         160         140         160         140         160         140         160         140         160         140         160         140         160         140         160         140         160         140         160         160         140         160 </td <td>88</td> <td>62.0</td> <td></td> <td>9</td> <td>143</td> <td>İsrael</td> <td>12.1</td> <td>1</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	88	62.0		9	143	İsrael	12.1	1			
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United Arab Emirates         23.3         4         0         6         143         Image Initiates         40.3         1         6         143         -0.7           United Kingdom         2.0         6         1         Aden Poiedrate         6.1         2         1         6         143         -0.5           United Kingdom         2.0         3         0         6         1         Cambool Belize (Belize (Belize (Belize))         6.1         1         6.1         1         0.5         1.0         0.5         1.0         0.5         1.0         0.5         1.0         0.5         1.0         0.5         1.0         0.5         1.0         0.5         1.0         0.5         1.0         0.5         1.0         0.5         1.0         0.5         1.0         0.5         1.0         0.5         1.0         0.5         1.0         0.5         1.0         0.0	Ġ.	65.1	0	3	143	Zaire	34.1	2	9		
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952 PREAH VIHEAR RAIDS 953 PREAH VIHEAR CLASHES 954 SECOND INDOCHINESE WAR 955 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 956 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 957 KOREAN WAR 958 MCKONG RIVER AIR RAID 960 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 961 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 962 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 963 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 964 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 965 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 965 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 966 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 966 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 967 YOM KIRPUR WAR 968 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 968 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 968 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 968 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 968 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 968 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 968 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 968 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 968 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 968 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 968 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 968 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 968 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 968 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 968 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR	11-Aug-1962 17-Nov-1965 01-Jul-1977 20-Jul-1977 01-Apr-1983 07-Dec-1950 01-Jun-1977 23-Dec-1978 08-Feb-1981 15-May-1984 20-Mar-1969	15-Aug-1962 27-Apr-1966 23-Jul-1970 27-Jun-1979	5 1 <b>62</b> 23	2	0 0	0.0	
PREAH VIHEAR CLASHES SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAT THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAT THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAT KOREAN WAR MEKONG RIVER AIR RAID THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAT THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAT THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAT THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAT THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAT SECOND	17-Nov-1965 01-Jul-1970 20-Jul-1977 01-Apr-1983 07-Dec-1993 17-Nov-1975 03-Jan-1977 23-Dec-1978 08-Feb-1991 15-May-1984 23-Jun-1969 23-Jun-1969	27-Apr-1966 23-Jui-1970 27-Jun-1979	1 <b>62</b> 23	2	0	0.0	
SECOND INDOCHINESE WAT THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAT THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAT KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAT THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAT THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAS SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAS WARRANT WAS THE WAS SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAS SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAS WARRANT WAS THE WAS SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAS WARRANT WAS SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAS SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAS WARRANT WAS SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAS WARRANT WAS SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAS WARRANT WAS SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAS WARRANT WAS SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAS SECOND IND	20-Jul-1970 20-Jul-1977 01-Apr-1983 07-Dec-1950 01-Jun-1951 01-Jun-1977 23-Dec-1978 08-Feb-1981 15-May-1964 23-Jun-1969 20-Mar-1970	23-Jul-1970 27-Jun-1979	23	Charles of a Colonial Solution of the Colonial Solution of the	White in all the mathematical in the service	dilita a tradución a definación tradución de ante	(1) 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1
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KOREAN WAR MEKONG RIVER AIR RAID THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR SECOND INDO-CHINESE W SECOND INDO-CHINESE W SECOND INDO-CHINESE W SECOND INDO-CHINESE W SECOND INDO-CHINESE W SECOND INDO-CHINESE W YOM KIPPUR WAR	01-Jun-1951 17-Nov-1975 03-Jan-1977 23-Dec-1978 08-Feb-1981 15-Jun-1969 20-Man-1970 19-Sep-1967	27-Jul-1953	964		09	0.1	
MEKONG RIVER AIR RAID THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR SECOND INDO-CHINESE W	17-Nov-1975 03-Jan-1977 23-Dec-1987 08-Feb-1981 15-May-1984 22-Jun-1969 20-Mar-1970 19-Sep-1967	27-Jul-1953	788	-	99	0.1	
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR SECOND INDO-CHINESE W SECOND INDO-CHINESE W SECOND INDO-CHINESE W YOM KIPPUR WAR KOHEAN WAR	03-Jan-1977 23-Dec-1978 08-Feb-1984 15-May-1984 23-Jun-1969 20-Mar-1970 19-Sep-1967	17-Nov-1975	-	3	0	0.0	
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAS SECOND INDO-CHINESE W SECOND INDO-CHINESE W SECOND INDO-CHINESE W YOM KIPPUR WAR KOREAN WAR	23-Dec-1978 08-Feb-1981 15-May-1984 23-Jun-1969 20-Mar-1970 19-Sep-1967	09-Feb-1977	38	4	0	0.0	
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAS SECOND INDO-CHINESE W SECOND INDO-CHINESE W SECOND INDO-CHINESE W YOM KIPPUR WAR KOREAM WAR	08-Feb-1981 15-May-1984 23-Jun-1969 20-Mar-1970 19-Sep-1967	24-Dec-1978	2	3	0	0.0	
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR YOM KIPPUR WAR KOREAN WAR	15-May-1984 23-Jun-1969 20-Mar-1970 19-Sep-1967	08-Feb-1981	-	4	0	0.0	
SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR YOM KIPPUR WAR KOREAN WAR	23-Jun-1969 20-Mar-1970 19-Sep-1967	19-Feb-1988	1376	2	100	1.0	1.9
SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR YOM KIPPUR WAR (In Egypt) KOREAN WAR	20-Mar-1970 19-Sep-1967	28-Jun-1969	9	-	0	0.0	
SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Egypt) KOREAN WAR	19-Sep-1967	27-Jan-1973	1045		8	0.1	
YOM KIPPUR WAR (In Egypt) KOREAN WAR	C1-C1	15-Apr-1972	1671	1	400	0.2	
KOREAN WAR	2/81-130-6	28-Oct-1973			0	0.0	0.3
VODEANI WAD	12-Oct-1950	27-Jul-1953	1020	Not probably designed by the second s	400	0.4	
	29-Nov-1950	27-Jul-1953	972		84	6.4	
CYPRIOT CIVIL WAR (in Cyprus)	25-Dec-1963	09-Aug-1964	229	-	-	0.0	0.7
	20-Jul-1974	25-Oct-1974	- 86		1000	10.2	0.5
372 MOMBASSA PORT BOYCOTT	01-Apr-1976	18-Apr-1976	18	2	0	0.0	0.8
OBOTE'S RESISTANCE	23-Aug-1971	1761-VoN-60	79	8	93	0.6	1.5
TANZANIAN-UGANDAN WAR	09-Oct-1978	30-Mar-1979	173	2	200	1.2	1.1
CONGOL ESE CIVIL WAR	15-Feb-1965	15-Feb-1965	-	2		10	-
GULF WAR	24-Feb-1991	28-Feb-1991	5	-	9	1.2	20.3 2
SOUTH ARABIAN REVOLT	15-Jun-1953	16-Oct-1959	2315	3	40	0.0	
	25-Apr-1982	20-Jun-1982	57	-	300	5.3	1.9
GUATEMALAN "INVASION"	21-Jan-1962	23-Jan-1962	3	2	0	0.0	2
FIRST INDO-CHINESE WAR	11-Oct-1945	07-Jan-1946	89	-	0	0.0	
381   ENOSIS MOVEMENT	10-Sep-1955	20-Feb-1959	1260		8	0,1	3.2
TURCO-CYPRIOT WAR	15-Jul-1974	30-Jul-1974	16	-	0	0.0	2.4 1
383 KOREAN WAR	28-Jun-1950	27-Jul-1953	1126	က	8	0.3	
	06-Jul-1950	27-Jul-1953	1118	က	300	0.3	
SUEZ WAR	31-Oct-1956	16-Nov-1956	17	3	ន	1.2	8.7
FIRST INDO-CHINESE WAR	30-Sep-1945	29-Nov-1946	426	-	009	1.4	
CONFRONTATION	30-Jul-1964	21-Nov-1965	480	2	5	0.0	12.2
CONFRONTATION (Malaysia)	11-Sep-1964	11-Aug-1966	700	-	0	0.0	12.2
GULFWAR	17-Jan-1991	15-Jul-1991	981	8	-10	0.1	18.0
_	17-Jan-1991	28-Feb-1991	43	က	10	0.2	16.0 2
391   PALESTINE WAR	28-Sep-1945	15-May-1948	961		200	0.2	
HENRY REBELLION	21-Jun-1960	27-Jun-1960	7	2	2	0.3	3.8 1
KENYAN ARMY MUTINY	24-Jan-1964	15-Apr-1964	83		0	0.0	12.2
MALAYAN INSURGENCY	18-Jun-1948	30-Jul-1960	4426	-	200	0.1	
CONFRONTATION	15-Aug-1963	11-Aug-1966	1093		8	1.0	4.6
CONFRONTATION (in Brunei)	10-Dec-1962	20-Dec-1962	=	-	<b>&amp;</b>	0.7	4.5
CONFRONTATION (in Sarawak)	12-Dec-1962	11-Aug-1966	1339		75	0.1	4.5
DHOFAR REBELLION	11-Jun-1970	17-Oct-1975	1955	2	20	0.0	1.3
399 MAM'S BEBEILION	7461-III-1957	09-Fah-1959	566	3	7	0.0	

United Kingdom         2.0         3         0         6         1           United Kingdom         2.0         3         0         6         1           United Kingdom         2.0         3         0         6         1           United Kingdom         2.0         3         0         6         1           United Kingdom         2.0         3         0         6         1           United States         1.0         1         0         6         19           United States         1.0         1         0         6								100 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Maria - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -	the state of the s	10. 10. 10. 10. 10. 10. 10. 10. 10. 10.	STORY THE PARTY OF	
Invalid Kingdom         20         6         1         Variant (Stewers Researchists)         47.1         1         9         3         13.3         2.5           Invalid Kingdom         20         3         0         6         1         Variant Alb Rapache         10.0         5         1         6         1.3         4.0           Invalid Kingdom         20         3         0         6         1         Vermin Alb Rapache         10.0         5         1         6         1.33         4.0           Invalid Kingdom         20         3         0         6         1         Vermin Alb Rapache         10.0         5         1         6         1.3         4.0           Invalid Kingdom         10         1         0         6         1         Vermin Alb Rapache         10.0         6         1.0         1         1         6         1         1         1         6         1	1.	2.0	ဇာ	0	9		Tanzania	8.L	8	9	143	-2.8 8	-2.4
United Kingstorm         1,0         3         0         1         Vernach Arab Researchistell         47.1         1         9         1,4         4.9		2.0	က	0	9	-	Uganda	65.1	0	ო	143	-2.5	-2.4
United States         1, 1         Verein Atail Papaulic         100.0         5         1         Verein Atail Papaulic         100.0         5         1         4, 4         4           United Kingdom         2.0         3         0         1         Verein Atail Papaulic         100.0         5         1         6         143         4, 0           United Kingdom         2.0         3         0         6         1         Verein Atail Papaulic         100.0         5         1         6         143         4, 0           United States         1,0         1         0         6         19         Carnoclal Devices         17, 1         1         6         19         Carnoclal Devices         17, 1         1         6         19         Carnoclal Devices         17, 1         1         10         1         10         1 <td></td> <td>1.0</td> <td>3</td> <td>0</td> <td>9</td> <td></td> <td>Vanuatu (Stevens Secessionists)</td> <td>47.1</td> <td>6</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>-1.9</td> <td>President of the second</td>		1.0	3	0	9		Vanuatu (Stevens Secessionists)	47.1	6			-1.9	President of the second
United Kingdorm         2.0         3         1         Verner Angle Robulle         1000.0         5         1         6         14.3         4.0           United Kingdorm         2.0         3         0         6         1         Verner Angle Robulle         1000.0         5         1         6         14.3         4.0           United States         1.0         1         0         6         1         Verner Angle Robulle         100.0         5         1         6         14.3         4.0           United States         1.0         1         0         6         19         Dam Rog Of Verterm         26.3         1         1         6         1.0         1         6         1.0         1.0         1         6         1.0         1         6         1.0         1.0         1         6         1.0         1.0         1         6         1.0<	;	2.0	က	0	9	n de de Company de Com	Yemen Arab Republic			A charles debrow because behave which	143	4.0	-2.4
United States         10         Vermin Atable Republic         100.0         5         1         Vermin Atable Republic         1         6         1         2         4         1         6         10         2         4         1         6         1         2         4         1         6         1         2         4         1         6         1         2         4         1         6         1         2         4         1         6         1         2         4         1         6         1         2         4         1         6         1         2         4         1         6         1         1         1         6         1         1         1         6         1         1         1         6         1	1.5	2.0	3	0	9		Yemen Arab Republic		3	9	143	4.0	-2.4
United States         10         6         11         Virtual Molphelity (CHI)         6         11         Carnotoda         61.1         4         4         6         10         24         10         2.2         10         2.4         1         6         10         2.4         1         6         10         10         10         2.4         1         6         10	:	2.0	3	0	9	-	Yemen Arab Republic	ar fadbari	addition is built and a section	6	143	-4.0	-2.4
United States         1.0         0         6         1.9         Carmboolide         1.1         4         1         6         2.9           United States         1.0         1         0         6         1.9         Down Report Olyveirem         7.1.7         1         6         2.9           United States         1.0         1         0         6         1.9         Down Report Olyveirem         2.2.7         4         1         6         1.9           United States         1.0         1         0         6         1.9         Down Report Olyveirem         2.2.7         4         1         6         1.9           United States         1.0         1         0         6         1.9         Down Report States         1         1         1.6         1.9         1.9         1.9         1.9         1.9         1.9         1.9         1.0 <th< td=""><td>1</td><td>2.0</td><td>3</td><td>0</td><td>9</td><td></td><td>Yemen Arab Republic</td><td></td><td></td><td>9</td><td>143</td><td>0.7</td><td>-2.4</td></th<>	1	2.0	3	0	9		Yemen Arab Republic			9	143	0.7	-2.4
United States         1,0         1         Dom't Rep Of Vietnam         71.7         1         100         1.0           United States         1,0         1         0         6         1.9         Dom't Rep Of Vietnam         25.5         4         1         160         1.0           United States         1,0         1         0         6         1.9         DOFFIX         4         4         1.0         1.0           United States         1,0         1         0         6         1.9         DOFFIX         6         1.0 </td <td></td> <td>1.0</td> <td>-</td> <td>0</td> <td>6</td> <td>19</td> <td>Cambodia</td> <td>and distribute</td> <td>and Southern State of State of State</td> <td>6</td> <td>160</td> <td>-2.4</td> <td>-2.4</td>		1.0	-	0	6	19	Cambodia	and distribute	and Southern State of State of State	6	160	-2.4	-2.4
United States         1,0         1         0         6         19         Dom/Index Please         1         1         1         10         1         <	les.	1.0		0	9	19	Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam				160	-2.9	-2,4
Universitations         10         1         0         19         Dam, Rejic Of Ventum         65         19         Dam, Rejic Of Ventum         61         4         1         65         19         DePRK         19	_	1.0	Title and " " It considerates, confere to Equation 19.	0	9	19	Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam	26.5 4	all designation of a social particle of	64 Nammer Name (Name (New Arts Andrews	160	-1.0	-2.4
United States         10         1         0         6         19         Dominican Rep. (Constitutionalists) 55.5         1         1         10         1         0         6         19         Dominican Rep. (Constitutionalists) 55.5         1         1         10         1         0         6         19         DPRK         6         19         DPRK         9         160         10 <td>200</td> <td>1.0</td> <td></td> <td>0</td> <td>9</td> <td>19</td> <td>532 F</td> <td>689</td> <td>-</td> <td></td> <td>160</td> <td>-2.5</td> <td>-2.4</td>	200	1.0		0	9	19	532 F	689	-		160	-2.5	-2.4
United States         1.0         1.0         DPRK         9         160           United States         1.0         1         0         6         1.9         DPRK         9         160           United States         1.0         1         0         6         1.9         DPRK         9         160           United States         1.0         1         0         6         1.9         DPRK         7         4         0         6         1.9           United States         1.0         1         0         6         1.9         DPRK         2.7         4         0         6         1.9           United States         1.0         1         0         6         1.9         Indept         4.0         1         1.6         1.9         1.0         1		1.0	-	0	9	19	Dominican Rep. (Constitutionalists	35.5	4	-	156	-1.3	-2.3
United States         10         6         19         DPRK         9         160           United States         10         1         0         6         19         DPRK         9         160           United States         10         1         0         6         19         DPRK         27         4         9         160           United States         1.0         1         0         6         19         India         227         4         9         19           United States         1.0         1         0         6         19         India         40.3         1         1         6         19           United States         1.0         1         0         6         19         India         40.3         1         1         6         19         10.4         1         1.0         1         1.0         1         1.0         1         1.0         1         1.0         1         1.0         1.0         1         1.0         1         1.0         1         1.0         1         1.0         1         1.0         1         1.0         1         1.0         1         1.0         1         1.		1.0		6		19	DPRK	and the Carbinate	6	All the second s	160		-2.4
United States         10         1         0         6         19         DPRK         6         19         Inan         40.3         1         9         6         19         Inan         40.3         1         9         6         19         Inan         40.3         1         9         6         19         Inan         40.3         1         1         6         13         1.1         6         13         1.1         6         14.3         1.6         1.9         1.1         1.0         1         1.0         6         19         Inan         40.3         1         1         6         19         Inan         40.3         1         1         6         19         Inan         40.3         1	Ξ	1.0	Amerika Mada Maria	ACCOUNTS FO AND SO	9	19	DPRK	C. 138 is secular for an analysis of the	6		160	Sulphities land for the definition of the	-2.4
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United States         10         6         19         Iraq         403         1         1         2.5           United States         10         1         0         6         19         Iraq         403         1         1         6         143         -116           United States         1.0         1         0         6         19         Ling         403         1         6         143         -16           United States         1.0         1         0         6         19         Ling         435         1         3         6         143         -17           United States         1.0         1         0         6         19         Ling         435         1         3         6         143         -17           United States         1.0         1         0         6         19         Ling         2         1         6         143         -17           United States         1.0         1         0         6         19         Ling         40         6         143         -143         -143         -143         -143         -144         -14         -143         -144         -143	120	1,0		0	9	19	Grenada	2.7	0	9	37	F 0=	-0.3
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United States         10         1         0         6         19         Iraq         403         1         1         6         143         -1.6           United States         10         1         0         6         19         Iraq         403         1         1         6         143         -1.6           United States         1.0         1         0         6         19         Panema         61.5         2         1         2         1         2         1         1.7         1.7           United States         1.0         1         0         6         19         Panema         11.2         2         1         2         2         1         2         1.7           United States         1.0         1         0         6         19         Panema         1.6         2         1         2         1.7         1.7           United States         1.0         1         0         6         19         Fabrical         7.2         4         6         1.7         1.7           United States         1.0         1         0         6         1         1.0         1.7         1.7         1.7 <td>Sud</td> <td>1.0</td> <td></td> <td>0</td> <td>9</td> <td>19</td> <td>Irad</td> <td>40.3</td> <td>1</td> <td>8</td> <td>143</td> <td>-1.6</td> <td>-2.1</td>	Sud	1.0		0	9	19	Irad	40.3	1	8	143	-1.6	-2.1
United States         1,0         1         0         6         19         Irag         40.5         1         1         6         143         4,6         1.2         4         1.5         2.4           United States         1,0         1         0         6         19         Lbya         43.5         1         3         6         143         -1.7           United States         1,0         1         0         6         19         Panenna         43.5         1         2         2.4         -1.7           United States         1,0         1         0         6         19         Panenna         11.2         2         1         2         2.1         2.4         1         1         0         6         19         Panenna         4.35         1         2         1.7         1         0         6         1.9         Lbya         1         1         0         6         1.9         Lbya         1         1         0         6         1.9         Lbya         1         1         0         1.4         1         0         1         1         0         1.4         1.4         1.4         1.4         1.4	1	1.0		0	6	19	Later with the processor of the parameter  40.3	Control of the Control of Control	6	143	-1.6	-2.1	
United States         10         6         19         Liberia         60.5         1         3         4         151         2.4           United States         10         1         0         6         19         Liberia         75.9         1         2         12         2.1         2         17         1.7         1.0         1         0         6         19         Rop. Of Vietnam         11.2         2         1         2         1.2         2         1.0         1.0         1         0         6         1.9         Rop. Of Vietnam         11.0         0         6         1.9         Rop. Of Vietnam         1         0         0         1.1         0         0         1.1         0         0         1.1         2         1.9         1.0         1.0	180	1.0		0	9	19	Irad	40.3		9	143	9.1-	2.1
United States         10         1         0         6         19         Lbya         435         1         3         6         143         -177         4         0         1         0         43         PRo-Of Vietnam         165         2         1         5         121         0.4         4.0         1         0         4.0         1         1         0         4.0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         1         0         1         0         1         0         1         0         1         0         1         0         1         0         1         0         1         0         1         0         1         0         1         0         1         <	-	1.0	Mills merically systematic	0	9	19	Liberia	60.5	3	4	151	-2.4	-2.2
United States         1,0         1         0         6         19         Paname         112         2         1         2         212         0,4           United States         1,0         1         0         6         19         Rap, Of Verlanm         7.59         1         4         6         150         -1.1           United States         1,0         1         0         6         19         Tawan         7.59         1         4         6         151         4.0         1         1         10         -1.1         10         1         1         0         1         1         4         6         151         4         6         151         4         6         151         1         4         6         151         1         0         6         151         1         6         151         1         6         143         1         6         147         1         6         143         1         6         143         1         6         143         1         6         143         1         6         147         1         6         143         1         6         143         1         6 <td< td=""><td>18 5 5</td><td>1.0</td><td></td><td>0</td><td>9</td><td>19</td><td>Libya</td><td>43.5</td><td>3</td><td>9</td><td>143</td><td>1.7</td><td>-2.1</td></td<>	18 5 5	1.0		0	9	19	Libya	43.5	3	9	143	1.7	-2.1
United States         1.0         6         19         Pago Of Vietnam         16.6         2         1         6         10           United States         1.0         1         0         6         19         Rep. Of Vietnam         75.9         1         6         15         16         1.1           United States         1.0         1         0         6         7.5         4         6         15         160         -1.1           United States         1.0         1         0         6         7.5         1         4         6         151         1.6         1.7         1.6         1.1         1.7         1.7         1.6         1.7         1.6         1.7         1.6         1.1         1.7         1.6         1.1         1.7		1.0	-	0	9	19	Panama	11.2 2	_	2	212	-0.4	-3.3
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United States         1,0         1         0         6         151           USSR         1,0         1         0         6         Aginanstan         61.8         1         4         6         151           USSR         0         1         China         China         50.9         5         1         6         151           USSR         0         1         China         China         60         1         4         6         151           USSR         1         0         1         2         158         Quyana         8.4         4         6         143           USSR         25.5         1         1         2         158         Quyana         8.4         4         6         143           Vernen Arab Republic         87.5         4         6         143         United Kingdom         3.0         3         0         1         3.9           Vernen Arab Republic         83.8         5         1         6         143         Vernen Republic         75.1         5         4         6         143         Vernen Republic         75.1         5         4         6         143         Vernen Republic <td>Ž.</td> <td>0.5</td> <td></td> <td>0</td> <td></td> <td>19</td> <td>Somalia</td> <td>75.9</td> <td>*</td> <td>9</td> <td>ষ্ঠ</td> <td>-3.0</td> <td>61.</td>	Ž.	0.5		0		19	Somalia	75.9	*	9	ষ্ঠ	-3.0	61.
USSR         0         6         Alginalisaria         91B         1         4         6         147           USSR         1         China         China         China         China         519         5         1         6         151           USSR         205         1         1         2         Hungary         31         1         9         6         143           USSR         23.5         1         1         2         1         6         143         Saud Araba         84         1         9         6         143         12         12         1         6         143         Saud Araba         9         6         143         1         9         6         143         1         1         9         6         143         11         1         6         143         Saud Araba         9         0         6         143         1         6         143         United Kingdom         30         3         0         6         143         1         8         1         6         143         Vernen Paopie's Republic         8         1         6         143         Vernen Paopie's Republic         8         1         6 </td <td></td> <td>1.0</td> <td>-</td> <td>0</td> <td></td> <td>19</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>0</td> <td>9</td> <td>151</td> <td></td> <td>-2.2</td>		1.0	-	0		19			0	9	151		-2.2
USSRI         Onna         United size         China         50.9         5         1         6         151           USSR         USSR         0         1         Venean People's Republic (All Factio 76.4         4         4         6         143           Venear Arab Republic         87.5         4         1         2         158         Guyana         8.4         1         9         6         143           Vennen Arab Republic         87.5         4         1         6         143         Dunted Kingdom         3.0         9         0         1         3.9           Vennen Arab Republic         86.2         5         4         6         143         United Kingdom         3.0         3         0         1         3.9           Vennen Arab Republic         85.6         5         1         6         143         Vennen People's Republic         8.3         5         1         6         143           Vennen Arab Republic         87.5         5         4         6         143         Vennen People's Republic         8.3         5         1         6         143           Vennen People's Republic         87.5         5         4         6				0	9		П	87.8	4	9	147		
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Yemen Arab Republic         100.0         5         1         6         143         United Kingdom         3.0         3         0         1         3.9           Yemen Arab Republic         96.2         5         4         6         143         United Kingdom         3.0         3         0         1         3.9           Yemen Arab Republic         83.8         5         1         6         143         Yemen People's Republic         75.1         5         4         6         143         Yemen People's Republic         75.1         5         4         6         143         Yemen People's Republic         87.8         4         6         143         Yemen People's Republic         87.8         4         0         6         143         Yemen People's Republic         87.8         4         0         6         143         Yemen Arab Republic         85.1         5         1         6         143         Yemen Arab Republic         75.1         5 <td< td=""><td>182</td><td>1000</td><td>+ <b>L</b></td><td>- •</td><td>o <b>(</b></td><td>£71</td><td>Saudi Alabia Ilbitad Kinodom</td><td></td><td></td><td>P</td><td><b>?</b></td><td>3.9</td><td>0.0</td></td<>	182	1000	+ <b>L</b>	- •	o <b>(</b>	£71	Saudi Alabia Ilbitad Kinodom			P	<b>?</b>	3.9	0.0
Yemen Arab Republic         96.2         5         4         6         14.3         Vernen Arab Republic         83.8         5         1         6         14.3         Yemen People's Republic         83.8         5         1         6         14.3         Yemen People's Republic         75.1         5         4         6         14.3         Oman People's Republic         75.1         5         4         6         14.3         Oman People's Republic         75.8         4         6         14.3         Oman People's Republic         75.8         4         0         6         14.3         0.0           Yemen People's Republic         87.5         5         1         6         14.3         Sandt Arabia         57.8         4         0         6         14.3         1.1           Yemen People's Republic         76.4         5         1         6         14.3         Yemen Arab Republic         75.1         5         1         6         14.3         Yemen Arab Republic         75.1         5         4         0.0         6         14.3         0.0           Yemen People's Republic         75.1         5         4         6         14.3         Yemen Arab Republic         75.1         5         3	200	100.0	5		9	143	United Kingdom	COMPANY.	C		SCHOOL SCHOOL STATES	3.9	24
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407 SOUTH ARABIAN REVOLT	08~Jun-1956	08-Jul-1958	761	3	0	0.0	
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413 KOREAN WAR	27-Jun-1950	27-Jul-1953	1127	3	30000	26.6	
•	30-Jun-1950	27-Jul-1953	1124	ဇ	30000	26.7	
415 KOREAN CONFLICT	29-Jul-1963	03-Nov-1963	- 86		3	0.0	
416 KOREAN CONFLICT	18-Nov-1965	18-Oct-1969	1431	-	40	0.0	
417 GRENADA INVASION	25-Oct-1983	15-Dec-1983	52	-	8	0.4	13.7
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443 OGADEN WAR (in Etniopia)	15-Jan-1978	12-Sep-1978	241	-	2	0.0	
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445 NDF INVASION	24-Feb-1979	19-Mar-1979	24	1	-10	0.4	
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In Chapter 3 we referred to the distributions of culture scores for both intervenors and targets. These are listed below as Figure 1 and Figure 2.




Figure 1. Intervenor Culture z-Score




Figure 2. Target Culture z-Score

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

A consistent recent theme sounded by defense policymakers and commentators is the difficulty of planning under conditions of strategic uncertainty. Many worry about the challenge of economic development in potential adversaries coupled with proliferation of advanced conventional weapons. They argue that those trends could place U.S. security at risk by fostering the emergence of regional hegemons or even near-peer competitors. We argue this is not necessarily the case. This is because two often overlooked factors, civil-military relations and culturally-based organizational norms, may act to systematically constrain a recipient country's ability to attain and maintain the skill needed to take advantage of these assets. We test this hypothesis in a large-*n* study and present the implications of our findings for defense policy and analysis.

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